Woods v. Partenreederei Ms. Yankee Clipper, Civ. A. No. 85-3652-C.

Decision Date18 December 1987
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 85-3652-C.
Citation677 F. Supp. 46
PartiesRichard WOODS, Plaintiff, v. PARTENREEDEREI MS. YANKEE CLIPPER, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Charles A. Clifford, Charlestown, Mass., for plaintiff.

Thomas Walsh, James Ring, Bingham Dana Gould, Boston, Mass., Robert E. McDonnell, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

CAFFREY, Senior District Judge.

This is a civil action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while working aboard the defendant vessel. Jurisdiction is based on admiralty jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. The matter is now before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff is a longshoreman who was employed by the stevedore, I.T.O. Corp., to help unload a cargo of containers from the defendant's ship, the MS Yankee Clipper, in Boston Harbor. The vessel began its journey at Halifax, Nova Scotia. Before reaching Boston, it stopped at Providence, Rhode Island, where it unloaded some of its containers.

On reaching Boston, the vessel docked at Castle Island terminal, where its containers were to be unloaded. The containers were stowed two layers deep on the top deck of the ship. Three more layers of containers were stowed in the hold of the ship below the hatch cover. The hatch covers themselves are segmented and are hydraulically operated. The containers were unloaded by using a stationary shore crane. Because the crane was stationary, the ship itself had to be moved to unload all the containers. The ship's crew was responsible for opening the hatch covers and moving the ship, while the stevedore directed all other aspects of the unloading operation.

On the morning of the accident, the two levels of containers above deck had been unloaded, and the hatch covers had been opened. The plaintiff was on the containers in the hold, giving directions to the crane operator. While walking on the top of one of the containers, the plaintiff slipped and fell on an unidentified substance covering the top of the container.1

The plaintiff brought this suit, claiming that the defendant was negligent in failing to provide a safe workplace. The defendant now argues that the shipowner did not violate any duty owed to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of going forward on the issue of the defendant's negligence.

The duty owed by a vessel to longshoremen is determined by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. Prior to 1972, a vessel owed the stevedore and his longshoremen a duty to provide a safe and seaworthy vessel. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946). Proof of unseaworthiness did not require that the shipowner be negligent. An injured longshoreman could recover from the shipowner by showing only that an unsafe, injury-causing condition existed on the ship. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 164, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 1620, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). If the condition was due to the actions of the stevedore, the longshoreman could still recover from the shipowner, who could in turn seek recovery from the stevedore for breach of warranty to handle cargo in a safe manner. Id. at 165, 101 S.Ct. at 1621.

In 1972, though, Congress amended the LHWCA to alter this liability scheme. While increasing the ability of the injured longshoreman to recover from the stevedore, Congress eliminated the longshoreman's right to recover for unseaworthiness. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). Under these amendments, a shipowner could be held liable for his own negligence, but not the negligence of the stevedore. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b).

The leading case on the duty currently owed to a longshoreman by a shipowner is Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). In this case, the Supreme Court noted that the vessel owes the longshoreman a duty to exercise due care "under the circumstances." Id. at 166, 101 S.Ct. at 1622. See also Raymond v. I/S Caribia, 626 F.2d 203, 206 (1st Cir.1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 969, 101 S.Ct. 2045, 68 L.Ed.2d 348 (1981). This duty generally requires the shipowner to have the ship and its equipment in such a condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able to carry on cargo operations safely. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622.

In this case, the plaintiff essentially argues that the defendant breached its duty of care in one of two ways. First, the plaintiff contends that the defendant knew of the slippery substance on the container, and therefore, the defendant should have either warned the plaintiff of the hazard or remedied the hazard.

If the defendant did know of the slippery condition, a jury could reasonably find that the defendant breached its duty of care by failing to warn or to clean the container. See Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 175-76, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 1626-27 (if the shipowner knew that a cargo winch was defective, and that the stevedore was continuing to use it, and the winch presented an unreasonable risk of harm, then the shipowner had a duty to repair the winch). There is however, absolutely no evidence indicating that the ship's crew was aware of the slippery substance. The facts indicate just the opposite. The container on which the plaintiff slipped was in the hold, covered by the hatch cover and two tiers of containers. The plaintiff himself noted that, even up close, the substance looked like "plain old dirt." There is no indication that the crew even had an opportunity to notice the condition of the containers, and no report of any hazardous condition was ever made to the ship's crew. The plaintiff has failed to provide evidence showing there is a factual dispute on this issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A jury could therefore not reasonably find that the defendant had actual knowledge of the hazard that caused the plaintiff's injury. The remaining question, then, is whether the defendant breached its duty by failing to discover the hazard.

A shipowner certainly has a duty to take reasonable precautions to make sure the ship and its equipment are free from any unreasonable risks of harm. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622; Raymond v. I/S Caribia, 626 F.2d at 206. This duty to inspect, however, does not generally extend to the cargo. In Raymond v. I/S Caribia, 626 F.2d 203 (1st Cir.1980), a longshoreman suffered a heart attack after attempting to lift a carton of frozen fish that was frozen to another carton. In finding that the ship could not be held liable, the court noted, "In the normal case, it is a condition of the ship, not the cargo, for which a vessel may be held responsible." Id. at 206. It is the stevedore, not the shipowner, who has the expertise in handling cargo. Raymond, 626 F.2d at 206. It is the stevedore, not the shipowner, who is in the best position to avoid accidents caused by hazards in the cargo area. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 451 U.S. at 171, 101 S.Ct. at 1624. Accordingly, the shipowner's duty of care does not generally require it to inspect the cargo, since it is entitled to rely on the expertise of the stevedore to ensure that the cargo does not pose any unreasonable risk to the longshoremen. Id. at 172, 101 S.Ct. at 1624. See also, Robertson v. Tokai Shosen, K.K., 655 F.Supp. 152 (E.D.Pa. 1987) (shipowner not liable for injury caused by improperly stowed cargo).

The plaintiff also argues, though, that the defendant's duty required it to warn of, or remedy, the hazard since the defendant actively engaged in the cargo operations. It is true that the defendant may be liable if it actively involved itself in cargo operations and negligently injures a longshoremen, or if it fails to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Halpin v. Atkinson-Kiewit, JV, Civ. A. No. 92-10632-NMG.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 12 Abril 1995
    ...is injured; there must be evidence of a causal connection between the injuries and the breach of duty. See Woods v. Partenreederei Ms. Yankee Clipper, 677 F.Supp. 46, 48 (D.Mass.1987); Dean, 771 F.Supp. at 476. Here, defendant contends plaintiff has failed to show that In opposition to defe......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT