Woods v. Edwards, 5209.
| Decision Date | 20 November 1947 |
| Docket Number | No. 5209.,5209. |
| Citation | 74 F. Supp. 534 |
| Parties | WOODS v. EDWARDS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Joseph E. Babka and Thomas R. R. Ely, both of St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff.
N. Murry Edwards and James A. Waechter, both of St. Louis, Mo., for defendant.
The complaint is in two counts, one for injunctive relief and the other for double damages for alleged overcharge of rent received by defendant from Dorothy Morgan. The case was submitted on stipulation of facts and testimony of Dorothy Morgan.
Plaintiff pleads an overcharge by defendant in renting housing accommodations to Dorothy Morgan by charging her $100.00 per month for a period from October 1, 1946 to January 1, 1947, when maximum legal rent was $35.00 per month. The premises are 3825 Delmar Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri. The dispute hangs on defendant and Dorothy Morgan signing a lease by which Dorothy Morgan agreed to pay a monthly rent of $35.00 per month for the dwelling house at 3825 Delmar Boulevard, $35.00 for a vacant lot on one side of the dwelling, and $30.00 for a vacant lot on the other side of the dwelling. Plaintiff's position is, defendant required Dorothy Morgan to rent the two lots as a condition for renting her the housing accommodation and the transaction is a tying agreement evading and in conflict with the rent regulations under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq. Defendant counters—(1) that Dorothy Morgan did not occupy the dwelling but operated a rooming-house under management of an agent and therefore the property is business and not housing accommodations under the terms of the Act; (2) that renting of the lots was a good faith transaction without intent to and not evasive of rent regulations.
Paragraph 7 of the stipulation recites: "The parties agree that the only question for the Court to determine is whether defendant lawfully charged more than the maximum legal rent on housing accommodations at 3825 Delmar Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri." The only additional issue that could be in the case is wilful violation.
Defendant owned a 14-room dwelling house at 3825 Delmar Boulevard and a vacant lot on each side of the lot occupied by the dwelling. The dwelling was registered "with O.P.A. at $35.00 a month in 1942". The 1942 registration was the last. J. A. Dunn was occupying the house on September 1, 1946, and operating a rooming house. Dunn was paying "$35.00 a month for said building * * * in addition thereto did rent the * * * lot * * * adjoining * * * and pay the defendant $30.00 a month for the rent thereof." In September 1946 Dorothy Morgan purchased the rooming house equipment from Dunn. Before completing the purchase Dorothy Morgan interviewed defendant and obtained his consent to occupy the premises. Dorothy Morgan testified, on her first interview with defendant she understood she would be required to rent one lot and that the rent "would be $65.00". Dorothy Morgan completed purchase of the furniture, started operation of a rooming house through an agent, and then pressed the defendant for a lease. She made many requests of the defendant to prepare the lease. Some time between purchase of the furnishings and execution of the lease about October 14, 1946, defendant informed Dorothy Morgan that the dwelling and two lots "had to rent together because they had to sell together". Defendant and Dorothy Morgan then executed the lease, written by defendant, which among other things provides:
"Parcel No. 1 House at 3825 Delmar Blvd. and 35
foot lot upon which the same is located Rent $35.00 per Mo
Parcel No. 2 35 foot lot adjoining on the east of
3825 Delmar Blvd. Rent 30.00 per Mo
Parcel No. 3 Lot, 55 foot front by 150 foot depth
adjoining on the west of 3825 Delmar
Blvd. Rent 35.00 per Mo
______
Total Rent $100.00 per Mo."
(I). We find no exemption taking the premises occupied by the dwelling from control of the Rent Regulation because of its use as a rooming house. Section 1 of Rent Regulations for Housing exempts rooming houses which "with the consent of the Administrator" are "brought under the control of the Rent Regulation for Hotels and Rooming Houses". No such claim is here made. There is a further exemption where structures of "more than 25 rooms are rented or offered for rent by any lessee, sublessee or other tenant of such entire structure or premises". Patently such exemption has no application. Subsection 4 of Section 1 provides the Regulation "does apply to entire structures or premises wherein 25 or less rooms are rented or offered for rent by any lessee, sublessee or other tenant of such entire structure or premises, whether or not used by lessee, sublessee or other tenant as a hotel or rooming house." This does not relieve defendant from control of the Act on the dwelling. The fact Dorothy Morgan operated a rooming house in the dwelling, for profit, by an agent presents no basis for exempting the premises from the regulation. That Dorothy Morgan did not occupy one or more rooms in the rooming house is no justification, in our opinion, for taking the premises from the regulation. There is no requirement in the regulation that the operator of a rooming house shall live on the premises. Whether the operator does or does not live on the premises, does or does not rent rooms, does not alter the objective of the regulation to control the rent on premises used for dwelling on housing purposes. The necessity is just as great that an overcharge shall not be made on the premises whether the lessee does or does not live on the premises. What the lessee pays for rent regulates what the roomers pay for rent. If there is no control on what the rent shall be that is exacted of the lessee, in turn there is no control on what the room rent shall be, payable by the roomers.
(II). The dwelling was, in accordance with rent regulations, registered with the Office of Price Administration, with the maximum legal rent fixed at $35.00 per month. Section 9 of the rent regulation provides: "The maximum rents and other requirements provided in this regulation shall not be evaded, either directly or indirectly, in connection with the renting or leasing * * * of housing accommodations * * * by tying agreement, or otherwise."
Do the facts in this case show the defendant, directly or indirectly, evaded the maximum rent on the premises by tying agreement, or otherwise? Defendant urges in his brief that there was no evasion or tying contract in this case because Dorothy Morgan did not request rental of the dwelling separate from the lots and because rental of the lots is set out in the lease separate from rental of the dwelling. That defendant's position in this respect may not be misunderstood we quote from his brief: "The lease of the three pieces of property contains the exact terms that Miss Morgan requested and demanded." In passing on the purpose of defendant not to violate rental regulations in rental of the lots with the dwelling, we believe a proper setting of the parties will serve a salutary purpose. Defendant is an active practicing lawyer, very positive and forceful in manner of speech, a man able to take care of himself in court on most any occasion. We assume as a matter of fact he knew the rental regulation. Dorothy Morgan testified in this case. She appeared timid. It was with difficulty the Court was able to hear her testimony. She impressed the Court as being frank but not as a positive or forceful character. Dorothy Morgan evidenced ignorance of the rental regulations. The stipulation of facts is not as revealing as the testimony of Dorothy Morgan on the attitude of defendant on the occasion of the first interview between defendant and Dorothy Morgan. There is no conflict between her testimony and the stipulation. The testimony of Dorothy Morgan is to the effect that the defendant met her at 3860 Washington "and stated how the — how they had to rent the house and lot, thirty-five dollars — the lot west of the house was thirty-five dollars and the lot east of the house was thirty dollars; and I asked him if the place was being sold, and he said yes, the place was being sold and that they had to rent together because they had to sell together." Defendant knew that Dorothy Morgan was buying the furniture and equipment of Mr. Dunn and intended to continue the operation of the rooming house. After the first conversation between defendant and Dorothy Morgan, Dorothy Morgan concluded her transaction with Mr. Dunn. She was then faced with the situation of owning the equipment in a rooming house, of having no lease and being under the impression that she...
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Woods v. Schwartz
...526; Anchor Liquor Company v. United States, 10 Cir., 158 F.2d 221; Coffin-Redington v. Porter, 9 Cir., 156 F.2d 113; Woods v. Edwards, D.C.E.D. Mo., 74 F.Supp. 534; Edwards v. Woods, 8 Cir., 168 F.2d 827; Rosenfeld v. United States, D.C.E.D.S.C., affirmed 4 Cir., 167 F.2d Section 13(a) (6)......
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Edwards v. Woods, 13681.
...proceedings not inconsistent herewith as may be appropriate. Warner Holding Co. v. Creedon, 8 Cir., 166 F.2d 119. 1 Woods v. Edwards, D.C., 74 F.Supp. 534, 538. 2 Paragraph 7 of the stipulation "`The parties agree that the only question for the Court to determine is whether defendant lawful......