Woodard v. Wainwright

• Decision Date: 29 July 1977
• Docket Number: Nos. 76-3418,76-3664,s. 76-3418
• Citation: 556 F.2d 781
• Parties: Wayne WOODARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louis L. WAINWRIGHT, Respondent-Appellee. Eddie BELL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louis L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary of Department of Offender Rehabilitation, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 781

556 F.2d 781

Wayne WOODARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louis L. WAINWRIGHT, Respondent-Appellee.

Eddie BELL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louis L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary of Department of Offender

Rehabilitation, Respondent-Appellee.

Nos. 76-3418, 76-3664.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

July 29, 1977.

Craig S. Barnard, Asst. Public Defender, 15th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, West Palm Beach, Fla., for Woodard and Bell.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Anthony J. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, Fla., for Wainwright in both cases.

Richard P. Zaretsky, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Dept. of Legal Affairs), West Palm Beach, Fla., for Wainwright in 76-3418.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before MORGAN and RONEY, Circuit Judges, and KING, ^* District Judge.

JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge:

In these cases we review orders of two United States District Courts denying separate applications for writs of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Both cases present the single issue of the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. Section 39.02(5)(c) which automatically divests Florida Juvenile Courts from their normal jurisdiction over juveniles upon the latter's indictment by a grand jury for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. ¹

Petitioner Woodard was indicted as an adult for false imprisonment, assault and robbery, the latter offense punishable by imprisonment for life. ² At the time Woodard was indicted by the grand jury, he was 16 years of age and would normally have been treated as a juvenile. ³ He unsuccessfully challenged, in the trial court, the constitutionality of Section 39.02(5)(c) which authorized the state to indict and try him as an adult. Subsequently, Woodard pleaded guilty to the robbery charge and was sentenced as an adult to five years in the Division of Corrections. The conviction was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court, ⁴ and Woodard's habeas petition was denied by the District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Petitioner Bell was 16 years old when he was indicted by a grand jury for one count of robbery. He pleaded guilty to assault with intent to commit robbery, an offense punishable by up to 20 years imprisonment, ⁵ and received a sentence of six months to 15 years. The District Court of Appeal affirmed Bell's conviction and upheld the constitutionality of Section 39.02(5)(c). ⁶ Bell petitioned the Middle District of Florida for habeas corpus relief. That court correctly decided that Bell's failure to appeal to the Florida Supreme Court did not amount to a failure to exhaust state remedies, because controlling state precedent ⁷ made such an appeal futile. ⁸ The habeas petition was denied, and Bell appealed.

In Chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1975), the Florida legislature enacted a comprehensive procedure for the treatment of offenders 18 years of age or younger. ⁹ The Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court is given "exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to be dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision." Fla.Stat. § 39.02(1) (1975). There are three exceptions to this exclusive original jurisdiction which provide for treatment of a juvenile as an adult. Under the first exception, a child 14 years of age or older may be certified for trial as an adult by a juvenile judge following a waiver hearing. ¹⁰ § 39.02(5)(a). Or a child may, joined by his parent or guardian, demand to be tried as an adult. § 39.02(5)(b). Finally, "(a) child of any age charged with a violation of Florida law punishable by death or life imprisonment" shall be tried as an adult "(if) an indictment on such charge is returned by the grand jury". § 39.02(5)(c). It is the constitutionality of the third exception that is challenged on appeal.

In essence petitioners assert that Section 39.02(5)(c) is unconstitutional because the decision to treat a juvenile offender as an adult should not be made without a hearing, with attendant right to counsel, confrontation of adverse witnesses, and findings of fact by a judge. In contrast to Section 39.02(5)(a) which provides for a hearing, Section 39.02(5)(c) requires only that a grand jury returned an indictment on a serious charge, whereupon the juvenile is automatically removed from the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. A prosecutor in the exercise of his discretion, may seek such an indictment against a juvenile, and if he is successful, the juvenile will be treated as an adult.

Petitioners argue that this automatic waiver of juvenile jurisdiction resulting from a grand jury indictment violates the due process standards mandated by the Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). They assert that those standards include a hearing with right to counsel, confrontation, and findings of fact.

In Kent, a minor in custody admitted several incidents of housebreaking, robbery and rape. The Juvenile Court for the District of Columbia waived jurisdiction without hearing and ordered the defendant tried as an adult. A statute then in force in the District of Columbia permitted such waivers "after full investigation" for minors over sixteen charged with felonies. ¹¹ The defendant's conviction as an adult in the District Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the "critical question" of whether a minor should be treated as an adult should not be answered without a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports . . . and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision. We believe that this result is required by the statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel. 383 U.S. at 557, 86 S.Ct. at 1055, 16 L.Ed.2d at 95 (footnote omitted).

The exact basis for this holding is not clear; however, as we noted in Brown v. Wainwright, 537 F.2d 154, 155 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976),

(a)lthough the Supreme Court does not make explicit whether its holding in Kent is based on the District of Columbia statute involved in that case or on a constitutional mandate, courts have interpreted Kent to hold that the requirement of counsel at a juvenile waiver hearing is constitutionally required. (citing cases)

There is support for this interpretation in Kent where the Court said, "we do hold that the hearing (to be held) must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." 383 U.S. at 562, 86 S.Ct. at 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d at 97-98 (citation omitted). However, it remains unclear whether the hearing required in Kent was constitutionally mandated or whether it was based on the "full investigation" requirement of the former District of Columbia Statute.

In any event, we do not have to decide that issue because Kent is distinguishable from the instant case. Kent concerned a statutory duty by a juvenile court judge to investigate and hear matters relevant to the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, whereas this case concerns the prosecutor's discretionary act to present his case to a grand jury. ¹²

Facing the Kent decision, several of our sister circuits have upheld the constitutionality of statutes similar to Florida's which permit juveniles to be treated as adults without a hearing in certain instances. In United States v. Bland, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 472 F.2d 1329 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909, 93 S.Ct. 2294, 36 L.Ed.2d 975 (1973), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a new District of Columbia Juvenile Code which permitted a prosecutor, for certain enumerated offenses, to charge juvenile offenders as adults without need for a hearing. Then in Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869, 94 S.Ct. 183, 38 L.Ed.2d 116 (1973), the Fourth Circuit held that the decision by a United States Attorney to charge a juvenile as an adult was "a prosecutorial decision beyond the reach of the due process rights of counsel and a hearing." 473 F.2d at 335. The panel in United States v. Quinones, 516 F.2d 1309 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 852, 96 S.Ct. 97, 46 L.Ed.2d 76 (1975), agreed with Cox that "the Attorney General (can) decide whether to proceed against a juvenile as an adult (without) a due process hearing." 516 F.2d at 1311. Finally, in Russel v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976), the Eighth Circuit agreed that under the "widely accepted concept of prosecutorial discretion, which derives from the constitutional principle of separation of powers(,)" a Nebraska statute permitting a minor to be charged either as an adult or a juvenile was not unconstitutional. 543 F.2d at 1216. Nor have state courts been inclined to find that juvenile jurisdiction waiver statutes without provision for a hearing are necessarily unconstitutional in view of Kent. ¹³

We are persuaded by respondents' argument that treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, therefore the legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification is involved. ¹⁴ Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, grants to certain persons age eighteen or younger the right to be charged and tried as juveniles. The section does not grant that right to persons indicted by the grand jury for crimes punishable by life imprisonment or death. This is a legislative classification "entitled to a strong presumption of validity (which) may be 'set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify (it).' " ¹⁵ No showing has been made that the classification is arbitrary or discriminatory. Doubtless the Florida legislature considered carefully the rise in the number of crimes committed by juveniles as well as the growing recidivist...