Woodruff v. One Covered Scow

• Decision Date: 18 February 1887
• Citation: 30 F. 269
• Parties: WOODRUFF v. ONE COVERED SCOW. [1]
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

30 F. 269

WOODRUFF v. ONE COVERED SCOW. ^[1]

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

February 18, 1887

J. E Ludden, for libelant.

E. R Chevalier, for claimant.

BENEDICT J.

This is a proceeding in rem to enforce a lien for wharfage against a structure termed in the libel a scow. The facts are not in dispute. The structure proceeded against consists of a float made of timbers, in width some 11 feet, and in length some 23 feet, constructed to float in the water, and to support above the surface of the water a floor and a house nearly the size of the float. One use of the structure is to store within the house the oars and sails of small boats landing at the float and to afford persons a means of egress from small boats coming to the slip to the adjoining wharf, and thence to the shore. This structure was never used as a means of transporting upon it from place to place either passengers or freight. It has for a long period been moored alongside the libelant's wharf, in one of the slips of this harbor, being attached to the wharf by lines, and there safely rising and falling with the tide. For the use thus made of the libelant's wharf the libelant seeks to enforce a lien.

The action is sought to be upheld by reference to the statute of the state of New York, which fixes the rates of wharfage in New York and Brooklyn, and gives a lien for the same. This statute, after fixing rates of wharfage for certain kinds of vessels, proceeds as follows:

'And from every other vessel or floating structure other than those above named, or used for transportation of freight or passengers, double the first above rates; except that floating elevators shall pay one-half the first above rates.'

This provision is manifestly imperfect, and the question arises, what effect can be given to the words, 'or used for transportation of freight or passengers. ' As the words read, they are without meaning, and if no effect is to be given them, the statute, by the previous words 'floating structure' includes in its provisions the structure here proceeded against. But if, as the claimant contends, the word 'or' be stricken out, and the word 'and' inserted in its place, the previous words, 'floating structure' will be so qualified as to exclude the structure here proceeded against; while, as the libelant suggests, effect may be given to all the words used, by inserting the words 'any craft,' after the word 'or.' So read, the statute would include the structure proceeded against.

It has been supposed by the advocates that this case must stand or fall, as one or the other of these constructions is placed upon the statute referred to. But while the statute, if construed as the libelant contends, would determine the rate of wharfage chargeable against this structure, the right of the libelant to maintain this action cannot depend upon the statute; for a statute of the state, while it may create a liability on the part of the owner of this structure to pay wharfage, and may attach a lien upon the structure to enforce such liability, cannot confer upon this court jurisdiction of this court to entertain the present proceeding depends not upon any statute, but upon the question whether the implied contract to pay the libelant for the use made of his wharf by the structure in question is a maritime contract. If the contract be maritime, this court, sitting in admiralty, has...