Woodroffe v. Rosenblum
| Decision Date | 28 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:15-cv-02390-SB |
| Parties | ROBERT WOODROFFE, Plaintiff, v. ELLEN ROSENBLUM; SHANNON VINCENT; VICTOR BEERBOWER; COLLETTE PETERS; MICHAEL GOWER; JOHN MYRICK; JILL CURTIS; CAPTAIN PEDRO; CAPTAIN IVERSON; CAPTAIN LYTLE; LT. R.A. YOUNG; LT. BOSTON; LT. EDISION; SGT. HAGA; SGT. HOSKINS; SGT. PRIMMER; MR. HILLMICK; MS. KRUEGER; MS. SHORT; LT. STEWART; MICHAEL MAHONEY; ROBERT H. KING JR.; DR. SHELTON; DR. NORTON; JAMES DEACON; SGT. WILSEN; LEONARD WILLIAMSON; MR. D. GREEN; MICHAEL JORDEN, the State Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court are nine motions seeking, among other things, dismissal on all remaining claims of self-represented plaintiff Robert Woodroffe ("Woodroffe"), an inmate at Two Rivers Correctional Institution ("TRCI").1 Additionally, Woodroffe filed a cross-motion for summary judgment against Defendant Robert J. King, a fellow inmate. (ECF No. 127.) In his Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), Woodroffe alleged violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED").2 (ECF No. 15.) For the reasons set forth below, this Court recommends that the district judge grant the State Defendants' motion for summary judgment and Defendant King's Motion to Dismiss, and deny all other motions.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of that party. Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2005). The court does not assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh evidence, or determine the truth of matters in dispute. Anderson v. LibertyLobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quotations and citation omitted).
Woodroffe's surviving claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are a First Amendment retaliation claim against defendants Pedro, Iverson, Lytle, Young, Short, and King; an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against defendant Dr. Shelton; and a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against defendants Curtis, Green, and Jorden.
Woodroffe alleges that Pedro failed to take disciplinary action against King despite knowing that King paid people to harm Woodroffe. (TAC ¶¶ 74-77.) According to Woodroffe, Pedro failed to protect him from King "due to [Woodroffe's] law suits and torts." (TAC ¶ 76.)
Woodroffe alleges that Iverson confiscated "1/2 his property and some being legal material and to this date still has it out of retaliation." (TAC ¶ 83.) Additionally, Woodroffe claims that Iverson held him in administrative segregation "based on protected right in filing civil action and or giving another legal advice." (TAC ¶ 84; see also id. at ¶ 90 (); id. at ¶ 92 ().) Finally, Woodroffe alleges that Iverson "has held up all incoming mail and out going mail to retaliate and harass [Woodroffe]." (TAC ¶ 93.)
Woodroffe alleges that Lytle and Young filed a misconduct report in November 2014, solely in retaliation for a tort claim filing. (TAC ¶ 80.) Additionally, Woodroffe alleges that in early 2016, Lytle "pull[ed Woodroffe] into the office and threaten[ed Woodroffe] with segregation any time he wants on a made up investigation for any reason for 30 days . . . ." (TAC ¶ 82.) Woodroffe contends Lytle's actions "were based on retaliation . . . ." (TAC ¶ 81.) Woodroffe alleges that Young assisted Lytle in the actions described above. (TAC ¶ 82.)
Woodroffe alleges that Short "retaliated against [Woodroffe] when she worked in concert with . . . King" to create false misconduct reports. (TAC ¶¶ 46, 103-105.)
Woodroffe alleges that King conspired with the State Defendants "to set [Woodroffe] up for false misconduct to retaliate against [Woodroffe] . . . ." (TAC ¶ 42.)
The five named State Defendants seek dismissal of Woodroffe's First Amendment retaliation claim on four grounds: (1) some claims are barred as untimely, (2) Woodroffe failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to some claims, (3) Woodroffe is unable to satisfy a prima facie case for retaliation, and (4) Pedro, Lytle, Young, and Short are entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 16.)
As discussed below, the Court finds that entry of summary judgment on Woodroffe's First Amendment retaliation claims is appropriate on the grounds of exhaustion and failure to present a prima facie case. As such, the Court does not reach the State Defendants' statute of limitations and qualified immunity arguments.
King seeks dismissal of Woodroffe's First Amendment retaliation claim on two grounds: (1) King is not a state actor, and (2) Woodroffe's claim against King is time barred. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 3.) As discussed below, the Court agrees that King is not a state actor. As such, the Court does not reach King's alternative ground for dismissal.
As a threshold matter, Defendants Pedro, Iverson, and Lytle argue that Woodroffe failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing his civil rights complaint in federal court. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 17.) As support for their exhaustion argument, the State Defendants rely on the Declaration of Arnell Eynon, TRCI's Grievance Coordinator and an Oregon Department of Corrections ("ODOC") custodian of records.3 In opposition, Woodroffe argues that the State Defendants are untruthful in their statement that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Pl.'s Opp. 20.)
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, requires that prisoners exhaust "such administrative remedies as are available" before filing suit challenging prison conditions in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). "If a prisoner had full opportunity andability to file a grievance timely, but failed to do so, he has not properly exhausted his administrative remedies." Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2009).
Once a defendant shows there was an available administrative remedy and the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy, the prisoner has the burden of production to come forward with evidence showing there is something in his case "that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him." Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014). A prisoner's failure to exhaust may be excused if he can demonstrate that the grievance process is unavailable to him because (1) "administrative procedures [are] unavailable," (2) "prison officials obstructed [the prisoner's] attempt to exhaust," or (3) prison officials failed to follow grievance-processing protocol. Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010). An administrative remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from using the process. Id. To be available, "a remedy must be capable of use for the accomplishment of its purpose." Id.
The grievance procedure available to Oregon inmates, such as Woodroffe, is explained in ODOC's Administrative Rules governing Grievance Review System (Inmate), set forth in Chapter 291, Division 109, of the Oregon Administrative Rules. See Or. Admin. R. ("OAR") 291-109-0100 et. seq. ("Inmate Communication and Grievance Review System"). ODOC has a three-level grievance and appeal process in place to address inmate complaints. Id.
Inmates may file grievances regarding several issues, including "unprofessional behavior or action which may be directed toward an inmate by an employee or volunteer." OAR 291-109-0140. Inmates are encouraged to communicate grievances informally with first-line staff as their primary means of resolving disputes, prior to filing a formal grievance. Id. at 291-109-0140(1)(a).
If the initial communication does not resolve the grievance, the inmate may proceed to level one by completing a grievance form. Id. If the matter is not an emergency, grievance forms must be filed with the grievance coordinator within thirty days of the aggrieving incident, and contain "a complete description of the incident, action, or application of the rule being grieved including date and approximate time." Id. at 291-109-0140(l)(b) and 291-109-0150(2). An inmate cannot grieve misconduct reports, or issues for which the inmate has already filed suit in state or federal court. Id. at 291-109-0140(3)(e), (i).
At level two, an inmate may appeal the grievance coordinator's decision regarding the inmate's level-one grievance form, to the functional unit manager. Id. at 291-109-0170(1). The inmate must file a grievance appeal form with the grievance coordinator within fourteen days of the date ODOC sent the level-one grievance response to the inmate. Id. at 291-109-0170(1)(b).
At level three, the inmate may appeal the decision made by the functional unit manager by filing an additional grievance appeal form with the grievance coordinator...
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