Woodburn v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs.

• Decision Date: 01 December 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 09–20981–CIV.
• Citation: 854 F.Supp.2d 1184
• Parties: Deotha WOODBURN et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

854 F.Supp.2d 1184

Deotha WOODBURN et al., Plaintiffs,

v.STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES et al., Defendants.

Case No. 09–20981–CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Dec. 1, 2011.

Howard M. Talenfeld, Stacie J. Schmerling, Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlinsky, & Abate, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Monica Galindo Stinson, Office of Attorney General, Charles M. Fahlbusch, Attorney General Office, Craig S. Hudson, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman Goggin, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Blake S. Sando, John Cody German, Cole Scott & Kissane, Cynthia A. Everett, Cynthia A. Everett, P.A., Miami, FL, for Defendants.

OMNIBUS ORDER ON ALL DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES' MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

ROBERT N. SCOLA, JR., District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaints and Defendant State of Florida Department of Children and Family Services' Motion to Stay Proceedings. After considering the written submissions and arguments of the parties, and for reasons more fully set forth below, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Defendants Our Kids, Inc. & Frances Allegra's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Lanaza's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 169) is granted in part and denied in part.

2. Defendant State of Florida Department of Children and Family Services' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Lanaza's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 170) is granted in part and denied in part.

3. Defendant State of Florida Department of Children and Family Services' Motion to Stay Proceedings on Counts IX and X of Plaintiff Lanaza's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 188) is denied as moot.

4. Defendants One Hope United, Inc. and Nakeitha Sweeting Hodrick's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Lanaza's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 171) is granted in part and denied in part.

5. Defendant Estate of Olga Rojas' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Lanaza's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 211) is denied.

6. Plaintiff Deotha Woodburn's Second Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice with regard to all Defendants.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Deotha Woodburn (“Woodburn”) initially brought a pro se action on behalf of Plaintiff Soung Lanaza (“Lanaza”) and herself on March 30, 2009 against various defendants, some of which are no longer parties to this suit, in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York. That court found that venue was improper, and transferred the case to the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2011). After Woodburn filed an Amended Complaint, this court granted Plaintiffs' Motions to proceed in forma pauperis, and appointed counsel for Lanaza, while denying Woodburn's request for appointment of counsel. Woodburn continues to act pro se, and each Plaintiff now acts on her own behalf. Both Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, 2d Am. Compl., May 4, 2011, ECF No. 149, which all Defendants have presently moved to dismiss.¹

FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

Soung Lanaza is a minor child, bora in Florida in February of 1994 and currently residing in New York. Deotha Woodburn is Lanaza's aunt, one-time foster caregiver, and current legal guardian. At all times material to this action, Woodburn resided in New York. According to an early medical determination, Lanaza was exposed to illegal substances in the womb, which caused damages to her fetal development. Lanaza allegedly suffers from mental and physical disabilities due to this exposure. Shortly after her birth, Lanaza was adjudicated dependent and became a ward of the State of Florida, in the legal custody of the State of Florida Department of Children and Family Services (“DCF”), the agency charged by Florida law with operating the state foster care system. She remained a ward of the State until 2010. She allegedly lived in a shelter until 1995, when she was moved to a group home supervised by one Delcita Bartley. Lanaza allegedly lived in the Bartley group home until 1999, when, pursuant to the Interstate Compact for the Protection of Children (“ICPC”), Woodburn became Lanaza's foster caregiver, and Lanaza moved to New York City. Under the terms of the ICPC, Lanaza remained a ward of the State of Florida during her time in Woodburn's care. On April 7, 2010, Woodburn became Lanaza's legal guardian, and Lanaza was no longer in the legal custody of DCF.

Olga Rojas (“Rojas”) was a DCF Family Services Counselor assigned to Lanaza's case (Rojas is deceased, and this action continues against her Estate, hereinafter “Estate”). Our Kids, Inc. (“Our Kids”) is a private corporation under a contract with DCF to provide community-based foster care services in Miami–Dade County. Frances Allegra (“Allegra”) is the executive director of Our Kids. One Hope United, Inc. (“One Hope”) is a private corporation under subcontract with Our Kids to provide foster case management services. Nakeitha Sweeting Hodrick (“Hodrick”) was the vice president and director of One Hope at all material times.

LEGAL STANDARD: MOTIONS TO DISMISS

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its own face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). While a court must accept well-pled facts as true, it need not assume the truth of conclusory allegations, nor are plaintiffs entitled to have the court view unwarranted deductions of fact or argumentative inferences in their favor. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (mere “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986); Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam). In order to be “minimally sufficient,” a complaint must put the defendant on notice of the claims against him. Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 288 Fed.Appx. 597, 603 (11th Cir.2008); see also City of Fort Lauderdale v. Scott, 773 F.Supp.2d 1355, 1362 (S.D.Fla.2011) (“Under the Iqbal standard, a plaintiff must allege facts which put each defendant on notice of the claims against him.”). Moreover, a complaint will not suffice if it tenders “ ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)); see also id. at 1945 (holding that well-pled complaint “demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955)). The Supreme Court also held that this standard applies to all civil actions. Id. at 1953.

The Eleventh Circuit has held that “ [p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Shuler v. Ingram & Assocs., 441 Fed.Appx. 712, 717 n. 3 (11th Cir.2011) (quoting Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir.2006)); Milton v. Turner, 445 Fed.Appx. 159, 161–62 (11th Cir.2011) (quoting Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.2008)). However, “the leniency afforded pro se litigants does not give courts license to serve as de facto counsel or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Shuler, 441 Fed.Appx. at 717 (citation omitted).

CLAIMS OF LANAZA

In her ten-count Second Amended Complaint, Lanaza brings the following claims: (1) claims for negligence against Our Kids, One Hope, and DCF, 2d Am. Compl. 19:1, 23:15, 44:11 (Counts I, II, IX); (2) claims under Fla. Stat. § 393.13 against Our Kids, One Hope, and DCF, Id. at 28:4, 30:1, 48:16 (Counts III, IV X); (3) claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Our Kids, Allegra, One Hope, Hodrick, and the Estate, Id. at 31:19, 35:5, 39:12 (Counts V, VI, VII); and (4) a claim for “estoppel/restitution” against DCF and Our Kids, Id. at 42:7 (Count VIII).

Lanaza alleges that DCF failed to place her in a home for two weeks, resulting in her being left in a shelter for longer than intended under applicable standards; that DCF and Rojas kept her in a group home despite legal requirements and prevailing practices prioritizing placement with relatives; that DCF failed to ensure that an effective case plan was in effect, and failed to ensure that she received developmental services during her time in foster care; that DCF and Rojas allowed her to deteriorate in the Bartley group home, leading to medical and developmental harm that DCF and Rojas further failed to evaluate and treat; and that DCF failed to timely terminate parental rights and facilitate adoption. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 31, 35, 37, 39, 4647, 50. Additionally, Lanaza alleges that on March 3, 1998, DCF represented to Woodburn that she would receive the foster care board rate and Lanaza's Social Security disability benefits (“SSI benefits”) upon becoming her caregiver. Lanaza states DCF intended to induce Woodburn's reliance, and that Woodburn did in fact rely upon DCF's statement. She then alleges that in July of 2002, DCF applied to become and did become the representative payee for her SSI benefits, changing its position, and applied the money to its own institutional benefit, causing her to suffer as a result of a lack of sufficient financial support. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40–41, 5657.

Lanaza alleges that Our Kids reviewed her case file in 2005 “as part of the transition to community based care,” and found “serious deficiencies” in the case's handling. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 62. Additionally, she alleges that on January 23, 2008, Our Kids replaced DCF as the representative payee of Lanaza's SSI benefits by misrepresenting that she did not live with relatives, despite the fact that...