Woodcock v. Correct Care Sols., LLC
| Decision Date | 04 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:16-cv-00096-GFVT |
| Parties | BRIAN WOODCOCK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
This case is primarily about the adequacy of medical treatment for state inmates with chronic Hepatitis C (HCV) viral infections. Plaintiffs challenge whether the failure of current Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC) policies and protocols to timely provide Direct Acting Antiviral drugs (DAA) to treat all HCV inmates constitutes deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, or otherwise constitutes negligence or gross negligence. In response, Defendants contend KDOC's HCV treatment policies and protocols are objectively reasonable and are the result of subjective medical judgment. The Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' claims, and for the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the Defendants' motion as to the claims under the Rehabilitation Act and American with Disabilities Act and the § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim and REMANDS the Plaintiffs' remaining state law Negligence and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claims for further consideration by the state court.
This case began in 2015 in Franklin Circuit Court in Franklin County, Kentucky. [R. 38 at 1.] Mr. Salinas filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus against then-Commissioner LaDonna Thompson, asking the Court to order treatment for his HCV infection. [Id. at 1-2]. On November 14, 2016, Mr. Salinas filed an Amended Class Action Complaint, naming additional plaintiffs and defendants. [Id. at 2]. The case was removed to this Court on December 7, 2016. [R. 1.] On August 18, 2017, Ms. Lawrence moved to intervene, adding Mr. Erwin as an additional defendant. [R. 33.] Magistrate Judge Edward B. Atkins permitted intervention. [R. 35.] On March 1, 2018, Plaintiffs filed motions to certify their class under Rule 23(b)(2). On July 12, 2019, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion & Order that certified the Plaintiffs' class of "all inmates in Kentucky prisons who have been diagnosed, or will be diagnosed, with chronic hepatitis C virus (HCV) for the purpose of injunctive relief." [R. 162 at 22.] Also, this Court appointed Plaintiffs Salinas and Lawrence as class representatives, appointed Plaintiff Class's counsel, and denied Plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction. [Id.]
The Plaintiffs in this matter are inmates, incarcerated with the Kentucky Department of Corrections. [R. 1-2 at ¶ 3.] Each of them have been diagnosed with the Hepatitis C virus. [Id.] Defendants are various official and nonofficial entities, all sued in their individual capacities, charged with managing the HCV treatment plan for and providing care to inmates. [R. 1-2 at ¶¶ 5-15.] Defendant James Erwin was the former Commissioner of the KDOC, responsible for its operations, policies, and employment. [R. 36 at ¶ 4; R. 178.] The original Plaintiffs did not sue Mr. Erwin, but he was added to this lawsuit by Intervening Plaintiff Jessica Lawrence. However,Plaintiffs have recently dismissed Defendant James Erwin from the suit in his individual capacity. [R. 186.] Defendants Rodney Ballard and LaDonna Thompson are former Commissioners of the KDOC. [Id. at ¶ 5-6.] Defendant Doug Crall, M.D., is the Medical Director of the KDOC, responsible for policies, procedures, and employment concerning the inmates' medical care. [R. 1-2 at ¶ 12.] Defendant Cookie Crews is the Health Services Administrator of the KDOC. [Id. at ¶ 13.] Defendant Frederick Kemen, M.D., is responsible for managing the HCV treatment plan for KDOC inmates. [Id. at ¶ 14.] Defendant Denise Burkett is the medical director of the KDOC. [R. 126 at ¶ 13.] Defendant Correct Care Solutions, Inc., provides medical services to inmates of the KDOC. [Id. at ¶ 15.]
Plaintiffs believe they have not been provided constitutionally adequate treatment for their HCV infections. [R. 134; R. 135.] According to their complaint, Defendants did not employ qualified individuals, did not adequately train these employees, and did not create or enforce necessary policies and procedures to ensure proper care. [R. 1-2 at ¶ 16.] Plaintiff Brian Woodcock is housed at the Kentucky State Penitentiary (KSP). [Id. at ¶ 52.] In December 2011, a biopsy indicated the fibrosis in his liver had advanced from Stage 1 to Stage 2. [Id.] Under Dr. Steven Shedlofshky's standards, he was first told he qualified for antiviral prescription medication. [Id.] But Dr. Shedlofsky then left KDOC, and KDOC found Mr. Woodcock did not qualify for medication. [Id.] Four years later, after his infection further progressed, he began receiving treatment. [Id. at ¶53.] Plaintiff Ruben Rios Salinas is also housed in KSP and has been denied testing and treatment of his HCV infection. [Id. at ¶¶ 54-55.] Plaintiff Keath Bramblett, another inmate at KSP, contracted HCV during incarceration. [Id. at ¶ 56.] He has been denied both participation in any program working with food and treatment for his condition. [Id. at ¶¶ 56-57.] Mr. Bramblett has been ordered to share razors with other inmates.[Id. at ¶ 57.] Plaintiff Jessica Lawrence has been diagnosed with HCV but has not received any treatment. [R. 36 at 5.]
Defendants do not contest the facts surrounding the care Plaintiffs have received, but disagree that such care is inadequate. [R. 140 at 3-4.] Plaintiffs sue Defendants on four separate theories. First, Plaintiffs sue Defendants under § 1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [R. 1-2 at ¶ 61.] Also, Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1978 for failure to reasonably accommodate their infections. [Id. at ¶ 64.] Based on the failure to meet the standard of care, Plaintiffs also believe Defendants acted with negligence and gross negligence. [Id. at ¶ 66.] Finally, Plaintiffs sue for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. [Id. at ¶ 68.] They seek both injunctive relief for care and damages for lack of treatment. [R. 1-2 at 19; R. 36 at 9.]
B
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A fact's materiality is determined by the substantive law, and a dispute is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The burden is initially on the moving party to inform"the district court of the basis of its motion, and [to identify] those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once this burden is met, the nonmoving party, "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Further, "the trial court no longer has a duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989). Instead, "the non-moving party has an affirmative duty to direct the Court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact." In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Woodcock and Bramblett failed to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing this action. [R. 168 at 23.] The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing suit under § 1983. Lee v. Wiley, 789 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 2015). The Sixth Circuit holds that since the language of § 1997e(a) makes exhaustion a condition precedent for the filing of a § 1983 claim, "The prisoner . . . may not exhaust administrative remedies during the pendency of the federal suit." Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999). This remains true even if exhaustion of the remedies is perceived as "futile," Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 149 L. Ed. 2d 958 (2001), or if the various stages of the appeals process within the prison system are optional, Owens v. Keeling, 461 F.3d 763, 770 n.4. (6th Cir. 2006).
Defendants have discovered that Mr. Woodcock filed a Healthcare Grievance prior to filing this lawsuit in regard to his inadequate medical treatment for HCV, requesting a re-biopsy of his liver. [R. 168 at 24.] As Defendants point out, Mr. Woodcock's only Grievance submitted "did not raise any grievances against CCS, Dr. Kemen, KDOC Defendants, or the HCV treatment protocol in place at that time." [Id.] Mr. Bramblett filed two Grievances relating to his treatment for HCV, but he did not appeal either of these Grievances according to his deposition taken. [Id.] Plaintiffs Woodcock and Bramblett's cases are therefore reasonably simple to decide: because they did not fulfill their obligation to seek complete redress through the administrative process in prison as an initial matter, both of their § 1983 claims were prematurely filed, and must be dismissed.
In addition, it has also been discovered that Plaintiffs Woodcock and Bramblett have been cleared of HCV. [R. 168 at 26; R. 182 at...
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