Woodruff v. State
| Decision Date | 25 February 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 29552,29552 |
| Citation | 233 Ga. 840,213 S.E.2d 689 |
| Parties | Eddie Junior WOODRUFF v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Garland & Garland, Byrd Garland, Jackson, for appellant.
Edward E. McGarity, Dist. Atty., Kenneth R. Waldrep, Asst. Dist. Atty., McDonough, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., John W. Dunsmore, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
This is an appeal from an armed robbery conviction in which the state's evidence against Woodruff was entirely circumstantial. He argues that the evidence was inadequate to 'exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused,' as required by Code § 38-109. We disagree, and affirm.
The state's evidence tended to show that the victims, two aged sisters, lived in a rural area near a dirt road, and that shortly before the robbery they saw a late model green automobile go past their house with three men inside. Somewhat later, two men subsequently identified as Woodruff's co-defendants, Hobbs and Parker, appeared at the victims' home asking first for gasoline, and then, being told the sisters had none, for a drink of water. Upon an exchanged signal of some sort, the two moved against the sisters and subsequently ransacked the house and beat one of the elderly women in the search for money. One of the robbers brandished a gun. They obtained about four dollars in change, and departed.
Two Butts County law officers arrived about ten minutes after the offense and were told about the green automobile. They set off in search of it and about 600 feet from the sisters' house met a late model green automobile being driven by Woodruff who appeared to be alone. The officers stopped and turned their automobile around to give chase, but the green car moved on out of sight and, from a point which it had recently passed, Hobbs ran across the road. The officers stopped and apprehended him, and then sped in the direction taken by the green car, with their blue light flashing. They next saw the green car near the city limits of Floville with Woodruff still driving and Parker seated beside him. In addition to their flashing light, the officers turned on their siren and, after a short time, concluding that Woodruff was not going to stop although he had been considerably slowed by being temporarily boxed in traffic, the officers sent a warning shot through the roof of the car whereupon Woodruff stopped. He and Parker were searched, and inside the glove compartment of the automobile, which belonged to Parker, the officers found a .25 caliber automatic. Subsequently, Hobbs and Parker were identified by the sisters as the robbers. At trial, the defense offered no evidence at all.
Woodruff argues here that a reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence and with the evidence is as follows: the green car, occupied by Woodruff, Hobbs and Parker, was actually out of gas; Hobbs and Parker went in search of gasoline while Woodruff remained with the car; a maroon automobile, which one victim testified went down the road after the green car had passed, could have stopped and given Woodruff gasoline, whereupon, Parker and Hobbs having split up for some reason, Woodruff drove Parker into town and was unaware that Parker and Hobbs had perpetrated the robbery. The flaw in this reasoning is that it does not explain Woodruff's flight from the officers as the driver of the green automobile.
Woodruff argues that there is no evidence of flight, and it is true that the officers' testimony was in some respects ambiguous; but this very clear exchange occurred during the testimony of Officer Barnes: We conclude that there was evidence before the jury of Woodruff's flight.
Flight, without more, is inadequate to support a conviction. Johnson v. State, 126 Ga.App. 277, 278, 190 S.E.2d 594. However, in each case the evidence of flight is to be considered with the other evidence to determine how the flight may be explained. See Griffin v. State, 2 Ga.App. 534, 536, 58 S.E. 781. In Griffin supra. Mere evidence that defendant fled from a scene of gambling when the chief of police burst upon the scene brandishing a pistol, was held insufficient to convict, because this flight could have been occasioned by surprise and apprehension, or by the contagious flight of the guilty participants. But, on the other hand, '(e)vidence that the defendant and three others were lying on the ground in a secluded spot with money before them, that each had cards in his hand, and that on being discovered all attempted to escape, was sufficient to sustain a verdict that the defendant was guilty of playing and betting at a game played with cards for money.' Harmon v. State, 120 Ga. 197, 47 S.E. 547. Thus, evidence of flight may be admitted as one of a series of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred. Sullivan v. State, 222 Ga. 691, 693, 152 S.E.2d 382; Smith v. State, 106 Ga. 673, 679, 32 S.E. 851.
Returning to the facts here, the hypothesis offered by Woodruff as reasonable and consistent with innocence, does not account for the circumstances of flight. Though the evidence as a whole presents a close case, on balance no reasonable hypothesis consistent with Woodruff's innocence and with the evidence, including evidence of flight, comes to mind; none was offered by him at trial; and none had been advanced in his behalf. Though Woodruff was under no compulsion to take the stand, had he done so and had he offered a reasonable explanation of his activities, we would be required to take that explanation 'into consideration insofar as it is consistent with the circumstantial evidence properly admitted.' Sentell v. State, 227 Ga. 153, 156, 179 S.E.2d 234, 237. Here, none of the three defendants testified. From the evidence, the only reasonable explanation was that Woodruff was in league with the robbers; was assigned to drive the automobile by which they planned to make their escape; and attempted that escape with Parker. To be adequate, circumstantial evidence need not remove every possibility of...
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