Woodford v. Com.
| Decision Date | 06 March 1964 |
| Citation | 376 S.W.2d 526 |
| Parties | Jimmie A. WOODFORD, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Tom Garrett, Paducah, for appellant.
Robert F. Mattews, Atty. Gen., F. E. Wood, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.
Jimmie A. Woodford was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the death of Mildred Traughber. His punishment was fixed at three year' confinement in the penitentiary. On appeal he urges that the trial court erred: (1) In requiring the appellant on voir dire to examine the prospective jurors collectively instead of individually; (2) in permitting the Commonwealth's attorney to propound improper questions; (3) in failing to instruct on the whole law of the case; and (4) in refusing his counsel the right to discuss the failure to administer a degree of intoxication test.
On November 7, 1962, at approximately 11:15 p. m., two cars driven by appellant and Mildred Traughber, respectively, collied at the intersection of 17th and Jefferson Streets in Paducah. Mildred Traughber died from injuries suffered in the collision. Issues involved on the trial were whether appellant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and whether he had run through a stop sign at the intersection.
After appellant's counsel had examined individually five prospective jurors on voir dire, the court refused to let him question individually each of the remaining prospective jurors. Thereafter, the questions were asked of the remaining seven prospective jurors and of two replacements collectively.
Appellant relies on the statement of purpose of voir dire made in Sizemore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 832, and upon statements in Apkins v. Commonwealth, 148 Ky. 662, 147 S.W. 376; Olympic Realty Company v. Kamer, 283 Ky. 432, 141 S.W.2d 293; and Alexander v. Jones, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 35, to the effect that the accused through counsel is entitled 'to examine the jurors separately upon their voir dire.' See also Criminal Code, Section 213. Such was the old rule.
This case was tried after the adoption of the Criminal Rules of Procedure. RCr 9.38 provides:
This rule quite obviously places the manner of conducting the voir dire examination in the discretion of the trial judge. It is recognized that the trial court, in an effort to expedite the selection of a jury, may 'take over' the examination of the prospective jurors on voir dire. In a proper case, this could constitute an abuse of discretion. In the instant case, it has not been shown that there was an abuse of discretion. Webb v. Commonwealth, Ky., 314 S.W.2d 543.
On cross-examination of the appellant, the Commonwealth's attorney asked the following questions:
'113x Now did anything happen to you between the time you left Mayford and started down Sixth Street and came on down to where this accident occurred?
'114X Well did you--I will ask you whether or not some police officers chased you before this accident?
'115X Didn't any police officers chase you?
'116X Did any police officers chase you at all that night before this accident?
'117X Are you sure about that?
'118x Isn't it true that a police car did chase you and you outran them just before this accident happened?
'119X Isn't there true?
'120X That did not happen?
There was no testimony of a police car chase and no further effort to prove any such chase. Similar conduct on the part of a Commonwealth's attorney was condemned as being unfair in Rowe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 269 S.W.2d 247. The repeated questions concerning a chase by a police car injected a false issue into the case which was highly prejudicial. Such conduct is inexcusable and unbecoming in an officer of the court whose duty is to see that a defendant is dealt with fairly and that his legal rights, as well as those of the Commonwealth's, are fully protected. Drake v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 107, 91 S.W.2d 1009; May v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 160; Arthur v. Commonwealth, Ky., 307 S.W.2d 182. After appellant answered in the negative, the continued questioning permitted by the court on the same matter was reversible error.
The questioning of ap...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bray v. Com., 2003-SC-0656-MR.
...cured. Appellant insists that reversal is required pursuant to Coates v. Commonwealth, 469 S.W.2d 346 (Ky.1971), and Woodford v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.2d 526 (Ky.1964). The defendant in Coates, an official with access to the State Reformatory, had been tried for possession of marijuana. Dur......
-
Bowler v. Com.
...questions. See, Coates v. Commonwealth, Ky., 469 S.W.2d 346 (1971) (one question plus comment in closing argument); Woodford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 376 S.W.2d 526 (1964) (seven questions); Rollyson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 800 (1959) (two improper questions); Rowe v. Commonwealth, Ky......
-
Coates v. Com.
...are Edwards v. Com., 298 Ky. 366, 182 S.W.2d 948 and Jackson v. Com., 301 Ky. 562, 192 S.W.2d 480.' Similarly, in Woodford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 376 S.W.2d 526 (1964), the Commonwealth's attorney in asking questions on cross-examination injected into the case the question of whether or not ......
-
McClellan v. Com., 82-SC-805-MR
...error that shall not be permitted to recur upon retrial. Coates v. Commonwealth, Ky., 469 S.W.2d 346 (1971), Woodford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 376 S.W.2d 526 (1964), Rowe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 269 S.W.2d 247 FIRST-DEGREE BURGLARY AS AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR Appellant contends first-degree burglar......