Woods v. Charles Gabus Ford, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-0002,19-0002
• Citation: 962 N.W.2d 1
• Parties: Lucas WOODS, Appellant, v. CHARLES GABUS FORD, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

962 N.W.2d 1

Lucas WOODS, Appellant,

v.CHARLES GABUS FORD, INC., Appellee.

No. 19-0002

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Submitted October 14, 2020

Filed June 25, 2021

Harley C. Erbe(argued) of Erbe Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.

Steven H. Shindler and James R. Hinchliff(argued) of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.

Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

OXLEY, Justice.

In this companion case to Dix v. Casey's General Stores, Inc. , 961 N.W.2d 671, ––––(Iowa2021), we address the nuances of Iowa's workplace drug testing statute, the importance of complying with all aspects of its notice provisions, and the consequences for failing to do so.For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the district court to award appropriate relief.

I.Factual and Procedural Background.

Lucas Woods was employed by Charles Gabus Ford(CGF) as a lube technician.On August 9, 2017, Woods was randomly selected for a drug test conducted by Mid-Iowa Occupational Testing.The lab technician in charge of collecting Woods's sample rejected his first sample for being insufficient.The technician testified that the sample appeared to have been altered, as the color was a bright yellow-green, similar to Mountain Dew.The technician flushed the first sample and instructed Woods to drink water and provide a second sample, which Woods did.This second sample tested positive for methamphetamine.The technician testified that Woods admitted to him that he had used methamphetamine the weekend prior to the test.Woods, however, denied telling the technician he had recently used methamphetamine.

According to Woods, when he brought his second sample to the technician, the technician combined it with another sample that was sitting out.Woods claims this other sample belonged to someone else.

Later testing by Quest Diagnostics confirmed the positive result for methamphetamine.Quest sent the results to a doctor, who confirmed the results and attempted to contact Woods.The doctor's staff attempted at least four phone calls to the number they believed Woods provided on his form and left voicemails.The number they called did not belong to Woods, which they later ascribed to difficulty reading his handwriting.After the failed calls, the doctor sent the information to Mid-Iowa, which informed Kelsey Gabus McBride, HR director at CGF.

As a result, CGF fired Woods.Following Woods's termination, Gabus McBride sent Woods a letter informing him of the results of his drug test, his right to get a confirmatory test, and that he would have to pay for a confirmatory test.The letter also explained that if the sample tested negative, CGF would reimburse Woods the cost of the confirmatory test.However, the letter did not include the cost for the test.It was also sent by certified mail but without return receipt requested.

Following his termination, Woods sued CGF under Iowa Code section 730.5(15)(2017).He alleged CGF did not substantially comply with section 730.5 because it did not inform him of the cost of the retest, nor was the letter sent by certified mail with return receipt requested.In a proposed order submitted after the bench trial, Woods also argued that the test was invalid because CGF failed to adequately train the employees who administered it.The district court found the letter substantially complied with section 730.5 and dismissed Woods's petition.

The court of appeals reversed.It found the manner the letter was sent substantially complied with the statute despite not being sent return receipt requested and the training issue was not preserved for review.However, it concluded the contents of the letter did not substantially comply with section 730.5 because the letter did not provide the cost of a retest.CGF applied for, and we granted, further review.

II.Standard of Review.

The parties agree this case was tried in equity.Therefore, our review is de novo.Dix , 961 N.W.2d at 695."[U]nder a de novo review we will make our own legal conclusions, as we are not bound by and give no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law."In re Est. of Johnson , 739 N.W.2d 493, 496(Iowa2007).To the extent the proceeding turns on questions of fact, "[w]e give deference to the factual findings of the court but are not bound by them."Id.

III.Analysis.

Woods's claims focus primarily on the notice he received following his positive test for methamphetamine.He argues that notice was deficient in two respects: (1) it did not include the cost of a retest and (2) it was not sent return receipt requested.He also alleges Gabus McBride was not properly trained.

A.Whether Charles Gabus Ford Complied with Section 730.5 ’s Training Requirements.Woods argues Gabus McBride was not properly trained to administer drug tests under Iowa Code section 730.5(9)(h ).However, Woods raised the issue for the first time in the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law he submitted following the bench trial, and the district court did not rule on it.

"It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal."This doctrine is based on the principle that "[i]t is not a sensible exercise of appellate review to analyze facts of an issue ‘without the benefit of a full record or lower court determination[ ].’ "

UE Loc. 893/IUP v. State , 928 N.W.2d 51, 60(Iowa2019)(alterations in original)(citation omitted)(quotingMeier v. Senecaut , 641 N.W.2d 532, 537(Iowa2002) ).

Because Woods did not raise this issue until after completion of the trial, CGF did not present evidence of Gabus McBride's training.No questions were asked about her training during trial testimony, by Woods or CGF.That Woods raised the issue a second time in his motion to reconsider does not change the fact that CGF had no opportunity to present evidence about whether Gabus McBride was properly trained.It is the employer's burden to prove compliance with section 730.5,Iowa Code § 730.5(15)(b ), but the employee must first put the employer on notice of the employee's claims so the employer may respond appropriately.Cf.U.S. Bank v. Barbour , 770 N.W.2d 350, 354(Iowa2009)("A ‘petition need not allege ultimate facts that support each element of the cause of action[;]’ however, a petition ‘must contain factual allegations that give the defendant"fair notice" of the claim asserted so the defendant can adequately respond to the petition.’ "(alteration in original)(quotingRees v. City of Shenandoah , 682 N.W.2d 77, 79(Iowa2004) )).

CGF did not present evidence of Gabus McBride's training, but, in light of the fact that Woods did not raise the training issue until after the close of evidence, this issue was not preserved.Cf.UE Loc. 893/IUP , 928 N.W.2d at 60("Our doctrine of error preservation ‘requires a party seeking to appeal an issue presented to , but not considered by, the district court to call to the attention of the district court its failure to decide the issue.’ "(emphasis added)(quotingMeier , 641 N.W.2d at 540 )).Thus, we do not decide whether Gabus McBride was properly trained.Seeid.("The claim or issue raised does not actually need to be used as the basis for the decision to be preserved, but the record must at least reveal the court was aware of the claim or issue and litigated it. "(emphasis added)(quotingMeier , 641 N.W.2d at 540 )).

B.Whether Charles Gabus Ford Substantially Complied With Iowa Code Section 730.5 ’s Notice Requirements.Iowa Code section 730.5(7)(j )(1) declares:

If a confirmed positive test result for drugs or alcohol for a current employee is reported to the employer by the medical review officer, the employer shall notify the employee in writing by certified mail, return receipt requested , of the results of the test, the employee's right to request and obtain a confirmatory test of the second sample ... at an approved laboratory of the employee's choice, and the fee payable by the employee to the employer for reimbursement of expenses concerning the test.The fee charged an employee shall be an amount that represents the costs associated with conducting the second confirmatory test, which shall be consistent with the employer's cost for conducting the initial confirmatory test on an employee's sample.

(emphasis added).

We have described section 730.5 as providing "severely circumscribed conditions designed to ensure accurate testing and to protect employees from unfair and unwarranted discipline."Harrison v. Emp. Appeal Bd. , 659 N.W.2d 581, 588(Iowa2003).In Sims v. NCI Holding Corp. , we held that section 730.5(7) is subject to a substantial compliance standard.759 N.W.2d 333, 338(Iowa2009)."Substantial compliance is said to be compliance in respect to essential matters necessary to assure the reasonable objectives of the statute."Id.(quotingSuperior/Ideal, Inc. v. Bd. of Rev. , 419 N.W.2d 405, 407(Iowa1988) ).This standard recognizes the detailed and often complex conditions placed on employers choosing to use a workplace drug testing program while ensuring compliance with the purposes and protections provided by the statutory scheme.

The notice requirement of section 730.5(7)(j )(1) provides important protections for the employee.Id.

Section 730.5(7)([j ])(1) accomplishes this protective purpose by mandating written notice by certified mail of (1) any positive drug test, (2) the employee's right to obtain a confirmatory test, and (3) the fee payable by the employee to the employer for reimbursement of the expense of the test.

Id.The employer must "provid[e] notice to the employee of the positive test result and a meaningful opportunity to consider whether to undertake a confirmatory test" to substantially comply with section 730.5(7)(j )(1).Id.Woods argues the notice sent by CGF did not substantially comply with...