Woodman v. Perrin

Decision Date29 February 1984
Docket NumberNo. 82-336,82-336
Citation474 A.2d 999,124 N.H. 545
PartiesWalter WOODMAN, Jr. v. Everett I. PERRIN, Jr., Warden of New Hampshire State Prison.
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

Pizzimenti & Immen, Concord (Dennis Pizzimenti, Concord, on the brief and orally), for plaintiff.

Gregory H. Smith, Atty. Gen. (Ronald F. Rodgers, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief and orally), for the State.

BATCHELDER, Justice.

This is an appeal from the denial by the Superior Court (Cann, J.) of the plaintiff's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The plaintiff is an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison, having pled guilty in 1972 to the crime of first degree murder. See former RSA 585:1 (1955). In 1981, the plaintiff was the subject of a disciplinary hearing which culminated in the plaintiff's loss of his accrued statutory good time, see RSA 607:51-b, I (Supp.1972), and his accrued meritorious good time. See RSA 607:51-b, II (Supp.1972). The plaintiff argues that he should have faced a maximum loss of 365 days of good conduct credits. We disagree and affirm the trial court on this issue.

The plaintiff was serving a life sentence for murder when he escaped from the State prison on May 1, 1981. At the time of his sentencing, a sentence to life imprisonment carried a minimum sentence of eighteen years. RSA 607:41-a (Supp.1972). Good conduct credits could be used to reduce this minimum sentence. RSA 607:51-b (Supp.1972). Following his escape, the plaintiff was recaptured in New Mexico and returned to the State prison on June 22, 1981. On July 17, 1981, the disciplinary board of the State prison found the plaintiff guilty of escape and revoked all his good conduct credits.

The plaintiff claims that the disciplinary board's power to mete out punishment for disciplinary infractions is prescribed by the appropriate provisions of the State prison's Manual For The Guidance of Inmates (1981 ed.) (Manual). The plaintiff points to the part of the Manual dealing with disciplinary hearings and section 5 thereunder, entitled "Punishment." Manual at 63-64. This section states that following a finding of guilty at a major disciplinary hearing, a "[f]orfeiture of not more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days of earned good conduct time" may be imposed. Id. The plaintiff maintains that, by imposing a forfeiture of more than 365 days, the disciplinary board exceeded its authority.

The procedural prerequisite for a court's consideration of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is an allegation of a present deprivation of a protected liberty interest. See Martineau v. Perrin, 118 N.H. 167, 168, 384 A.2d 135, 136 (1978). The plaintiff contends that if the disciplinary board had ordered the forfeiture of only 365 days of his accrued good conduct credits, the application of his remaining credits against his minimum sentence would make him presently eligible for parole. The State does not contest the plaintiff's arithmetic; consequently, we will assume that the plaintiff's petition is not procedurally deficient.

In 1972, the plaintiff was sentenced pursuant to former RSA chapter 607 (Supp.1972). Former RSA 607:51-b (Supp.1972) governed credits for good conduct and provided the warden with the discretion to subject a prisoner to the loss of all or any portion of accrued credits for any serious act of misconduct or insubordination. RSA chapter 607 (Supp.1972) was replaced by RSA chapter 651 (Supp.1981) (effective November 1, 1973), and this latter chapter was in effect at the time of the plaintiff's escape and his disciplinary hearing. Former RSA 651:45, III (Supp.1981) (repealed by Laws 1983, 461:33) makes the law in effect as of the time of a prisoner's sentencing govern the terms of that prisoner's release from prison. Thus, argues the plaintiff, former RSA 607:51-b, III (Supp.1972) retains its effectiveness and applicability to him and the terms of his release. Furthermore, the plaintiff's argument continues, the warden himself circumscribed the discretion granted him by former RSA 607:51-b, III (Supp.1972) to ordering the forfeiture of no more than 365 days of accrued good conduct credits. The warden placed this check on his discretion, it is contended, through the promulgation of the Manual and its provisions regarding disciplinary hearings and punishments.

In his analytic effort, the plaintiff attempts to steer between provisions in the Manual and in former RSA 651:55-b, III (Supp.1981) (now codified at RSA 651-A:22, IV (Supp.1983). The Manual contains the following passage: "Any inmate who attempts to escape will be fired upon. Apprehension is sure, swift and will result in additional confinement and the automatic loss of earned good conduct time and meritorious good conduct time." Manual at 26. (Emphasis added.) Undaunted by this peril, the plaintiff directs the court's attention to former RSA 651:55-b, III(a) (Supp.1981) which provides: "Any prisoner who escapes from the state prison or from custody of any person charged with his custodial safekeeping ... will automatically suffer the loss of all accrued good conduct credits."

The plaintiff attempts to escape the effect of both these provisions with a single argument: The statute, RSA 651:55-b (Supp.1981), clearly has no application to his situation for he was sentenced before the passage of the Criminal Code, and so former RSA 651:45, III (Supp.1981) makes former RSA chapter 607 (Supp.1972) apply to him. Also, for the same reason, inasmuch as the offensive language in the Manual is assuredly derived from former RSA 651:55-b (Supp.1981), it has no bearing on his situation. The plaintiff further maintains that if this language in the Manual is inapplicable to him, the provision in the Manual regarding a maximum forfeiture of 365 days remains the only provision that can be applied to his situation.

The Manual (1981 edition) used at the plaintiff's disciplinary hearing does post-date the effective date of former RSA 651:55-b (Supp.1981), August 22, 1979. However, we...

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13 cases
  • Knowles v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • October 31, 1995
    ...that his present imprisonment is unlawful, alleging "a present deprivation of a protected liberty interest." Woodman v. Perrin, 124 N.H. 545, 548, 474 A.2d 999, 1001 (1984). Our analysis of liberty interests begins with part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and with the fourt......
  • Petition of Strandell
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • August 16, 1989
    ...do not possess the power to contravene a statute." In re Richard M., supra at 16, 497 A.2d at 1203 (quoting Woodman v. Perrin, 124 N.H. 545, 549, 474 A.2d 999, 1002 (1984)). If the Division acted "beyond the limited discretion granted by a valid enactment, the rule is invalid." In re Richar......
  • Bussiere v. Cunningham
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • March 9, 1990
    ...petition for a writ of habeas corpus is an allegation of a present deprivation of a protected liberty interest." Woodman v. Perrin, 124 N.H. 545, 548, 474 A.2d 999, 1001 (1984) (citation omitted). In Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 513 A.2d 956 (1986), this court explained the analysis w......
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    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • December 20, 2006
    ...possess the power to contravene a statute and we will not construe an administrative rule as an attempt to do so." Woodman v. Perrin, 124 N.H. 545, 549, 474 A.2d 999 (1984) (citation omitted).The state fire marshal's apparent interpretation of the code is that it "has no provisions for ‘gra......
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