Woods v. Board of Trustees of Policemen and Firemen Retirement System of City of Detroit, 46842

• Decision Date: 27 July 1981
• Docket Number: No. 46842,46842
• Citation: 310 N.W.2d 39,108 Mich.App. 38
• Parties: Mary WOODS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the POLICEMEN AND FIREMEN RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF the CITY OFDETROIT, Defendant-Appellant. 108 Mich.App. 38, 310 N.W.2d 39
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 39

310 N.W.2d 39

Mary WOODS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the POLICEMEN AND FIREMEN RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF the CITY OFDETROIT Defendant-Appellant.

No. 46842.

108 Mich.App. 38, 310 N.W.2d 39

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

July 27, 1981.

[108 MICHAPP 39] Bernard Feldman, Southfield, for Mary Woods.

[108 MICHAPP 40] Ronald Zajac, Detroit, for Bd. of Policemen & Firemen.

Before HOLBROOK, P. J., and BRONSON and WALSH, JJ.

HOLBROOK, Presiding Judge.

Defendant appeals as of right from an order of summary judgment entered against it pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3).

The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff was a Detroit police officer and, by virtue of her employment, became a member of the Policemen and Firemen Retirement System for the City of Detroit. The Policemen and Firemen Retirement System is a municipally chartered pension system whose purpose is to provide retirement allowances and death benefits for policemen and firemen. Part of the pension system includes provisions relative to duty disability retirement benefits. The charter vests defendant with the administration, management and responsibility for proper operation of the pension system.

Plaintiff alleges that she was totally incapacitated by an injury suffered in the performance of her duties. The plaintiff applied for a duty disability retirement pursuant to Article VI, Part B, Section 1 of the pension plan. Detroit Charter, Title 9, ch 7, art VI, part B, § 1. Section 1 reads in pertinent part:

"If a member shall become totally incapacitated for duty by reason of injury, illness or disease resulting from performance of duty and if the Board of Trustees shall find such injury, illness or disease to have resulted from the performance of duty, on written application to the Board of Trustees by or on behalf of such member or by the head of his Department such member shall be retired; provided, the Medical Director, after examination[108 MICHAPP 41] of such member, shall certify to the Board of Trustees his total incapacity."

According to the provisions of the city charter, plaintiff was sent to the medical director for an evaluation of her disability. The medical director certified the plaintiff's disability and recommended a duty disability retirement. The Board of Trustees initially granted plaintiff a duty disability pension.

The defendant reconsidered its decision and, pursuant to the city charter, referred the matter to a three-member Medical Board of Review. Each member of the Medical Board of Review examined plaintiff, reviewed her entire pension file and issued a medical report. The doctors never met collectively. The Medical Board of Review submitted a majority opinion to defendant finding that plaintiff's disability was not causally related to her employment. Since the opinion of the Medical Board of Review is final and binding as to medical findings, the defendant denied plaintiff a duty disability pension.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court alleging that the Medical Board of Review acted in a manner inconsistent with due process requirements because it did not meet collectively to determine whether the plaintiff's disability was related to her duties as a police officer. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3) arguing that there was no dispute as to any material facts. The trial judge granted plaintiff's motion and vacated defendant's adoption of the Medical Board of Review's findings. The trial court ordered that a new Board of Review be selected and that this new Board meet collectively before submitting an opinion to the defendant.

The charter provision directly involved in the [108 MICHAPP 42] instant case is Title 9, ch 7, art III, § 12(c), which reads in pertinent part:

"If the Board of Trustees, any member, any beneficiary or any other person claiming benefits hereunder, shall disagree with any medical finding of the Medical Director, the Board of Trustees on its own motion may or on petition of any such member, beneficiary or person claiming benefits hereunder, shall refer the matter in dispute to a Medical Board of Review consisting of three physicians or surgeons, of whom one shall be named by the Board of Trustees, one by the affected member, beneficiary, or other person claiming benefits, and the third by the two so named. * * * The Board of Review shall promptly examine the medical findings in dispute and shall within sixty days from its appointment file with the Board of Trustees a written report of its findings, which shall be final and binding as to the medical findings."

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in construing the charter provision above quoted to mandate that the Medical Board of Review meet collectively. We hold that the clear and unambiguous language of the charter requires no collective meeting.

In construing provisions of a city charter the general rules recognized in cases involving the interpretation of statutes are applicable. Brady v. Detroit, 353 Mich. 243, 91 N.W.2d 257 (1958). These rules of construction have been set out in Charter Twp. of Pittsfield v. Saline, 103 Mich.App. 99, 104, 302 N.W.2d 608 (1981), as follows:

" * * * if the statute is unambiguous on its face, we will avoid further interpretation or construction of its terms. Detroit v. Redford Twp., 253 Mich. 453, 235 N.W. 217 (1931). However, if ambiguity exists, it is our duty to give...