Woods v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 02 November 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 20-0782 (CKK)
• Parties: JERMAINE WOODS, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA and DANIEL LEO Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

JERMAINE WOODS, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA and DANIEL LEO Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-0782 (CKK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

November 2, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Now before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"), see ECF No. 6, of Officer Daniel Leo and the District of Columbia (collectively, "Defendants"). Upon consideration of the briefing, the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole,¹ the Court will GRANT Defendants' Motion and DISMISS Plaintiff's claims, see ECF No. 1-1, against both the District of Columbia and Officer Leo WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

First, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's common law claims against the District of Columbia in Counts I and II of the Complaint because Plaintiff has not demonstrated compliance with the notice requirements of D.C. Code § 12-309. In addition, the Court must dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against the District of Columbia, including his claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Next, the Court also dismisses each of Plaintiff's claims against Officer Leo, in his individualcapacity, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finally, Plaintiff purports to sue Officer Leo in his "official" capacity. Compl. ¶ 5. But these "official capacity" claims against Officer Leo are duplicative of the claims Plaintiff asserts against the District of Columbia. See Mack v. Aspen of DC, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 215, 218 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)). As such, the Court will treat these "official capacity" claims against Officer Leo in the same manner as Plaintiff's claims against the District of Columbia, which the Court dismisses herein. See Harris v. Bowser, 404 F. Supp. 3d 190, 195-96 (D.D.C. 2019), aff'd, No. 19-5246, 2020 WL 873558 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2020); Cotton v. District of Columbia, 421 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2006).

I. BACKGROUND

On January 18, 2017, an off-duty police officer with the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") of Washington, D.C. reported that the driver of a vehicle (the "Suspect") at the intersection of 3rd and U Streets, Northeast, had fired multiple gun shots in the area. Compl. ¶ 7. Sometime thereafter, the Suspect picked up Mr. Jermaine Woods ("Plaintiff") in his vehicle and "attempted to drive [Plaintiff] to his home." Id. ¶ 9. When the Suspect picked Plaintiff up, Plaintiff was allegedly unaware of the Suspect's involvement in the prior shooting. See id. Also unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the off-duty MPD officer who had observed the earlier shooting, provided a description of the Suspect and his vehicle to fellow MPD officers. See id. ¶ 8. These MPD officers, including Officer Daniel Leo, were then able to locate the Suspect's vehicle "operating in the area of the 300 block of W Street, Northwest" and follow the Suspect until he arrived at Plaintiff's house. Id. ¶¶ 8-10.

When the Suspect arrived at Plaintiff's house, the MPD officers pulled their police vehicle in behind the Suspect's car. Id. ¶ 10. Then, as Plaintiff exited the Suspect's car and began to walk towards the gate behind his house, see id., Officer Leo allegedly exited the police vehicle and"instantly began to fire his service weapon at Plaintiff without uttering a single word," id. ¶ 11. Concerned for his life, Plaintiff "immediately dropped to the ground and attempted to crawl under a nearby van for safety." Id. ¶ 12. Officer Leo, however, allegedly continued to fire his service weapon at Plaintiff, though Plaintiff does not allege that he was injured during this gunfire. Id. ¶ 13. Officer Leo then proceeded to arrest Plaintiff, handcuff him, and place him in the back of the MPD police vehicle for "several hours." Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Thereafter, Plaintiff "was taken to Providence Hospital to treat physical injuries attributed to his arrest." Id. ¶ 15. He was released from police custody and the hospital on that same day. Id.

Plaintiff has "proclaimed his innocence and sought explanations for [Officer Leo's] violent actions." Id. ¶ 16. On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed a civil action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia asserting three claims against both Officer Leo and the District of Columbia. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1-1. Defendants, however, removed Plaintiff's action to this Court, see Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1, at 1-3, and subsequently moved to dismiss Plaintiff's action in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, under Rule 56. The briefing on Defendants' Motion has closed and the Motion is now ripe for this Court's review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content thatallows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts "do not accept as true, however, the plaintiff's legal conclusions or inferences that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

III. DISCUSSION

In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts three distinct claims: (1) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, (2) Negligent Training and Supervision, and (3) an Excessive Force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. ¶¶ 22-37. Plaintiff asserts each claim against both the District of Columbia and Officer Leo, in his individual capacity. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will DISMISS each claim against the District of Columbia and Officer Leo WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

A. Section 12-309 Notice

In Counts I and II of the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks damages from the District of Columbia under common law claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Negligent Training and Supervision. See Compl. ¶¶ 22-28. As a threshold matter, the Court must dismiss these common law claims against the District of Columbia because Plaintiff failed "to provide proper notice of those claims pursuant to D.C. Code § 12-309." Martin v. District of Columbia, 720 F. Supp. 2d 19, 24 (D.D.C. 2010). Specifically, § 12-309 provides that "an action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage." D.C. Code § 12-309(a). Compliance with § 12-309 is "mandatory as a prerequisite to filing suit against the District," Hubbard v. Chidel, 790A.2d 558, 571-72 (D.C. 2002) (quotation omitted), and unless a plaintiff demonstrates such compliance, his "suit against the District is properly dismissed," District of Columbia v. Arnold & Porter, 756 A.2d 427, 436 (D.C. 2000) (quotation omitted).

Plaintiff advances multiple arguments regarding § 12-309 notice, none of which is availing. As an initial matter, Plaintiff's Complaint offers no more than the conclusory allegation that "the District of Columbia was given notice of this potential claim consistent with D.C. Code § 12-309." Compl. ¶ 2 n.1. The Complaint, however, provides no factual allegations about when this notice was given, let alone that the notice was properly given to the District of Columbia within six months of Plaintiff's alleged injury on January 18, 2017. See Compl. ¶ 7. Neither does the Complaint offer factual allegations regarding to whom Plaintiff provided the notice, or even what the contents of the notice were. Cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As such, there are no factual allegations in the Complaint from which the Court could plausibly infer that Plaintiff "provide[d] written notice of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of [his] injury or damage to the Mayor of the District of Columbia," in compliance with § 12-309. Martin, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 24. This deficiency alone requires the dismissal of Plaintiff's common law claims against the District of Columbia. See id. at 25 n.6 (dismissing common law claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to provide notice under § 12-309); Nutt v. District of Columbia Gov't, No. CV 19-3220 (ABJ), 2020 WL 4597100, at *4-5 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2020) (dismissing common law claims against the District of Columbia where "the complaint fail[ed] to allege any facts to show that plaintiff complied with the notice requirement" of § 12-309).

Plaintiff attempts to remedy this deficiency by arguing in his opposition "that existing police reports provide enough notice." Pl.'s Opp'n at 11. The police reports Plaintiff references, however, do not provide the District of Columbia with adequate § 12-309 notice of his commonlaw claims.² In general, a plaintiff may rely upon a police report for purposes of notice, as § 12-309 provides that "[a] report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under this section." D.C. Code § 12-309(a). "But the mere existence of a police report does not necessarily mean that the District has received the type of actual notice which § 12-309 contemplates." Patrick v. District of Columbia, 126 F. Supp. 3d 132, 136 (D.D.C. 2015) (...