Wooddy v. Matthews

• Decision Date: 17 June 1915
• Docket Number: 696
• Parties: WOODDY v. MATTHEWS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

69 So. 607

194 Ala. 390

WOODDY v. MATTHEWS.

No. 696

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 17, 1915

Rehearing Denied July 2, 1915

Appeal from Chancery Court, Shelby County; W.W. Whiteside Chancellor.

Suit by Margaret Wooddy against K.N. Matthews for an accounting, and to declare a trust in certain lands, and to require a conveyance thereof to complainant. From a decree for defendant, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

The bill contained the following prayers:

The premises considered, your oratrix prays the court that the said K.N. Matthews be made a party respondent to this bill of complaint, and that the usual process issue out of your honor's court making him said party respondent, and that on final hearing your honor will state an account between the said K.N. Matthews and your oratrix, charging the said K.N. Matthews with the rents and profits from said lands described in Exhibit A hereto, for the years 1902, 1903, to 1912, both inclusive, and crediting him with the taxes paid on said lands and all the permanent improvements made on said lands, and charging him with any other moneys in his possession, and any and all amounts due your oratrix from the said K.N. Matthews, and crediting him with any and all amounts that may be found due him from your oratrix, and that on said final hearing your honor will declare and decree by the judgment of your honor's court that the said K.N Matthews practiced a fraud on your oratrix in the preparation of said deeds, and in the procurement of the conveyances to him, instead of your oratrix, of a one-half interest of the said lands described in Exhibit A hereto, and that in equity and good conscience that your oratrix is entitled to a one-half interest in said lands described in Exhibit A hereto, and that the said K.N. Matthews holds title to said one-half interest in said lands as in trust for your oratrix and that in equity and under the law he is not entitled to the same, and that the said K.N. Matthews be required to convey to your oratrix an undivided one-half interest in the lands described in Exhibit A hereto, making your oratrix a quitclaim deed conveying to her all of his rights, title, and interest in said lands described in Exhibit A hereto, and the said interest in said lands which he holds title to by virtue of said conveyance, and that he be required to execute with proper acknowledgments a conveyance to your oratrix to said one-half interest in said lands, and that, if for any reason the said conveyance is not made by the said K.N. Matthews to your oratrix, that your honor by appropriate orders and decrees require the register of this court to convey to your oratrix all the right, title, and interest of the said K.N Matthews in and to the said lands described in Exhibit A hereto, and a title to the said one-half interest which the said K.N. Matthews holds to said lands, under and by virtue of said deed of conveyance, a copy of which is Exhibit A hereto. And if your oratrix is mistaken in the relief prayed, then she prays for such other, further, and additional relief as may seem to your honor meet and proper; and as in duty bound she will ever pray.

Riddle, Ellis & Riddle, of Columbiana, for appellant.

A. & F.B. Latady, or Birmingham, for appellee.

THOMAS J.

To enable the appellant to have the relief sought, the allegation of the bill must be clear and specific that appellee did not rightfully acquire her interest in the lands sought to be divested out of him and invested in her. Nor should she have such relief without clear and convincing proof of facts showing that the deed was procured by fraud of her right of ownership therein. The evidence shows that in 1902 appellee was the administrator of the estate of appellant's deceased mother, and that appellant, Margaret Wooddy, and her two sisters, Mrs. Sue Ware Matthews and Mrs. Bob Ware Rogers, and one brother, E.M. Ware, were the sole heirs and distributees of said estate; that said heirs and distributees also owned real estate which had come to them from the estate of their deceased father; that at the time of the conveyance questioned all of the parties in interest sought to make an agreement of settlement and distribution among themselves of all the property of the respective estates of their mother and father. The evidence further shows that, prior to the said settlement and distribution, appellee had purchased from appellant's brother an undivided one-fourth interest in all of the said properties, and that appellee's wife, Sue Ware Matthews, owned a one-fourth interest which came to her from her said father's and mother's estates. By this settlement the appellee and wife received the deed in question to the lands in Shelby county from the two other heirs having an interest, Mrs. Bob Ware Rogers (and husband, J.H. Rogers), and appellant, Margaret Ware. It is further shown by the evidence that appellee has never paid Margaret Ware, now Margaret Wooddy, the amount which he claims was agreed on as the purchase price for interest in said lands.

The contention of appellant is that appellee practiced a fraud on her, in said settlement, in procuring the deed in question to be made to him and wife, instead of to appellant and her sister, appellee's wife. Complainant alleges in her bill that in this settlement "it was agreed that her brother, E.M. Ware, and her sister, Mrs. Bob Ware Rogers, and her husband, J.H. Rogers, would convey to appellant and appellee's wife, Sue Ware Matthews, their one-half interest in the land in Shelby county, involved in this suit"; that appellee was a party to this agreement, and was selected by the parties in interest to have the proper conveyances drawn in accordance with the agreement; that the deeds when presented were signed by the parties without being read, on account of their confidence in appellee; and that she filed her bill on her late discovery that the deed was made to appellee and wife, and not to appellant and her sister.

This contention is denied by appellee, who insists that the deed executed in 1902 was in accordance with their agreement of settlement and distribution of the property; that he and his wife purchased appellant's interest in the property, giving his note for the balance of the purchase money. At the date of conveyance the land was worth about what appellee claims he agreed to pay, or the agreed price was not greatly disproportionate to its true value. At the time the deeds were executed, E.M. Ware had sold his undivided one-fourth interest in the property to appellee--a fact well known to each party. He did not sign the deed in question, and was not even present. The allegation in the sixth paragraph of the bill that he agreed to sign the deed with Mr. and Mrs. Rogers and appellant seems inconsistent with the fact that he did not then own an interest in the properties.

The appellant was an intelligent person, and joined with her sister and brother-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. J.H. Rogers, in a conveyance of her interest to her sister and appellee, without reading the instrument. She then acknowledged before an officer that, being informed of the contents of the conveyance, she executed the same voluntarily on the day the same bore date. If, by fraudulent misrepresentations of its contents, she was induced by appellee to sign the deed without reading it, she would be excused. Beck v. Houppert, 104 Ala. 503, 16 So. 522, 53 Am.St.Rep. 77; Bank of Guntersville v. Webb, 108 Ala. 132, 19 So. 14; Tillis v. Austin, 117 Ala. 262, 22 So. 975; Leonard v. Roebuck, 152 Ala. 312, 44 So. 390; Prestwood v. Carlton, 162 Ala. 327, 332, 50 So. 254; B.R., L. & P. Co., v. Jordan, 170 Ala. 530, 54 So. 280. If a party signs an instrument without reading it, or having it read to him, if he cannot read, he cannot avoid it because not informed of its contents, unless there was fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation practiced upon him in its execution; for in such cases the law attributes ignorance of its contents to his own negligence. Prestwood v. Carlton, supra; Burroughs v. Pacific Guano Co., 81 Ala. 255, 1 So. 212; Pacific Guano Co. v. Anglin, 82 Ala. 492, 1 So. 852; Cannon v. Lindsey, 85 Ala. 198, 3 So. 676, 7 Am.St.Rep. 38; B.R..L. & P. Co. v. Jordan, supra. It was indispensable that a misrepresentation or concealment materially contributed as an inducement for her to sign without reading. So. L. & T. Co. v. Gissendaner, 4 Ala.App. 523, 529, 58 So. 737.

The burden is on one who seeks to set aside a conveyance of real estate, because of a fraudulent misrepresentation that induced the signature without a knowledge of its contents, to show such false and fraudulent inducement. The measure of proof required in such cases is that the evidence be "clear and convincing," or "the strongest possible," or "clear, exact, and satisfactory." 2 Pom.Eq.Jur. § 858; Guilmartin v. Urquhart, 82 Ala. 570, 1 So. 897. If the proof is uncertain in any material respect, it will be held insufficient, though the court may feel that a great wrong has been done; the court cannot grant the relief by reason of uncertainty. Hertzler v. Stevens, 119 Ala. 333, 24 So. 521; Alexander v. Caldwell, 55 Ala. 517; Berry v. Sowell, 72 Ala. 17; 7 Mayf.Dig. 189.

If the evidence showed that a confidential relation existed between the parties at the time of the execution of the conveyance, and that the grantee was the dominating spirit in the execution of the conveyance, the law would presume the exercise of undue influence; and to rebut the presumption clear and convincing proof is required that the party claiming the benefit acted in good faith and did not take advantage of the weaker. Couch v. Couch, 148 Ala. 332, 42 So. 624; 6 Mayf.Dig. 158. In such case, as Lord Eldon said:

"It is not a question whether the party knew what he

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