Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc.
Decision Date | 05 April 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 93-2296,93-2296 |
Citation | 30 F.3d 255 |
Parties | 65 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1109, 5 NDLR P 242 Jimmie E. WOODS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. FRICTION MATERIALS, INC., Defendant, Appellee. . Heard |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Frederick T. Golder, with whom Bernstein, Golder & Miller, P.A., Lynnfield, MA, was on brief, for appellant.
Samuel A. Marcosson, James R. Neely, Jr., Gwendolyn Young Reams, and Vincent J. Blackwood, Washington, DC, were on brief, for E.E.O.C., amicus curiae.
Dan T. Carter, with whom James Allan Smith, Smith, Currie & Hancock, Atlanta, GA, Richard W. Gleeson, and Gleeson & Corcoran, Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellee.
Before BREYER, * Chief Judge, BOUDIN and STAHL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Jimmie E. Woods filed a complaint charging defendant Friction Materials Inc. ("FMI") with illegal race, age, and handicap discrimination in violation of state and federal law. Woods now appeals the district court grant of summary judgment in favor of FMI. We affirm.
Woods, a 54 year-old, handicapped, African-American male, was employed between 1961 and 1986 by PT/BT, a small group of interrelated brake manufacturing companies in Lawrence, Massachusetts. During his tenure with PT/BT, Woods was promoted twice, to the position of foreman in 1968, and to the position of supervisor in 1970. In 1986, FMI, a wholly owned subsidiary of Echlin, Inc. ("Echlin") acquired the assets of PT/BT. Thereafter, Woods continued working at FMI as a production foreman without a break in service.
In February of 1987, Echlin, concerned about the financial condition of the newly formed FMI, fired FMI's president and manufacturing manager. Three days later, Echlin appointed Patrick Healey to the top managerial position at FMI, that of division manager. Under Healey's leadership, FMI began to retool and update its manufacturing processes.
As a result, Woods and the other three FMI production foremen in the block-making department (Richard Bond, a 45 year-old caucasian male, Paul Harris, a 65 year-old African-American male, and Peter Lane, an 50 year-old African-American male) experienced an increase in their duties and responsibilities. According to Woods, FMI began to expect more from its employees and the supervisor's position became more complicated than it had been when he worked at PT/BT. Deposition of J. Woods at 28. After the reorganization began, of the four supervisors in the block-making department, Bond was terminated for poor performance and Lane was demoted to a non-supervisory position. Woods initially fared well at FMI, as evidenced by a November 1987 written evaluation in which Superintendent Elvin Valentin gave Woods an overall rating of three on a scale of one to five. In 1988, however, Woods learned that Valentin's opinion of his work had diminished. In a ten to fifteen In October 1988, Woods was injured in a non-work related automobile accident. The resulting injuries forced Woods to take an extended medical leave of absence from FMI. By the end of February 1989, Woods had used all of his medical and vacation leave time and still was unable to return to work. Pursuant to FMI's policy of terminating all employees who are unable to work after the expiration of their leave time, notwithstanding the ongoing nature of the ailment, FMI terminated Woods. Woods does not challenge his termination.
minute review, Valentin told Woods that both he and manufacturing manager Ray Shaffer (Woods' direct supervisor) felt that Woods was not performing up to his capability, that he needed to improve his scheduling and interpersonal skills, and that he would not be receiving a raise. Id. at 47-49.
By 1989, Woods was physically able to return to work. In late 1989, FMI began interviewing candidates for the position of production foreman for a new production line. Woods, along with approximately seventy-four others, applied for one of four available positions. Of the seventy-five applicants, personnel manager Arthur McKew decided to interview eight, including Woods. The eight applicants were interviewed by two of FMI's production superintendents, Warren Kappeler and Garnet Wilson 1, who evaluated the candidates on their manufacturing and production knowledge and comprehension, supervisory skills, and general demeanor. Both Kappeler and Wilson assessed Woods' supervisory skills and understanding of production processes as weak and felt that on balance these weaknesses outweighed Woods' years of experience. Both men recommended that Woods not be hired. McKew stated that he ultimately decided not to hire Woods based upon the interviews and Woods' previous performance evaluations. In his deposition, McKew conceded that although Woods could have filled one of the open positions, he was not hired because there were others who he found to be better qualified. The positions were thereafter filled by four younger, nonhandicapped, caucasian males. Woods concedes that he is unaware of the qualifications possessed by those ultimately hired.
On March 19, 1990, Woods filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"). On May 7, 1990, Woods commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Superior Court of Massachusetts for the County of Middlesex. In his complaint, Woods charged FMI with age discrimination in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq., and with age and/or race and/or color and/or handicap discrimination in violation of Mass.Gen.L. ch. 151B and Mass.Gen.L. ch. 93 Secs. 102 and 103.
After removing the action to the federal district court in Massachusetts, FMI filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims, claiming that Woods had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not shown that he was qualified for the position sought, and, in the alternative, that FMI's decision not to hire Woods had been made for nondiscriminatory reasons, i.e., those hired were better qualified. Woods filed a motion in opposition. On October 1, 1993, the district court issued a written order in which it awarded summary judgment in FMI's favor, finding that although Woods had established a prima facie case, he had failed to allege sufficient facts to rebut FMI's articulated nondiscriminatory reasons under both ADEA and Mass.Gen.L. ch. 151B. The district court further held that Woods' claim under Mass.Gen.L. ch. 93 was preempted by Mass.Gen.L. ch. 151B. It is from this judgment that Woods now appeals.
We review grants of summary judgment de novo, and, like the district court, are obliged to review the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all inferences in the non-moving party's favor. LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). " '[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.' " Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8 (emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted)). Moreover, summary judgment may be appropriate " '[e]ven in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, ... if the non-moving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.' " Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8). Finally, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) "mandates the entry of summary judgment ... upon motion against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
On appeal, Woods claims, inter alia, that the district court misapplied the respective burdens of the parties under both federal and state law. More specifically, Woods argues that the district court erred in ruling that the burden shifting framework as limned in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and expounded in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (1) may require plaintiff to present more than a prima facie case in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, (2) requires the employer to do no more than simply articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action, and (3) requires plaintiff to present evidence to show not only that the employer's proffered reason was a pretext, but that it was a pretext for illegal discrimination. Moreover, Woods claims that the district court erred in analyzing both the federal and state claims together under the same federal standard and further erred in finding that Woods claims under Mass.Gen.L. 93 Secs. 102 and 103 were preempted. We address each argument in turn.
In an ADEA failure to hire discrimination suit, plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the factfinder that the employer illegally discriminated against plaintiff by refusing to hire plaintiff on the basis of his/her age. See Lawrence v. Northrop Corp., 980 F.2d 66, 69 (1st Cir.1992). Where there is little direct evidence of age discrimination, plaintiff...
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