Woods v. Dist. of Columbia, 11–CV–1011.
Decision Date | 28 March 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 11–CV–1011.,11–CV–1011. |
Citation | 63 A.3d 551 |
Parties | Phyllis WOODS, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jeffrey L. Light, with whom Daniel E. Schultz, Washington, was on the brief, for appellant.
Holly M. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before OBERLY and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and STEADMAN, Senior Judge.
Phyllis Woods sued the District of Columbia, claiming that her medical condition was aggravated because she relied on a negligent diagnosis by a District ambulance crew that provided her with emergency care. The trial court granted the District's motion to dismiss Ms. Woods's suit on the ground that, even if the District's actions were negligent, the District was shielded from liability by the public-duty doctrine, which precludes holding the District liable in negligence based on a duty to the general public, rather than on a duty arising out of a special relationship with the plaintiff. See generally, e.g., Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 131–32 (D.C.1990). We affirm.
For current purposes, the parties do not dispute the following facts. While visiting a friend, Ms. Woods became ill, with symptoms including slurred speech, loss of balance, and vomiting. In response to a 911 call, a District ambulance crew arrived at the friend's home to evaluate Ms. Woods. After examining Ms. Woods both inside the residence and outside in the ambulance, the ambulance personnel concluded that Ms. Woods had become ill because she had recently stopped smoking cigarettes. The District personnel advised Ms. Woods of their diagnosis and told her that it was not necessary to transport her to a hospital emergency room for further evaluation or treatment. After the ambulance crew departed, Ms. Woods remained at her friend's house overnight without seeking additional care. The next morning Ms. Woods became ill once again, and was transported to the hospital, where it was determined that Ms. Woods had suffered a “completed stroke” that morning.
Ms. Woods sued the District, alleging that her medical condition had been worsened by her reliance on an incorrect diagnosis provided to her by District personnel. Relying on the public-duty doctrine, the trial court granted the District's motion to dismiss Ms. Woods's suit.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth sufficient facts to establish the elements of a legally cognizableclaim. Chamberlain v. American Honda Fin. Corp., 931 A.2d 1018, 1023 (D.C.2007). This court reviews de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1022. The court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint as true and view [s] all facts and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff [ ].” Hillbroom v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 17 A.3d 566, 572 (D.C.2011).
In general, “[t]he elements of a cause of action for negligence are a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant, and damage to the interests of the plaintiff, proximately caused by the breach.” Taylor v. District of Columbia, 776 A.2d 1208, 1214 (D.C.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). “With respect to the duty of care owed by the District in a case like the one before us, ... a government and its agents owe no general duty to provide public services to particular citizens as individuals.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]bsent a special relationship between the [District] and an individual, no specific legal duty exists,” and a suit against the District based on a claim of simple negligence will “fail[ ] as a matter of law.” Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 3, 4 (D.C.1981) (en banc). Accord, e.g., Klahr v. District of Columbia, 576 A.2d 718, 719 (D.C.1990) ( ).1
Although the District generally cannot be held liable in negligence for its failure to provide services to the general public, liability can arise if there is a “special relationship” between the District and the plaintiff. Warren, 444 A.2d at 4. This court has used somewhat varying formulations to describe the circumstances in which such a special relationship will arise. In Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1314 (D.C.1983) (en banc), for example, the court explained that a special relationship will arise if there is “(1) a specific undertaking to protect a particular individual, and (2) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff.” In Snowder v. District of Columbia, 949 A.2d 590, 604 (D.C.2008), the court described the first component of the special-relationship test in terms of a “direct contact or continuing contact between the victim and the governmental agency.” 2
This court has indicated that justifiable reliance may be shown by establishing that “affirmative acts” by District employees “actually and directly worsen[ed] the [plaintiff's] condition.” Johnson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 140, 142–43 (D.C.1990). See also id. at 143 (). As the court has cautioned, however, “that is not to say that even acts worsening the victim's condition are always sufficient to form a basis for liability.” Id. at 143 n. 4. In general, “[t]his court has adhered to a strict interpretation of the special relationship test, including the justifiable reliance prong.” Taylor, 776 A.2d at 1218.See also Powell v. District of Columbia, 602 A.2d 1123, 1128 (D.C.1992) ( ). 3
Ms. Woods's principal contention is that District employees created a special relationship with her by undertaking to examine her and by providing her a mistaken medical diagnosis, upon which she relied to her detriment. We hold to the contrary.
We acknowledge at the outset that there is language in this court's decisions that, considered in isolation, provides support for Ms. Woods's contention. For example, the interaction between Ms. Woods and the ambulance personnel who examined her can reasonably be described as a “direct contact.” Snowder, 949 A.2d at 604. Accepting the allegations in the amended complaint as true, moreover, Ms. Woods's physical condition was worsened because she justifiably relied upon the ambulance personnel's affirmative conduct in negligently misdiagnosing her condition. Conversely, however, there is also broad language in our prior opinions that, considered in similar isolation, could be viewed as foreclosing Ms. Woods's contention. See, e.g., Allison Gas Turbine Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 642 A.2d 841, 845 (D.C.1994) ( )(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); Wanzer, 580 A.2d at 132 ().4
In deciding the question before us, we must consider more than just isolated phrases in our prior decisions. Cf., e.g., Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 511, 520, 184 L.Ed.2d 417 (2012) (); Kraft v. Kraft, 155 A.2d 910, 913 (D.C.1959) (). We therefore turn to a more concrete analysis of this court's prior decisions, focusing not only on the court's holdings but also on the court's “explications of the governing rules of law.” Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that this court's prior cases foreclose Ms. Woods's claim that her reliance on an alleged misdiagnosis by District personnel gave rise to a special relationship permitting liability in negligence notwithstanding the public-duty doctrine.
This court has on two prior occasions considered claims that the District could be held liable in negligence because the plaintiff relied to his or her detriment upon actions or representations by District employees providing emergency assistance. See Miller v. District of Columbia, 841 A.2d 1244, 1245–48 (D.C.2004); Warren, 444 A.2d at 1–4.5 In each case, this court found the claim to be foreclosed. Finding no meaningful distinction between those cases and this one, we reach the same conclusion here.
First, in Warren, the plaintiffs alleged that, after receiving a mistaken assurance from a police dispatcher that help was on the way, they called out to check on a roommate who was being assaulted during a burglary at their house. 444 A.2d at 2. The plaintiffs' cries alerted the burglars to the plaintiffs' presence, and the plaintiffs were kidnapped and severely abused. Id. Although the plaintiffs alleged that they had relied on the police dispatcher's false assurance, this court held that the public-duty doctrine barred a negligence action, because no special relationship had been established. Id. at 4. As this court later explained it, Warren concluded that the actions of the police during the rescue operation were...
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