Woods v. Graphic Communications

• Decision Date: 20 February 1991
• Docket Number: 89-35842,Nos. 89-35400,s. 89-35400
• Citation: 925 F.2d 1195
• Parties: 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2660, 55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 242, 56 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,644, 118 Lab.Cas. P 10,584 Raymond WOODS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS; Union Local 747/Printing Specialties; Local Union 380, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1195

925 F.2d 1195

136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2660, 55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 242,

56 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,644,

118 Lab.Cas. P 10,584

Raymond WOODS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS; Union Local 747/Printing Specialties; Local Union 380, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 89-35400, 89-35842.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 8, 1990.

Decided Feb. 20, 1991.

Richard H. Robblee, Hafer, Price, Rinehart & Schwerin, Seattle, Wash., for defendants-appellants.

Jeffrey Needle, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.

Before WRIGHT, BEEZER and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

BEEZER, Circuit Judge:

Graphic Communications Union Local 747 ("the Union") appeals two judgments of the district court holding the Union liable for racial discrimination against Woods and awarding fees. We affirm and remand.

I

Woods, who is Black, worked at the Kent plant of Princeton Packaging, Inc. ("Princeton"), from 1984 to 1988. The workers at the plant are represented by the Union, of which Woods was a member. Woods was also represented by the shop steward, Mike Floyd, and a shop committeeman, Darrel Burnham.

The labor agreement in effect from 1985 to 1988 contained an explicit anti-discrimination clause. ¹ Despite this provision, racial jokes, cartoons, comments and other forms of hostility directed at almost every conceivable racial and ethnic group, particularly Blacks, were common at the plant. The parties agree that many such incidents occurred in the area where Floyd worked. Floyd and Burnham made many of the offensive remarks.

Woods worked in an area approximately 100 feet from Floyd. He heard about most of the incidents through other employees. Over the course of his employment, however, Woods was subjected to several racial remarks and hostility, such as a karate chop by Burnham, a racial joke by Floyd, and instructions by coworkers to wash his hands in a urinal. At one point, the letters "KKK" appeared on a machine near his area. During this period, Woods sought psychological counseling, which Princeton provided. He took several medical leaves. Woods left the plant in 1988 due to a knee injury.

The Union was well aware of the racial atmosphere in the plant. Woods complained to the Union through Floyd and other officials, and asked Floyd at least three times to file a grievance concerning the plant's racial atmosphere. The Union concedes it never filed a formal grievance. It did file grievances on behalf of Woods on other subjects, including one race-related attendance issue.

The Union states that it took less formal action. Floyd participated in some shop-floor negotiations concerning specific racial complaints. Floyd also participated in discussions with Princeton's personnel department concerning complaints of racism. The Union posted a notice in response to one incident. Nevertheless, the Union rejected the idea that any Union member should be disciplined by Princeton for racial harassment. At the same time, no disciplinary action was taken by the Union against any Union member, either. Needless to say, the incidents continued.

Woods brought this action against Princeton and the Union alleging violations of federal and state law. The federal claims were brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981; and the duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). The state law claims were brought for violation of the Washington State Law Against Discrimination, Wash.Rev.Code Ch. 49.60; and the torts of outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Princeton settled the claims against it and was dismissed from the suit. Because the Union was named as a party after the commencement of the suit, the Title VII claims against it were barred by the procedural limitations of that statute. The Union proceeded to trial before the district court on Woods' claims under Wash.Rev.Code Ch. 49.60, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, the NLRA, and state tort law.

The district court found that the incidents of racial harassment had occurred and found Floyd's testimony denying his involvement not credible. Instead, the court found that Floyd and Burnham participated in the harassment of Woods and others. The district court also found that Woods, as well as other employees, had requested the Union to file a grievance about the situation, giving the Union actual and constructive knowledge of racial harassment in the plant. The court found that the Union systematically failed to file a formal grievance or take any effective action to alleviate the problem. The court further found that this failure to act was intentional.

On these facts, the court held that the Union had violated Wash.Rev.Code Ch. 49.60, Sec. 1981, the duty of fair representation, and state tort law. It awarded general, special, and punitive damages to Woods. It also awarded attorneys' fees and costs, which were reduced on a motion for reconsideration. The Union appeals both judgments.

The district court had jurisdiction over the 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 claim under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343(a)(4) and the NLRA claim under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. It had pendent jurisdiction over the claims brought under Washington state law. Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir.1990) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)). We have jurisdiction over these timely appeals under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.

We review de novo the district court's interpretation of state law. In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc). Whether proven incidents constitute violations of Sec. 1981 or the NLRA is a mixed question of law and fact also reviewed de novo. Galindo v. Stoody, 793 F.2d 1502, 1513 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). We "must accept the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 112 (9th Cir.1990).

II

Under the "clearly erroneous" standard, a district court's findings of fact may not be reversed unless we have the "definite and firm conviction" that a mistake has been made. Vasconcelos, 907 F.2d at 112. At oral argument, the Union conceded that it does not challenge the district court's findings. The Union admits that the racial atmosphere in the plant was "abysmal."

Intent is also a question of "historical fact that Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) enjoins appellate courts to accept unless clearly erroneous." Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2623, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987). In its brief, the Union argues there is no evidence that the Union intentionally discriminated against Woods. We disagree. The Union does not deny that racist remarks were made to Woods by Floyd. It knew about the situation in the plant, yet took a conscious stand opposing disciplinary action against Union members for racial harassment. At a minimum, these facts support the district court's finding of discriminatory motive. We are not left with the "definite and firm conviction" that a mistake has been made. The district court's finding of intent was not clearly erroneous.

III

We next must determine whether the facts support a finding of liability for racial discrimination under state and federal law. We conclude that they do.

A

The Washington State Law Against Discrimination is codified at Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 49.60.010 et seq. Section 49.60.030 guarantees the right to be free from discrimination because of race, including the

right "to obtain and hold employment without discrimination." Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 49.60.030(1)(a). Specifically, a union may not "discriminate against any member ... to whom a duty of representation is owed." Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 49.60.190. The entire statute is to be liberally construed. Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 49.60.020. ²

Washington courts have not yet been called upon to determine the scope of union liability under the statute. However, the modern version of the statute is patterned after Title VII. Oliver v. Pacific Northwest Bell, 106 Wash.2d 675, 724 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1986) (en banc). Washington courts will look to federal law for guidance, though they are not bound by that law. Id. 106 Wash.2d 675, 724 P.2d at 1005; Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash.2d 401, 406 n. 2, 693 P.2d 708, 711-12 n. 2. (1985).

Under Title VII, a union may be liable in several ways for workplace discrimination. First, a union may be liable under Title VII for intentionally failing to file grievances concerning a racially hostile working environment. Goodman, 482 U.S. at 667, 107 S.Ct. at 2624. This inquiry does not require proving that the workplace was hostile. In Goodman, as here, the union had for several years been a party to a collective bargaining agreement with a provision expressly prohibiting discrimination. It was aware of, but nevertheless ignored, grievances based on racial harassment and other forms of discrimination. The Supreme Court held that the union's deliberate failure to bring race-based claims, by itself, constituted discrimination, violating the plain terms of Title VII. Id. at 667-68, 107 S.Ct. at 2624-25. The union's proffered explanation, that such grievances would upset its relationship with management, was irrelevant. Id. at 668, 107 S.Ct. at 2624. So was the fact that the union may have had no racial animus of its own. Id.

The Washington statute also prohibits discrimination by a union. As in Goodman, the Union admits that it was requested to but never filed a formal grievance alleging racial harassment. Its proffered explanation is that Woods' complaints were too "general." The Union suggests that only specific incidents, and not the overall tone of the workplace, would...