Woods v. Hopmann Machinery, Inc., 89-239
| Decision Date | 16 January 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-239,89-239 |
| Citation | 782 S.W.2d 363,301 Ark. 134 |
| Parties | T.K. WOODS, Appellant, v. HOPMANN MACHINERY, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
C.C. Gibson III, Monticello, for appellant.
Brooks A. Gill, Dumas, for appellee.
This case involves the appellee's sale of a combine to the appellant. In August 1982, appellant purchased the machine for $46,500 payable over a five year period; he paid a down payment comprised of $3,000 in cash and a note in the amount of $6,500 which was secured by the combine. Soon after the sale, appellant complained that the combine failed to harvest his crops. After the parties were unable to satisfy their differences, the appellee, having repossessed the combine, filed suit on October 2, 1985, to collect the $6,500 note. Appellant answered denying liability. Appellee then moved for a summary judgment, and appellant responded, raising several defenses including the appellee breached expressed and implied warranties. Appellant raised his implied warranty defense late in the litigation by amending his counterclaim on March 29, 1988. The trial court granted appellee's request for summary judgment, finding the appellant's expressed warranty defense was barred by the terms of the parties' sales contract, and it further concluded that appellant's implied warranty claim was foreclosed by both the terms of the contract and by the statute of limitations. We reverse.
Appellant does not seriously challenge the trial court's holding that his expressed warranty claim is barred by a specific provision contained in the parties' contract. Instead, his primary argument is that his implied warranty claim was not barred by the statute of limitations nor should it have been resolved by summary judgment. In making his argument, appellant states that while he raised his implied warranty defense by amended counterclaim after the four year statute of limitations for such a claim had run, Ark.R.Civ.P. 15(c) operated to relate the amended claim back to the date of appellant's original pleading (counterclaim) which had been filed well within the limitation statute. We agree.
Rule 15 not only makes liberal provision for amendments to pleadings, it also states that any claim asserted in the amended pleading, which arises out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading. Jim Halsey Co. v. Bonar, 284 Ark. 461, 683 S.W.2d 898 (1985). Since the amendment relates back, there can be no statute of limitations objection to the amendment without proof of undue delay or prejudice. Id. In the present case, in his original counterclaim, appellant alleged the appellee had expressly guaranteed that the combine would properly harvest appellant's crop--which the machine failed to do after multiple adjustments and repairs. In his amended claim, he primarily relied upon the same allegations underlying his express warranty claim but added that the same sale or transaction, and appellee's conduct surrounding it, breached implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose. Because appellant's amended claim arose out of the same transaction described in his original counterclaim, his amended counterclaim related back to his original pleading and thereby avoided the application of the statute of limitations. Furthermore, the appellee failed to argue below that the amendment of the counterclaim would cause undue delay or prejudice. Regardless, since the appellant's claim for breach of implied warranty is so closely related to the earlier claim of breach of expressed warranty, there can be no undue delay or prejudice.
In so holding, we note the appellee's argument that neither appellant's original nor his amended counterclaim contained sufficient facts to support his allegations of expressed or implied warranty violations. 1 We dismiss such arguments because they were not raised below. Appellee could have raised such arguments by filing a motion under Ark.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6), but instead it sought summary judgment relief pursuant to Ark.R.Civ.P. Rule 56.
Of course, summary judgment is only proper when a review of the pleadings, depositions or other filings reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Township Builders, Inc. v. Kraus Construction Co., 286 Ark. 487, 696 S.W.2d 308 (1985). While appellee contends otherwise, we conclude that the record reveals the appellant has shown a material factual issue exists regarding his implied warranty claim, which we found above to have been filed timely.
To recover for breach of implied warranty, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) he sustained damages; (2) at the time of contracting, the defendant had reason to know the particular purpose for which the product...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hood on Behalf of Hood v. Arkansas School Bd. Ins. Co-op.
...no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Woods v. Hopmann Machinery, Inc., 301 Ark. 134, 137, 782 S.W.2d 363 (1990). Here, there is nothing to support ASBIC's motion for summary judgment other than the bare allegations in the......
- Winters v. State
-
Snyder v. Martin
...genuine issue of material fact, as here, and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Woods v. Hopmann Mach. Inc., 301 Ark. 134, 782 S.W.2d 363 (1990). In a well-written dissent, the minority extrapolates various provisions of our Motor Fuels Tax Laws statutes and a......
-
Peterson v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
...because, it claims, Tyson cannot establish an element essential to its claim for indemnification: damages. Cf. Woods v. Hopmann Machinery, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 363, 364-65 (Ark. 1990) (must show damages to recover for breach of warranty in sale of The Trust argues that Tyson cannot prove that i......