Woods v. Oxford Law, LLC
| Decision Date | 24 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:13-6467 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | JESSICA WOODS and JOSHUA EVANS, Plaintiffs, v. OXFORD LAW, LLC and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants. |
Pending is the plaintiffs' motion for default judgment, filed June 26, 2014. This suit was initiated in this court on March 28, 2013.
At some point (the complaint does not say when), the plaintiffs, Jessica Woods and Joshua Evans, "incurred a financial obligation in the approximate amount of $532" to Care Credit, which is not named as a defendant. Compl. ¶ 8. "The [d]ebt arose from services . . . [that] were primarily for family, personal or household purposes[.]" Id. ¶ 9. Thereafter, the debt was either "purchased, assigned or transferred to Oxford [Law, LLC ("Oxford")] for collection, or Oxford was employed . . . to collect the [d]ebt." Id. ¶ 10.
In or around September of 2012, "Oxford started contacting [the plaintiffs] in an attempt to collect the [d]ebt by placing calls to [the plaintiffs'] residential telephone." Id. ¶ 12. According to the complaint, Oxford employed a number of abusive tactics and harassed the plaintiffs in doing so. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that Oxford "failed to identify the name of its company and failed to state that" it was calling to collect a debt; "misleadingly identified itself as an attorney's office"; "accused [Evans] of lying and falsely stated [that Evans] was trying to avoid the [d]ebt"; "threatened [Evans] that Oxford would visit the [p]laintiffs if they failed to satisfy the [d]ebt"; and "failed to send . . . written validation of the [d]ebt[.]" Id. ¶¶ 13-16, 21.
The complaint also claims that Oxford "repeatedly" disregarded Evans' request to stop calling about the debt and to correspond with the plaintiffs only in writing. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Finally, even after Evans "informed Oxford that [the plaintiffs] had retained legal representation and provided Oxford with their attorney's contact information,"1 Oxford "proceeded to place anadditional call to [the plaintiffs] on March 14, 2013." Id. ¶¶ 19, 20. The plaintiffs assert that Oxford's actions caused them to suffer "humiliation, anger, anxiety, emotional distress, fear, frustration and embarrassment." Id. ¶ 23.
In their complaint, Evans and Woods charge Oxford and John Does 1-102 with violating numerous provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA"), and the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W. Va. Code § 46A-1-101, et seq., ("WVCCPA"). The complaint seeks actual and statutory damages under the FDCPA, statutory damages under the WVCCPA, and the recovery of attorney's fees and costs. Id. at Prayer(1)-(7).
Service of process on the defendant was achieved on April 8, 2013, but Oxford failed to answer the complaint. As a result, on October 22, 2013, the court ordered the plaintiffs to submit a motion for entry of default judgment by not later than November 6, 2013. The plaintiffs thereafter "attempted to confer with [] Oxford in an attempt to resolve the matter." Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement ("Motion to Enforce") ¶ 4 (ECF No. 8, filed February 26, 2014). On November 6, 2013, rather than filing a motion for entry of default, the plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement, indicating that the parties had reached an agreement, and advising that a voluntary dismissal would be forthcoming within sixty days. Unfortunately, the parties were ultimately unable, after months of fruitless attempts, to complete a contemplated written agreement. In an order dated June 6, 2014, the court denied the plaintiffs' request to enforce the terms of a preliminary verbal settlement allegedly reached by the parties, and directed them to instead move for default judgment.3
In response, on June 26, 2014, the plaintiffs filed the pending motion for default judgment, reiterating thesubstance of the complaint, and repeating their request for damages under the FDCPA and WVCCPA.
With respect to the FDCPA, the plaintiffs seek judgment against Oxford for violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) by contacting them after learning that they were represented by counsel; violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2) by using abusive language when speaking with "the consumer"; violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5) by "caus[ing] a phone to ring repeatedly and engag[ing] the [p]laintiffs in telephone conversations, with the intent to annoy and harass"; violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) by placing calls to the plaintiffs without disclosing its identity as a debt collection agency; violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) by misleading the plaintiffs "into believing the communication was from a law firm or an attorney"; violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) by "fail[ing] to inform the consumer that the communication was an attempt to collect a debt"; violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692f "in that [Oxford] used unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt"; and violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) by "fail[ing] to send [the plaintiffs] an initial letter within five days of its initial contact with [the plaintiffs.]" Memorandum of Law inSupport of Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment ( ) at 4-8; see also Compl. ¶¶ 24-37.4
With respect to the WVCCPA, the plaintiffs seek judgment against Oxford for violating section 46A-2-123(a) by falsely representing that they were a law firm or attorney; violating section 46A-2-124(a) by "express[ly] or implicitly threaten[ing] use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to [the plaintiffs]"; violating section 46A-2-124(f) by threatening to take action prohibited by the FDCPA that is of the same nature as subsection -124(a); violating section 46A-2-125(b) by placing calls to the plaintiffs without disclosing its identity; violating section 46A-2-125(d) by repeatedly calling the plaintiffs at "unusual times or at times known to be inconvenient"; violating section 46A-2-127(h) by "falsely represent[ing] the status or true nature of" Oxford's business (that is, debt collection); and violating section 46A-2-128 by "us[ing] unfair or unconscionable means to collect the [d]ebt." Pls.' Mem. at 8-11; see also Compl. ¶¶ 38-53.
They request "at least $1,000.00 in statutory damages under the FDCPA; $19,302.24 in statutory damages for at least four violations of the WVCCPA; $50,000.00 to compensate [them]for their actual damages; and a reasonable award of their attorney's fees and litigation costs." Pls.' Mot. ¶ 37.
Affidavits from Evans and Woods are attached to the motion. Evans attests that Oxford identified itself as an attorney's office but did otherwise inform the plaintiffs of "the true name of their company"; threatened to "come 'visit'" the plaintiffs if the debt was not paid; accused Evans of lying about his inability to pay the debt; continued to call the plaintiffs after Evans requested that Oxford not do so; called the plaintiffs on March 14, 2013 after being informed that the plaintiffs were represented by counsel; and failed to send the plaintiffs any written validation of the debt. Evans Aff. ¶¶ 6-11. He states that he "suffered damages, anger, fear, embarrassment, anxiety, emotional distress, and frustration as a result of Oxford's" actions. Id. ¶ 12. Woods' affidavit contains substantially identical information. See generally Pls.' Mot., Ex. B ("Woods Aff.").
Default judgments are governed by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 55(a) states that if a party has "failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failureis shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default." Once default has been entered by the clerk, the plaintiff may move the court to enter a default judgment against the defendant pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2).
"The defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact[.]" Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). But "a default judgment may be lawfully entered only 'according to what is properly to be decreed upon the statements of the bill, assumed to be true,' and not 'as of course according to the prayer of the bill.'" Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206 (quoting Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 113 (1885) (internal quotations and citations omitted)), quoted in Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780. In other words, "[t]he defendant is not held . . . to admit conclusions of law," Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780 (quoting Nishimatsu), and the "court must, therefore, determine whether the well-pleaded allegations in [the] complaint support the relief sought in" the motion for default judgment, id., see also City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 n.23 (2d Cir. 2011) .
For purposes of that analysis, well-pleaded allegations are those that offer something more than "'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 775 F.3d 689, 695-96 (5th Cir. 2015) (); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) ().
Assuming that the well-pleaded facts demonstrate that the...
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