Woods v. Milner

Decision Date15 March 1991
Docket NumberNo. 89-73756.,89-73756.
PartiesBarbara WOODS, M.D., Luz Mary Aquino, M.D., Arlene Young Jun, M.D., Plaintiffs, v. Boaz MILNER, M.D., Michael Sampson, M.D., James Stevens, Alan Wilcox, and Edward Derwinski, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jeffrey A. Heldt, Birmingham, Mich., for plaintiffs.

Jennifer Elgee, Detroit, Mich., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This four-count lawsuit is presently before the Court on four dispositive motions filed by the parties between November 20, 1989 and January 14, 1991. These motions are as follows:

(1) Defendants' Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56 Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I, II and III of Plaintiffs' Complaint, filed on November 20, 1989;
(2) Plaintiffs' December 11, 1989 Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I;
(3) Defendants' Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss All Claims Except Plaintiff Jun's Discrimination Claim in Count IV Against Defendant Derwinski, filed on January 14, 1991;1 and
(4) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Jun's Claim of Discrimination in Count IV, also filed on January 14, 1991.

Having reviewed each of these Motions and the parties' respective Briefs in support and in opposition to the motions, as well as the exhibits and affidavits attached thereto and filed therewith, and having heard the oral arguments of the parties' attorneys on March 7, 1991, the Court is now prepared to rule on these Motions. This Memorandum Opinion and Order sets forth that ruling.

II. THE PARTIES

Plaintiffs, Barbara Woods, Luz Mary Aquino and Arlene Young Jun, are former and current "temporary full-time" physicians at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Allen Park, Michigan (the "Allen Park VA Hospital"). They instituted this action in this Court on August 24, 1989 contending that they were each wrongfully denied "permanent" employment at the Allen Park VA Hospital.

The named Defendants are Boaz Milner, Plaintiffs' former supervisor; Michael Sampson, the Chief of Staff at the Allen Park VA Hospital; Alan Wilcox, the former Chief of Personnel at the Allen Park VA Hospital; James Stevens, the Director of the Allen Park VA Hospital; and Edward Derwinski, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE CLAIMS AND ARGUMENTS

In their four-count Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege (1) that their appointment as "temporary", and not "permanent", VA physicians is in violation of the statutory provisions governing the Veterans Administration's hiring of medical and surgical personnel, 38 U.S.C. § 4101, et seq. (Count I); (2) that with respect to Plaintiffs Aquino and Jun only, Defendants breached an oral contract of employment allegedly promising to convert them to permanent status after two years of satisfactory service (Count II); (3) that by terminating Plaintiff Woods' employment, the Defendants deprived this Plaintiff of an alleged a property interest in continued employment in violation of her Fifth Amendment due process rights (Count III); and (4) that the Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff Jun on the basis of sex and race by denying her application for permanent status, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 ("Title VII") (Count IV).2

The relief sought by Plaintiffs in Count I of their Complaint is (1) a declaratory judgment invalidating the implementing regulations promulgated by the Chief Medical Director of the VA Department of Medicine and Surgery concerning temporary full-time VA physician appointments, and (2) an order of mandamus from this Court compelling the VA to place Plaintiffs in "permanent" positions. They also seek an award of damages on their claims of breach of contract, violation of due process rights, and discriminatory treatment in Counts II-IV.

On November 20, 1989, Defendants moved for Summary Judgment on Counts I, II and III, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(c), contending (1) that the implementing regulations and Plaintiffs' temporary appointments in accordance therewith are not violative of the provisions of the Veterans Administration temporary full-time hiring statute, 38 U.S.C. § 4114(a)(3)(A); (2) that the alleged oral representations of the former Chief of Staff at the Allen Park VA Hospital, upon which Plaintiffs Aquino and Jun predicate their common law breach of oral contract claim, cannot, as a matter of law, form the basis of an employment contract with the United States where the terms of the employment are established by statute; (3) that no property interest exists in a temporary appointment so as to give rise to a claim of violation of due process rights; and (4) that even if such a property interest exists, Defendants are, nonetheless, entitled to qualified immunity from liability on any constitutionally-based claim predicated on such an interest.

On December 11, 1989, Plaintiffs filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in their favor on Count I (their claim for violation of the VA temporary full-time hiring statute) together with a "Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment". In their Brief, Plaintiffs agree that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Count I of Plaintiffs' Complaint, and implicitly adopt Defendants' version of the pertinent facts regarding each of the Plaintiffs' employment as they relate to this count. However, Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor as a matter of law based upon their argument that the VA implementing regulations which permit temporary full-time appointments for renewable terms of up to three years (and upon which Defendants rely in support of their motion for summary judgment on this count) contravene the language of 38 U.S.C. § 4114(a)(3)(A) which provides that "temporary full-time appointments of physicians ... may exceed 90 days only if the Chief Medical Director finds that circumstances render it impracticable to obtain the necessary services through permanent appointments under paragraph (1) of section 4104."

On December 31, 1989, the Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, to which Plaintiffs replied by filing a Reply Brief on January 5, 1990.

Following the filing of the Defendants' first Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I, by stipulation of the parties, Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their Complaint on May 8, 1990 to add an additional count — Count IV — Plaintiff Jun's sex and race discrimination claim. The Defendants filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on June 21, 1990. A Joint Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment was filed on November 14, 1990, and denied by this Court on November 20, 1990.

On January 14, 1991, Defendants filed a Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss All Claims Except Plaintiff Jun's Discrimination Claim in Count IV Against Defendant Derwinski, and a separate Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment on Count IV.

In these two January 14, 1991 Motions, Defendants assert additional arguments for dismissal of the first three counts in Plaintiffs' Complaint—to-wit, (1) that Plaintiffs Aquino and Jun's breach of oral contract claim in Count II should be dismissed because the former Chief of Staff who made the alleged oral promises upon which these Plaintiffs predicate their claim was not a party to their employment contract; and (2) that Plaintiffs are not entitled to an issuance of an order of mandamus compelling Defendants to appoint them to "permanent" positions (which is the remedy they seek in Count I of their Complaint) as a matter of law. As to Plaintiff Jun's discrimination claims in Count IV, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not established a prima facie case of either sex or race discrimination with regard to Defendants refusal to appoint Plaintiff Jun to a permanent position, and even if Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case, Defendants have articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not appointing Jun to a permanent position and Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants' reason was a pretext for discrimination.

On February 13, 1991, Plaintiffs filed Briefs in Opposition to both of Defendants' January 14, 1991 Motions.3

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE VA DEPARTMENT OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY

The Department of Medicine and Surgery of the Veterans Administration was established by Congress in 1945.

The "primary" function of the Department of Medicine and Surgery is the provision of complete medical and hospital service for the care and treatment of veterans. 38 U.S.C. § 4101(a). In furtherance of this primary function, the Veterans Administration is statutorily authorized to employ physicians and other medical personnel to staff the various departments of the VA hospitals and medical centers. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4104 and 4114.

Physicians in the VA Department of Medicine and Surgery fall into one of three categories: (1) permanent appointees under 38 U.S.C. § 4104 who have completed a two-year probationary period; (2) permanent § 4104 appointees who are serving their two-year probationary period under 38 U.S.C. § 4106; and (3) physicians who are employed either full-time or part-time pursuant to temporary appointments under 38 U.S.C. § 4114.

Section 4114(a)(3)(A) provides that temporary full-time appointments of physicians may exceed 90 days if the Chief Medical Director finds that circumstances render it impracticable to obtain necessary services through permanent appointments under 38 U.S.C. § 4104(1). Pursuant to statutory authority, the Veterans Administration's Department of Medicine and Surgery...

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    ...arise. Accordingly, he was not entitled to due process protections in connection with his terminable position. See Woods v. Milner, 760 F.Supp. 623, 643 (E.D.Mich.1991), aff'd, 955 F.2d 436 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that temporary terminable-at-will employee lacked legitimate claim of entitle......
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    • January 31, 1992
    ...from a judgment entered March 15, 1991 in the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, Gerald E. Rosen, District Judge, 760 F.Supp. 623 (E.D.Mich.1991), granting appellees' motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint in its entirety. In granting appellees' motion, the d......

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