Woodford v. Community Action of Greene County, 98-CV-220 LEK/RWS.
| Decision Date | 03 February 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-CV-220 LEK/RWS.,98-CV-220 LEK/RWS. |
| Citation | 103 F.Supp.2d 97 |
| Parties | Iva WOODFORD, Plaintiff, v. COMMUNITY ACTION OF GREENE COUNTY, INC.; Board of Directors of Community Action of Greene County, Inc.; Edward J. Daly; Rosemary Blois; Robert C. Schrock; Anne Yon; William Reich; Rudolph Monteleone; Laurette Sudds; Thomas Yandeau; Penny Friedrich; Eleanor Van Schaack; Donna Rummo-Faulkner; Karlene Schnur; Andrew Dresser; Elaine Farley, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Kernan, Kernan Law Firm, Utica, NY (Kevin G. Martin, of counsel), Office of James F. Keefe, Cairo, NY (Patricia G. Schneider, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Office of James T. Towne, Jr., P.C., Albany, NY (James T. Towne, Jr., of counsel), Donohue, Sabo Law Firm, Albany, NY (Alvin O. Sabo, of counsel), for the defendants.
The Court must here determine whether Plaintiff Ms. Iva Woodford was an eligible employee for purposes of the Family and Medical Leave Act. This requires an assessment of the relevance of Plaintiff's time sheets to the question of whether she worked the minimum number of hours required to qualify under the act. The Court must also determine whether Defendants may have improperly interfered with Plaintiff's rights when they suspended her from work, and whether they provided her with timely notice, when she sought leave, that they might not restore her to her job at the end of her leave. Finally, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff may be liable to Defendants for any false or defamatory statements she has made in prosecuting this action.
Plaintiff in this action claims that Defendants violated her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2654, and also asserts a supplemental state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on Defendants' conduct pursuant to their purported violations of the FMLA. Defendants have made a counterclaim for defamation in the form of libel, alleging false and defamatory statements made in connection with this action.
Plaintiff Ms Woodford was employed by Defendant Community Action of Greene County, Inc. ("CAGC") from March 1985 to 15 January 1998. She was a teacher until 1987, and then was promoted to day care Director. She was promoted to Head Start Director in 1988, and held that job until her employment with CAGC ended. The individual Defendants are or were members of the CAGC Board of Directors.
Disputes related to the present action arose in 1996. Plaintiff alleged improper conduct on the part of one the Defendants; Defendants instituted disciplinary actions against Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that stress arising from these incidents led to extreme mental and physical problems, and on that basis she sought leave under the FMLA in November 1997. Defendants initially rejected her application for leave, and required that she return to work. Defendants subsequently granted leave, but told her she had no right under the FMLA to be restored to her position once her leave ended. As the dispute over Plaintiff's application for FMLA leave continued, and Plaintiff remained away from work, Defendants hired an interim Head Start Director. Eventually, in January 1998, Defendants denied Plaintiff's request to be restored to her position as Director pursuant to the FMLA.
Plaintiff filed this action 9 February 1998. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff seeks damages, punitive damages, and such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Defendants in their counterclaim seek damages and such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
Now before the Court are Defendants' motions for summary judgment and Plaintiff's cross motion to dismiss Defendants' counterclaim.
A. Standards of Decision
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," must be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). (Black, J.) In assessing the sufficiency of a pleading, "all factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true," LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.1991), and all reasonable inferences must be construed in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); see also Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1099 (2d Cir.1988), (applying the principle of construing inferences in favor of plaintiff) cert. denied sub nom. Soifer v. Bankers Trust Co., 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1642, 104 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989).
[C]onsideration is limited to the factual allegations in [the] complaint, which are accepted as true, to documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in it by reference, to matters of which judicial notice may be taken, or to documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.
Brass v. American Film Technologies, Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir.1993).
The Rules do not require the plaintiff to set out in detail the facts upon which the claim is based, but only that a defendant be given "fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. Individual allegations, however, that are so baldly conclusory that they fail to give notice of the basic events and circumstances of which the plaintiff complains are meaningless as a practical matter and, as a matter of law, insufficient to state a claim. See Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir.1987) ().
Summary judgment must be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Lang v. Retirement Living Pub. Co., 949 F.2d 576, 580 (2d Cir.1991). The moving party carries the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Thompson v. Gjivoje, 896 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir.1990). Facts, inferences therefrom, and ambiguities must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per curiam)); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 968 (2d Cir.1983). A genuine issue is an issue that, if resolved in favor of the non-moving party, would permit a jury to return a verdict for that party. R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, 112 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
When the moving party has met the burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. At that point, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. To withstand a summary judgment motion, evidence must exist upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Thus, summary judgment is proper where there is "little or no evidence ... in support of the non-moving party's case." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir.1994).
The Court addresses the motions on the basis of these standards.
A. Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment
Defendants have divided into two groups, and submitted separate motions. They do not, however, raise different issues, and the second group essentially joins the arguments the first makes. (See Sabo Aff. at 2 (Doc. 38, 9 Aug. 1999).) The Court will refer to these motions as one, for the purpose of this discussion.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not an eligible employee under the FMLA's provision that an employee must have been employed "for at least 1,250 hours of service with [her] employer during the previous 12-month period." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(ii). If she is not eligible, then she would not have a right to reinstatement under the FMLA. Defendants' evidence indicates that Plaintiff worked a total of 852.5 hours in the twelve-month period before she requested FMLA leave. Plaintiff argues that that evidence understates her hours worked, and that even if she had not reached the requisite 1250 hours Defendants' wrongful actions prevented her from accumulating the necessary numbers of hours, and she is thus entitled to FMLA protection.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' records of her hours are not accurate, because the records were, in essence, simply a checkoff verifying that Plaintiff, as an "exempt" employee, had worked the minimum of 35 hours per week required. (See Mem. Law Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ.J. and in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. Dismiss (hereinafter "Pl.'s Mem.Law") at 3-4 (Doc. 41, 9 Aug. 1999).) That assertion, however, is not consistent with the evidence before the Court. Plaintiff's time sheet is the basis for Defendants' claim that she worked 852.5 hours in the twelve months prior to her request for leave.1 (See Blois Aff., Ex. E (Doc. 35, 9 Aug. 1999).) Pla...
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Woodford v. Community Action of Greene County
...not worked a minimum of 1,250 hours at CAGC in the last twelve months as the FMLA requires. See Woodford v. Community Action of Greene County, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)). Judge Kahn also held that CAGC's notice to Woodford that it would den......