Wooden v. Perez

Citation269 A.3d 953,210 Conn.App. 303
Decision Date25 January 2022
Docket NumberAC 44301
Parties Marilyn WOODEN, Executor (Estate of Lonnie Thomas, Sr.) v. Dinanyelly E. PEREZ
CourtAppellate Court of Connecticut

Steven P. Kulas, Seymour, for the appellant (substitute plaintiff).

Ian Cole, Derby, for the appellee (defendant).

Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Alexander, Js.

PER CURIAM.

In this adverse possession action, the substitute plaintiff, Anthony E. Monelli, as administrator of the estate of the decedent, Lonnie Thomas, Sr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Dinanyelly E. Perez, on the ground that the substitute plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the action.1 The substitute plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly determined that he lacked standing to pursue the adverse possession claim because the decedent had devised the property at issue to a trust for the benefit of his children and, therefore, only the trustees of that testamentary trust, and not the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate, had standing to prosecute the present action. We disagree with the substitute plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.

The record reveals the following relevant procedural history and undisputed facts. In the underlying action, the substitute plaintiff claimed, on behalf of the decedent's estate, a right to title by adverse possession of a strip of the defendant's property that was adjacent to property at 116 North Prospect Street Extension in Ansonia, which the decedent had owned at the time of his death in 1989. According to the complaint, the decedent and his successors in interest had used that portion of the defendant's property as a driveway and for other purposes for more than fifteen years. The decedent died testate, and his will, which was admitted to probate, provided in relevant part: "As to my property known as 116 North Prospect Street Extension, Ansonia, Connecticut, the family homestead, I hereby devise and bequeath to Larry Thomas and Marilyn Wooden, in trust for all my following [named] children ... share and share alike. That said Trustees shall maintain said family homestead until, in their judgment, they determine it can be liquidated or purchased by one or more of my children." (Emphasis omitted.)

On March 11, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the adverse possession action, asserting that the substitute plaintiff lacked standing to pursue such an action on behalf of the estate with respect to the 116 North Prospect Street Extension property because the estate has no interest in that property due to the express devise in the decedent's will, which passed legal title to the property to Marilyn Wooden and Larry Thomas as cotrustees of a trust benefiting the decedent's children. The substitute plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Although he did not dispute any of the relevant factual allegations in the defendant's motion to dismiss, he asserted by way of legal argument that, until the estate finally was administered, the estate continued to have an interest in the property, and, therefore, he, in his capacity as administrator of the estate, had standing to pursue the adverse possession claim. The defendant filed a reply memorandum responding to the substitute plaintiff's objection.

On September 18, 2020, the court, Pierson , J ., issued an order granting the motion to dismiss. The court held that the substitute plaintiff was the substituted executor of the decedent's estate, not a trustee of the testamentary trust that owns the subject property. Moreover, the court stated that "the [substitute] plaintiff has not demonstrated, and the court does not find, that he has a direct and personal interest in the subject property or the claims asserted in this action." The court concluded that the principal case relied on by the substitute plaintiff in support of his position that he had standing, O'Connor v. Chiascione , 130 Conn. 304, 33 A.2d 336 (1943), was readily distinguishable because "that case does not involve a testamentary trust, nor does it stand for the proposition that an administrator or executor has standing to pursue a legal action affecting land owned or claimed by a testamentary trust. Moreover, and as correctly pointed out by the defendant, [although] General Statutes § 45a-321 (a) provides that the fiduciary of an estate ‘shall, during settlement , have the possession, care and control of the decedent's [real] property’, it also contains the relevant qualification, unless such real property has been specifically devised ....’ " (Emphasis altered.) In light of that qualifying language, and because the 116 North Prospect Street Extension property was specifically devised in the decedent's will to a trust, the court concluded that the substitute plaintiff's reliance on § 45a-321 was misplaced and that he had demonstrated no other interest in the property as executor that was sufficient to confer standing. This appeal followed.

"The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. Practice Book § 10-31 (a). [I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute. ... Because a determination regarding the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law, our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McWeeny v. Hartford , 287 Conn. 56, 63–64, 946 A.2d 862 (2008) ; see also Johnson v. Rell , 119 Conn. App. 730, 734, 990 A.2d 354 (2010) ("[i]n an appeal from the granting of a motion to dismiss on the ground of subject matter jurisdiction, this court's review is plenary" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Our Supreme Court repeatedly has stated "that [s]tanding is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. ... These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy ... provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. ...

"Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory. ... Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share. ... Second, the party must also show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest. ...

"Statutory aggrievement [howev...

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2 cases
  • Karen v. Loftus
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
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  • Miriam v. Summit Saugatuck, LLC
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
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    ...devised real property passes to a decedent's devisees at his death, such title is not absolute"); see also Wooden v. Perez, 210 Conn.App. 303, 309, 269 A.3d 953 (2022) ("[o]n the death of an owner, title to real estate at once passes to his heirs, subject to being defeated should it be nece......

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