Woodard v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 26 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:18-cv-445-MMH-JBT |
| Parties | LESTER WOODARD, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Lester Woodard, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on March 30, 2018,1 by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1). In the Petition, Woodard challenges a 2003 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and dealing in stolen property. Woodard asserts five grounds as his basis for seeking relief. See Petition at 12-23.2 Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Response (Response; Doc. 17) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). Woodard filed a briefin reply. See Petitioner's Reply to Respondents Response Under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(d) and (c) Evidentiary Hearing Requested (Reply; Doc. 19). This case is ripe for review.
On July 7, 2003, the State of Florida (State) charged Woodard with burglary of an unoccupied dwelling (count one) and dealing in stolen property (count two). Resp. Ex. 1 at 23. Following a trial, a jury found Woodard guilty as charged, with a specific finding as to count one that the structure Woodard burglarized was a dwelling. Id. at 56-57. On September 8, 2003, the circuit court adjudicated Woodard to be a habitual felony offender (HFO) and prison releasee reoffender (PRR) and sentenced him to a term of incarceration of thirty years in prison, with fifteen-year minimum mandatory sentences as to both counts. Id. at 77-83. The circuit court ordered count two to run concurrently to count one. Id.
Woodard appealed his convictions and sentences to Florida's First District Court of Appeal (First DCA). Id. at 95. His appellate counsel filed an Anders3 brief, see Resp. Ex. 4, and Woodard filed a pro se initial brief, in which he asserted there was insufficient evidence to convict him of both counts, seeResp. Ex. 5. On September 20, 2004, the First DCA per curiam affirmed Woodard's convictions and sentences. Resp. Ex. 6.
On January 24, 2005, Woodard filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). Resp. Ex. 7 at 1-26. In the Rule 3.850 Motion, Woodard argued that his counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to suppress (ground one) and two motions to dismiss (grounds two and three). Id. Woodard further argued that police illegally interrogated him (ground four) and violated his Fourth Amendment rights (ground five). Id. On March 3, 2006, the circuit court denied relief on the Rule 3.850 Motion. Id. at 27-30. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of relief without issuing a written opinion on June 23, 2006, and issued the mandate on August 29, 2006. Resp. Ex. 9.
On October 26, 2006, Woodard filed a second Rule 3.850 Motion (Second Rule 3.850 Motion). Resp. Ex. 10 at 1-52. In the Second Rule 3.850 Motion, he raised various claims that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they searched his residence and his personal property. Id. The circuit court denied the motion. Id. at 53-54. Woodard moved for rehearing, which the circuit court also denied. Id. at 55-62. On September 5, 2007, the First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of relief, and on October 4, 2007, issued the mandate. Resp. Ex. 12.
On August 28, 2008, Woodard filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to § 2254. Resp. Ex. 13. The district court denied the petition on August 11, 2011. Resp. Ex. 14. Thereafter, on June 27, 2013, Woodard returned to state court and filed a third motion for postconviction relief (Third Rule 3.850 Motion), which he later amended. Resp. Ex. 15 at 1-22. In the Third Rule 3.850 Motion, Woodard argued that the circuit court failed to give a requested jury instruction. Id. On March 25, 2015, the circuit court denied relief. Id. at 33-38. Woodard appealed the decision but on May 27, 2015, he voluntarily dismissed that appeal. Resp. Ex. 16.
On May 11, 2015, Woodard filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) (Rule 3.800(a) Motion), in which he contended that his adjudication as an PRR on count two was illegal. Resp. Ex. 17 at 1-4. On April 5, 2017, the circuit court granted the motion and struck the PRR fifteen-year minimum mandatory term as to count two but left the remaining aspects of the sentences intact. Resp. Ex. 18 at 1-2. Woodard filed a successive federal habeas petition, which the district court dismissed without prejudice and instructed Woodard to seek authorization from the Eleventh Circuit. Resp. Ex. 19. Woodard sought such authorization, but the Eleventh Circuit determined he did not need authorization because his petition was not successive in light of the fact that the state court had entereda new judgment when it granted his Rule 3.800(a) Motion. Resp. Ex. 20. Woodard then filed the instant Petition.
This proceeding was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can "adequately assess [Woodard's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has instructed:
[T]he federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.
If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:
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