Woods v. Kuhlmann
| Decision Date | 13 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 1381,D,1381 |
| Parties | 20 Media L. Rep. 1835 Alonzo WOODS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Robert KUHLMANN, Superintendent of Sullivan Correctional Facility; Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York, Respondents-Appellees. ocket 92-2025. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Richard Joselson, New York City (Philip L. Weinstein, Frank A. Brady, The Legal Aid Soc., New York City, of counsel), for petitioner-appellant.
Sholom J. Twersky, Asst. Dist. Atty., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Charles J. Hynes, Dist. Atty. for Kings County, Jay M. Cohen, Asst. Dist. Atty., Brooklyn, N.Y., of counsel) for respondents-appellees.
Before: MESKILL, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and PIERCE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Charles P. Sifton, Judge, denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner claims he was denied a public trial in violation of his rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. The order of the district court is affirmed.
In 1987, Woods was convicted of robbery in the first degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15(3), in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, before Justice Anne Feldman. A witness for the People, one Hazel Neal, was to testify that she observed Woods inflict violence upon the victim. Prior to calling her to testify, the prosecutor requested a conference with Justice Feldman and Woods' attorney in the judge's chambers. The prosecutor informed the judge of the following:
I asked for this conference in your chambers, your Honor, to put on the record the fact that in the process of talking to my witness preparatory to her going on this morning, she informed me that--suddenly she clammed up and once again went into her refusal to testify, being very upset because she had just seen the defendant's family, among whom she said was one of the people who had visited her at her house ....
I put this on the record earlier. At the time it was by one person. Now it is by at least two, she tells me, connected with or in fact members of the defendant's family.
... [S]he knows the family and she knows the people in the neighborhood. She is now scared to death.
....
[They came] to her telling her she had better not testify, she had better not go to court.
In light of this, the prosecutor requested that the "witness not be subjected to have to testify in the presence of people who have threatened her or at least who have been connected with the threat, whom she is very afraid of."
Justice Feldman asked defense counsel to obtain the names of the family members who were in the courtroom that morning and their relationship to the defendant, Woods. Counsel informed her that three of the defendant's family members were in the courtroom--Constance Wright, Woods' common law wife; Dawn Wright, Constance Wright's sister; and Curtis Williams, Woods' cousin. Defense counsel then asked the court to ask the prosecutor to try to elicit from Neal which member of the family had approached her.
Justice Feldman, however, did not feel that this was necessary because Therefore, based upon the representations made by the prosecutor, the trial judge decided to exclude all members of Woods' family during Neal's testimony. "As soon as the witness finishes," the judge determined, "the family may enter the courtroom...." Defense counsel objected to the exclusion of these persons from the courtroom.
Immediately before Neal testified, Justice Feldman asked Neal if it was true that she was reluctant to testify because of "certain fears" that she had for the safety of herself and her family. Neal responded, "Yes." The judge then informed Neal that the courtroom had been cleared of Woods' family and that they had been warned of the grave implications of "bothering a witness who wants to come forward and testify." The jury was then brought in and Neal testified.
As noted, Woods was convicted of robbery in the first degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15(3). On August 31, 1987, he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of eight to sixteen years. Following his conviction and sentencing, Woods appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, arguing, inter alia, that he had been denied the right to a public trial by the exclusion of his family from the courtroom during the testimony of Neal. Woods maintained that the exclusion based solely upon the prosecutor's representation that the witness had "clammed up," was erroneous and, consequently, his conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered. In opposition, the People maintained that the court's limited exclusion of the defendant's family was proper in order to insure "Neal's accurate testimony."
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that sufficient facts had been placed before the trial judge to justify the closure of the courtroom to Woods' family during the testimony of the witness. People v. Woods, 156 A.D.2d 609, 610, 549 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (2d Dep't 1989). Woods applied for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals; the application was denied. People v. Woods, 75 N.Y.2d 971, 555 N.E.2d 628, 556 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1990) (Alexander, J.).
Thereafter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Woods filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. In his memorandum in support of his petition, Woods maintained that he had been deprived of his right to a public trial by the state court's closure order, which, he maintained, failed to satisfy three of the four requirements of Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). Respondents opposed the petition, arguing that the state trial judge had fully complied with Waller. In a memorandum and order dated December 9, 1991, the district judge denied Woods' petition, holding that the limited closure of the trial was justified and had not violated Woods' right to a public trial. This appeal followed.
In Waller v. Georgia, the Supreme Court addressed the breadth of a criminal defendant's rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to insist upon a public trial. The sixth amendment provides, inter alia, that a defendant shall enjoy "the right to a speedy and public trial." In Waller, the Court recognized that the central aim of a criminal proceeding is to try the accused fairly. See 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. at 2215. The Court noted that, to that end, a public trial allows the public to see for itself that the accused is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. Moreover, a public trial ensures that judges, prosecutors and witnesses carry out their respective duties with a keen sense of the importance of their functions. Id. at 46, 104 S.Ct. at 2215.
The Waller Court also recognized, however, that the right to a public trial is not absolute, and in some instances must yield to other interests, such as those essential to the administration of justice. Id. at 45, 104 S.Ct. at 2214. To ensure that the proper balance of interests is struck, the Court adopted the following requirements: 1) a party seeking to close a court proceeding must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; 2) the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest; 3) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding; and 4) it must make findings adequate to support the closure. Id. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216.
In applying Waller to the instant case, we note a significant difference. Waller dealt with the total closure of a suppression hearing in which all persons other than witnesses, court personnel, the parties and their lawyers were excluded for the duration of the hearing. Id. at 42, 104 S.Ct. at 2213. The case herein, however, deals with a partial closure of a trial in which only members of the defendant's family were excluded and then only for the duration of one witness' testimony. Although this Circuit has not had the opportunity to address Waller in this context, the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have done so and have concluded that when a trial judge orders a partial, as opposed to a total, closure of a court proceeding at the request of one party, a "substantial reason" rather than Waller's "overriding interest" will justify the closure. See, e.g., United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir.) (since substantial reason, rather than compelling interest, was necessary and had been articulated, defendant's right to a public trial had not been violated), petition for cert. filed, No. 92-5433 (U.S. July 27, 1992); Nieto v. Sullivan, 879...
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...of the Waller test, partial closures are subject to a lower level of scrutiny than complete courtroom closures. See Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992). Only a "substantial reason," rather than an overriding interest, is needed to justify partial closure of the courtroom. See ......
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