Wooden v. Perez
Citation | 269 A.3d 953,210 Conn.App. 303 |
Decision Date | 25 January 2022 |
Docket Number | AC 44301 |
Parties | Marilyn WOODEN, Executor (Estate of Lonnie Thomas, Sr.) v. Dinanyelly E. PEREZ |
Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
Steven P. Kulas, Seymour, for the appellant (substitute plaintiff).
Ian Cole, Derby, for the appellee (defendant).
In this adverse possession action, the substitute plaintiff, Anthony E. Monelli, as administrator of the estate of the decedent, Lonnie Thomas, Sr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Dinanyelly E. Perez, on the ground that the substitute plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the action.1 The substitute plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly determined that he lacked standing to pursue the adverse possession claim because the decedent had devised the property at issue to a trust for the benefit of his children and, therefore, only the trustees of that testamentary trust, and not the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate, had standing to prosecute the present action. We disagree with the substitute plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.
The record reveals the following relevant procedural history and undisputed facts. In the underlying action, the substitute plaintiff claimed, on behalf of the decedent's estate, a right to title by adverse possession of a strip of the defendant's property that was adjacent to property at 116 North Prospect Street Extension in Ansonia, which the decedent had owned at the time of his death in 1989. According to the complaint, the decedent and his successors in interest had used that portion of the defendant's property as a driveway and for other purposes for more than fifteen years. The decedent died testate, and his will, which was admitted to probate, provided in relevant part: (Emphasis omitted.)
On March 11, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the adverse possession action, asserting that the substitute plaintiff lacked standing to pursue such an action on behalf of the estate with respect to the 116 North Prospect Street Extension property because the estate has no interest in that property due to the express devise in the decedent's will, which passed legal title to the property to Marilyn Wooden and Larry Thomas as cotrustees of a trust benefiting the decedent's children. The substitute plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Although he did not dispute any of the relevant factual allegations in the defendant's motion to dismiss, he asserted by way of legal argument that, until the estate finally was administered, the estate continued to have an interest in the property, and, therefore, he, in his capacity as administrator of the estate, had standing to pursue the adverse possession claim. The defendant filed a reply memorandum responding to the substitute plaintiff's objection.
On September 18, 2020, the court, Pierson , J ., issued an order granting the motion to dismiss. The court held that the substitute plaintiff was the substituted executor of the decedent's estate, not a trustee of the testamentary trust that owns the subject property. Moreover, the court stated that "the [substitute] plaintiff has not demonstrated, and the court does not find, that he has a direct and personal interest in the subject property or the claims asserted in this action." The court concluded that the principal case relied on by the substitute plaintiff in support of his position that he had standing, O'Connor v. Chiascione , 130 Conn. 304, 33 A.2d 336 (1943), was readily distinguishable because (Emphasis altered.) In light of that qualifying language, and because the 116 North Prospect Street Extension property was specifically devised in the decedent's will to a trust, the court concluded that the substitute plaintiff's reliance on § 45a-321 was misplaced and that he had demonstrated no other interest in the property as executor that was sufficient to confer standing. This appeal followed.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) McWeeny v. Hartford , 287 Conn. 56, 63–64, 946 A.2d 862 (2008) ; see also Johnson v. Rell , 119 Conn. App. 730, 734, 990 A.2d 354 (2010) ( ).
Our Supreme Court repeatedly has stated "that [s]tanding is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. ... These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy ... provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. ...
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...devised real property passes to a decedent's devisees at his death, such title is not absolute"); see also Wooden v. Perez, 210 Conn.App. 303, 309, 269 A.3d 953 (2022) ("[o]n the death of an owner, title to real estate at once passes to his heirs, subject to being defeated should it be nece......