Woods v. Executive Office of Communities and Development

• Decision Date: 09 January 1992
• Citation: 411 Mass. 599,583 N.E.2d 845
• Parties: Kemmie WOODS et al. 1 v. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF COMMUNITIES AND DEVELOPMENT et al. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 845

583 N.E.2d 845

411 Mass. 599

Kemmie WOODS et al. ¹ v. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF COMMUNITIES AND DEVELOPMENT et al.²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 5, 1991.

Decided Jan. 9, 1992.

Margaret F. Turner (Thomas A. Mela, with her), for plaintiffs.

Daniel W. Halston, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Thomas A. Barnico, Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for defendants.

William Breitbart, for Citizens Housing and Planning Ass'n, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, GREANEY, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

The plaintiffs, low-income tenants participating in the State housing voucher program, brought suit, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, in the Superior Court challenging a decision of the Executive Office of Communities and Development (EOCD) to reduce program benefits to all recipients by $200 a month effective September 1, 1991. The decision was made in response to language contained in the fiscal year 1992 budget, St.1991, c. 138, § 2, line item 3722-9024, which, EOCD claimed, mandated such a reduction. The line item appropriated $97,577,388 for, among other things, "a program of housing assistance consistent with the program requirements established by the federal government for the program authorized by Public Law 98-181, Section 207 [i.e., the so-called Section 8 program] ... provided that notwithstanding any general or special law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the department shall reduce the average housing voucher monthly payment standard by two hundred dollars by September 1, 1991." Of the $97,577,388, the amount of $6,185,780 was targeted specifically for the State housing voucher program.

The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint: (1) that EOCD had exceeded the terms of the mandate set forth in the line item, because such a reduction of their benefits violated the provisions of the Federal Section 8 program; (2) that EOCD had abused its discretion in interpreting the line item to require the immediate reduction of benefits to all recipients; and (3) that the reduction as implemented constituted a violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1988), by effectively denying housing on the basis of race, color, or national origin, by discriminating in the terms and conditions of housing, and by perpetuating segregated housing. ³ The plaintiffs sought certification of a class action; a declaration that an "across-the-board" reduction of program benefits in the manner implemented by EOCD was unlawful; and preliminary and permanent injunctions against EOCD's reduction of the benefits except in accordance with Federal Section 8 program provisions.

A judge in the Superior Court denied the plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction. ⁴ The judge concluded that, while the plaintiffs had shown that they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, and that the balance of harms weighed in their favor, the plaintiffs' had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits.

The plaintiffs petitioned a single justice of the Appeals Court for relief pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 118, first par., from the denial of their application for a preliminary injunction in the Superior Court. The single justice concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that EOCD had exceeded its authority in interpreting the line item, and he directed the entry of a preliminary injunction ordering that program benefits be restored to prereduction levels for the month of November, 1991. See Edwin R. Sage Co. v. Foley, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 20, 22-25, 421 N.E.2d 460 (1981). The single justice then reported to a panel of the Appeals Court the question noted below. ⁵ We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We treat the question of the single justice of the Appeals Court as essentially reporting the propriety of his ruling that the plaintiffs had demonstrated entitlement to a preliminary injunction. ⁶ See Foreign Auto Import, Inc. v. Renault Northeast, Inc., 367 Mass. 464, 468-469, 326 N.E.2d 888 (1975). We conclude that the plaintiffs are entitled to such an injunction. ⁷

The State housing voucher program, begun in 1987, provides rental assistance to low-income tenants. Under the program, which is administered through EOCD and local housing authorities, tenants find apartments with private landlords in the marketplace, and the State makes monthly rental assistance payments to the landlords on the tenants' behalf. As of September 30, 1991, 1,218 tenants were participants in the program.

The program receives no Federal money and is not subject to any Federal control. However, the Legislature intended EOCD to administer the program in a manner consistent with the Federal Section 8 housing voucher program, ⁸ which EOCD also administers. This intent is clearly expressed in the budget line item for the program, which in each year's appropriation has provided: "for a program of housing assistance consistent with the program requirements established by the federal government for the program authorized by Public Law 98-181, Section 207 [the Federal Section 8 housing voucher program]." ⁹ In keeping with this direction, EOCD has always administered the program in conformity with the Federal regulations. ¹⁰

Pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 887.351(a) and (b), EOCD maintains a schedule of "payment standard amounts" for apartments of various sizes (single room occupancy and zero to four bedrooms) in various municipalities within its jurisdiction. The payment standard amounts (from which the actual housing subsidies are derived) must be between 80 and 100 per cent of the fair market values for rental property in the area, as calculated by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). See 24 C.F.R. § 887.351(b)(2) (1991). Once a payment standard is determined for a tenant, EOCD may not substitute a new, lower payment standard until the tenant relocates to a new unit. See 24 C.F.R. § 887.353(b)(3)(i) (1991). The housing subsidy is calculated from the payment standard amount; for most tenants, the subsidy is lower than the payment standard by a figure representing 30 per cent of the tenant's household income. 24 C.F.R. § 887.353(a) (1991).

In its budget for fiscal year 1992, the Legislature reiterated its intent that the State housing voucher program be administered in accordance with Federal regulations, and for the first time added the following language to the line item: "provided that notwithstanding any general or special law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the department shall reduce the average housing voucher monthly payment standard by two hundred dollars by September 1, 1991" (emphasis supplied). The appropriation for the program was reduced from $11,078,596 for fiscal year 1991, to $6,185,780 for fiscal year 1992.

EOCD implemented this new statutory mandate by ordering a reduction of $200 in housing subsidies to all tenants participating in the program, effective September 1, 1991. The plaintiffs claim that, in doing so, EOCD violated the plain language of the line item, which requires a reduction of the "payment standard" rather than the housing subsidy. By using the term "payment standard," the plaintiffs argue, the Legislature intended EOCD to implement the reduction by reducing tenants' subsidies only when they relocate in conformity with 24 C.F.R. § 887.353(b)(3)(i). We agree.

Our conclusion follows from established principles of statutory construction. In using the words "payment standard," the Legislature was referring to that technical term as defined in the Federal regulations, 24 C.F.R. § 887.351(a). ¹¹ See Assessors of Melrose v. Driscoll, 370 Mass. 443, 447, 348 N.E.2d 783 (1976), and cases cited. We construe "technical words and phrases and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law ... according to such meaning." G.L. c. 4, § 6, Third (1990 ed.). See Nichols v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 314 Mass. 285, 305, 50 N.E.2d 76 (1943); Ex parte Hall, 1 Pick. 261, 261-262 (1822). By choosing the technical term "payment standard," with its attendant restrictions as set out in the Federal regulations, the Legislature expressed its intent that those regulations should be applicable. In this case, the regulations require that a tenant's "payment standard amount" may not be changed until a tenant relocates.

Our interpretation also conforms to the principle favoring the narrow construction of a statutory proviso. "It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that '... where a provision, general in its language and objects, is followed by a proviso, ... the proviso is to be strictly construed, as taking no case out of the provision that does not fairly fall within the terms of the proviso, the latter being understood as carving out of the provision only specified exception, within the words as well as within the reason of the former.' Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, 742." Opinion of the Justices, 254 Mass. 617, 620, 151 N.E. 680 (1926). See Commonwealth v. Germano, 379 Mass. 268, 271-273, 397 N.E.2d 663 (1979); Martin v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 745, 747, 477 N.E.2d 426 (1985); Lexington Educ. Ass'n v. Lexington, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 749, 752-753, 448 N.E.2d 1271 (1983). In this enactment, the general intent of the Legislature is that EOCD administer the housing voucher program in a manner consistent with the Federal regulations. The more specific proviso requires EOCD to reduce the payment standard by $200, "notwithstanding any general or special law, rule or regulation to the contrary." EOCD may comply with this mandate by reducing the payment standard by $200 notwithstanding the Federal regulation that prohibits payment standard amounts from falling below 80 per cent of HUD's fair market value calculations, 24 C.F.R. § 887.351(b)(2), and by otherwise...