Woods v. Greenblatt, 23205.

• Decision Date: 16 July 1931
• Docket Number: 23205.
• Citation: 163 Wash. 433,1 P.2d 880
• Parties: WOODS v. GREENBLATT et ux.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

1 P.2d 880

163 Wash. 433

WOODS v. GREENBLATT et ux.

No. 23205.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 16, 1931

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; William J. Steinert, Judge.

Action by John E. Woods against Hyman Greenblatt and wife. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Roberts, Skeel & Holman and Frank Hunter, all of Seattle, for appellants.

George F. Hannan, of Seattle, for respondent.

MILLARD J.

While operated by the wife, an automobile owned by Hyman Greenblatt and Mollie Greenblatt, a marital community, struck John E Woods, who instituted this action to recover for the resultant personal injuries. The trial of the cause to a jury resulted in verdict for $7,000, which was reduced by the trial court to $5,000, in favor of the plaintiff. From the judgment entered on the reduced verdict, the defendants appealed.

Appellants first contend that the contributory negligence of the respondent was the proximate cause of his injuries, and that the trial court erred in not holding, as a matter of law that it barred respondent's right to a recovery.

Unless only one reasonable conclusion can be reached from a given state of facts, a court will not determine the question of contributory negligence. That question is ordinarily, one for the jury. Lawe v. Seattle (Wash.) 1 P. (2d) 237.

That the court did not err in submitting the question of contributory negligence to the jury is patent from an examination of the facts, which are summarized as follows:

The accident occurred near the southeast corner of the intersection of Third avenue and Union street in the city of Seattle about 11:45 o'clock the morning of April 10, 1930. The traffic at this intersection was controlled by an automatic elelctric signal device, which was suspended over the center of the intersecting territory. The signal alternately turned red and green, stopping and starting the traffic at the intersection. The traffic engineer of the city testified that the signal was timed as follows: 'There would be a flow of traffic for twenty-two and one-half seconds in this direction. The signal then would change to red all around and remain red all around for five seconds, when it would appear green north and south and red east and west, and remain in that position for twenty-two and one-half seconds. A bell rings one second at the beginning of the change, and one second at the end of the change'--that is, traffic proceeds freely for twenty-two and one-half seconds in the direction in which the green light is showing. When the signal is to be changed to permit cross traffic to proceed for a like period of twenty-two and one-half seconds, a warning is given by the ringing of a bell for one second. For five seconds from the time that the bell first rings, the stop signal of red is shown in all four directions. The five seconds is to afford sufficient time for those within the intersection to proceed through the intersecting territory which they entered under permission of the green light. During this five-second interval, when the red light is showing in all four directions, such traffic as enters the forbidden territory does so at its peril.

The course of Third avenue is north and south. This avenue, measured from the north property line on Union street to the south property line on Union street, is seventy-five feet wide. Measured from curb to curb, the distance is fifty-four feet. Union street runs in an easterly and westerly direction. The width of Union street from the west property line on Third avenue to the east property line on Third avenue is seventy-one feet. The width from curb to curb is forty-six feet.

Respondent, who was about seventy-two years old and blind in his left eye (the automobile came from his left side), testified that he was proceeding northward on the east side of Third avenue; that he arrived at the southeast corner of the intersection of Third avenue and Union street 'just as the light had went out.' He stood on the corner and waited for the signal to change from red to green, 'and when it changed to green I proceeded.' He took three or four steps, then was struck by appellants' automobile, which he never saw at any time. The respondent was eight or ten feet north of the south curb of Union street when he was struck. One of respondent's witnesses testified that she was standing at the same corner where the respondent was standing; that she, too, awaited the showing of the green light, and, when the green light was displayed, she started across Union street almost alongside the respondent; that an automobile suddenly appeared from the left and struck the respondent, who was rendered unconscious by the blow. There is other testimony corroborative of the testimony of the respondent that he did not start across the street until the green light appeared, authorizing north-bound and south-bound traffic to proceed across Union street at this point.

Mrs. Greenblatt was traveling eastward on Union street. Her automobile was proceeding at a speed of from ten to fiteen miles an hour. She testified that she entered the intersection of Third avenue and Union street with the green light in her favor; that a traffic officer signaled her to cross the intersection. Two traffic officers stationed in the vicinity testified that no traffic officer was on duty at the intersection in question during the time the accident occurred. Appellant wife further testified that when she had traveled one-third of the distance across the intersection a bell rang indicating an approaching change of lights; that at that moment the respondent stepped out into the street from the southeast corner of the intersection; that she pursued her course, and, as the auto reached the pedestrian lane, the respondent walked into the side of the right front fender of the automobile. Mrs. Greenblatt's son was in the rear seat, and her sister was in the front seat of the automobile. The son's testimony was corroborative of his mother's testimony. Mrs. Greenblatt's sister was not present at the trial.

Appellant wife's testimony is to the effect that she entered the intersection with the green light in her favor, and that she traveled one-third of the distance across the intersection Before the bell rang warning that the signal light was changing. At that instant, she saw the respondent step from the side-walk on the southeast corner of the intersection. It will be remembered that the total distance she had to travel to cross Third avenue, measured from the west property line on Third avenue to the east property line of that avenue, was seventy-one feet; therefore, she had a remaining distance of forty-seven and two-thirds feet to travel. If the speed of her automobile was ten miles an hour, or fifteen feet a second, she would have passed the southeast corner within less than four seconds. If her speed was fifteen miles an hour, or twenty-two feet a second, less than two and one-half seconds would have been required to negotiate the distance. Respondent was eight or ten feet out into the street when he was struck. If he was walking three miles an hour, he would have proceeded at the rate of four and one-half feet a second; that is, if Mrs. Greenblatt was driving ten miles an hour, during the time she was traversing the remaining forty-seven and two-thirds feet, the respondent would have been seventeen feet or more north of the south curb of Union street. Traveling at fifteen feet a second, or ten miles an hour, Mrs. Greenblatt would have covered a distance of seventy-five feet during the five-second period the lights were red. If the speed of her car was fifteen miles an hour, she would have covered one hundred and ten feet during the five-second interval when red shows in all directions.

That the jury were convinced that the green light changed Before Mrs. Greenblatt entered the intersection is reflected by their verdict. Accepting appellant wife's testimony as true, that she was proceeding at a speed of ten or fifteen miles an hour, she would have had ample time ...