Woods v. Pleasant Hills Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 03 October 1973
• Citation: 454 Pa. 224,309 A.2d 698
• Parties: Marie P. WOODS, Administratrix of the Estate of Clarence Woods, also known as Clarence D. Woods, on behalf of the Estate of Clarence Woods, also known as Clarence D. Woods, Deceased, Appellant, and Marie P. Woods, Administratrix of the Estate of Clarence Woods, also known asClarence D. Woods, on behalf of the next of kin of Clarence Woods, also knownas Clarence D. Woods, Deceased, Appellant, v. PLEASANT HILLS MOTOR COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee, and Ford Motor Company, a corporation, Appellee, and Charles Bluestone Company, Inc., a corporation.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 698

309 A.2d 698

454 Pa. 224

Marie P. WOODS, Administratrix of the Estate of Clarence Woods, also known as Clarence D. Woods, on behalf of the Estate of Clarence Woods, also known as Clarence D. Woods Deceased, Appellant and Marie P. Woods, Administratrix of the Estate of Clarence Woods, also known asClarence D. Woods, on behalf of the next of kin of Clarence Woods also knownas Clarence D Woods, Deceased, Appellant, v. PLEASANT HILLS MOTOR COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee, and Ford Motor Company, a corporation, Appellee, and Charles Bluestone Company, Inc., a corporation.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Oct. 3, 1973.

Murray S. Love, Sikov & Love, Pittspellees.

Clem R. Kyle, George M. Weis, Weis & Weis, Randall J. McConnell, Jr., Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, Pittsburgh, for appellees.

Before EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

MANDERINO, Justice.

MANDERINO, Justice.

Charles D. Woods was killed on July 14, 1965, when a 1965 Ford truck which he was driving failed to negotiate a curve at the bottom of a hill, left the paved portion of the highway, collided with a pole, crossed over to the other side of the highway, ran into a hillside, and overturned.

The deceased was operating the truck in the regular course of his employment for the Charles Bluestone Company, Inc. The truck had been purchased on February 15, 1965, from Pleasant Hills Motor Company. Suit was filed by Marie P. Woods, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, her husband, against the seller of the truck, Pleasant Hills Motor Company, and the manufacturer of the truck, Ford Motor Company. Subsequently, the two original defendants filed a complaint against the deceased's employer, Charles Bluestone Company, Inc.

The jury returned a verdict against both Pleasant Hills Motor Company and Ford Motor Company in the amount of $52,515, under the wrongful death act and $37,485, under the survival axt. A compulsory nonsuit had previously been granted as to Charles Bluestone Company, Inc., the additional defendant, from which no appeal has been taken. Post-trial motions by the defendant were denied. On appeal to the Superior Court, the judgments were reversed and a new trial awarded to both defendants. Woods v. Pleasant Hills Motor Co., 219 Pa.Super. 381, 281 A.2d 649 (1971). The petition of the appellant administratrix, Marie P. Woods, for allowance of appeal was granted. Suit in this case was brought on alternate theories of common law negligence and strict liability under section 402(a) of the Restatement of Torts. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(a) (1965). The appellant contended that an alleged defect in the braking mechanism of the truck caused the brakes to malfunction, resulting in the accident. Both theories were based on the failure of the Ford Motor Company to properly manufacture or assemble the braking mechanism and on the failure of Preasant Hills Motor Company to inspect or properly inspect the fitting on the brake mechanism that was alleged to have been defective.

The alleged defect concerns the proper functioning of an air supply line which is a part of the truck's braking system. The appellant contended that the air supply line between the reservoir tank and the foot valve (brake pedal) had become disconnected due to insufficient tightening of a nut. Had the nut been properly tightened, it would have caused a ferrule (copper ring) to clamp in a pinching manner around the hollow copper end of the air supply line. This would have properly secured the line. The tightening of the nut and the clamping of the ferrule around the copper line, according to the appellant, would have caused a crimping of the copper line. The clamped ferrule on the crimped copper line would make it most difficult to remove the ferrule from the copper line by hand. The appellant's evidence indicated that the line had never been crimped, from which it could be inferred that the appropriate nut had never been tightened sufficiently to cause the ferrule to clamp around the line and hold it securely in place. This failure made it possible for the copper line to become disconnected, causing a loss of air from the air lines which in turn caused the brakes on the truck to fail. There was evidence that at the time of the accident or immediately prior thereto, a swishing wind sound was heard coming from the truck. The evidence established that such a sound would be made if the air supply line became disconnected causing a sudden loss of air pressure in the braking system. There was also evidence that after the accident the ferrule was removed from the line by hand in a very easy manner.

The Superior Court's reversal of the judgments in favor of the appellant was based primarily on its conclusion that certain photographs admitted into evidence at the appellant's request should not have been admitted because they had no probative value. These photographs were photographs of the copper portion of the air supply line which would have been crimped if the ferrule around the line had been properly clamped around it by the tightening of the nut on the ferrule. The photographs did not show any crimp in the copper line.

The photographs were taken at different times several months after the accident. Before the photographs were taken various changes were made on the truck. Because of the changes, the Superior Court concluded that the photographs were not relevant to show the condition of the truck at the time of the accident.

We agree that changes took place on the truck between the time of the accident and the taking of the photographs. Some dismantling took place and certain parts were removed. None of the changes however concerned the copper portion of the air supply line depicted in the photographs. The photographs were offered for the purpose of showing the lack of a crimp in the copper line.

The law does not require that every object depicted in photographs remain unchanged from the time of an accident until the photographs are taken. See Vanic v. Ragni, 435 Pa. 26, 254 A.2d 618 (1969); Nyce v. Muffley, 384 Pa. 107, 119 A.2d 530 (1956). If this were the rule, it would be impossible to ever use a photograph taken after the time of an accident. Of necessity there will always be changes in that which is depicted in a photograph taken after an accident. Even one minute after an accident, a vehicle does not look as it did at the time of the accident. Not only are there changes in the vehicles in such photographs, but there can be extensive changes in the background. The leaves on the trees may have been green at the time of the accident and a reddish orange at the time photographs are taken. Changes occurring to objects depicted in photographs are not important Unless the changes occurred to objects that are relevant to a determination of the disputed issues.

In this case, the photographs were not introduced to prove any condition of any portion of the truck as it existed at the time of the accident except for the copper line which the appellant claimed had never been properly crimped by a tightening of a nut. For this reason, changes made to the cab or to the bed of the truck or to any other portion of the truck, between the accident and the time the photographs were taken, are totally irrelevant. The important point is that there is no evidence in the record from which any inference can be drawn that the crucial portion of the copper line which was depicted in the photographs as uncrimped, had in any way been changed. In fact, the appellant, as pointed out by the trial court, presented evidence establishing that those persons who had custody of the truck from the time of the accident until the photographs were taken did not in any way alter the crucial portion of the copper air supply line. One witness, Dale Fenchel, testified that several months after the accident he spent three hours inspecting the truck and all of the brake lines. He testified as an expert that there was no evidence that indicated that any changes had been made so far as the copper portion of the air supply line was concerned. This same witness looked at the photographs and testified that the condition of the air supply line depicted in the photographs was identical to the condition of the line at the time he inspected the truck.

Moreover, it is important to focus on the alleged evidence depicted in the photographs so far as the uncrimped copper line is concerned. Certain physical facts may be allowed to speak for themselves, if they are readily understandable by a jury. For example, if one party claims that a windshield on a vehicle was not cracked at the time of an accident, and the other party claims that it was cracked, the party claiming the lack of a crack could take a photograph years after an accident and the jury could, without any assistance, observe the photograph to determine whether or not there was any crack in the windshield. No matter what the time lapse between the accident and the taking of the photograph, an inference would certainly be reasonable that no change occurred, since it is almost impossible for a cracked windshield to become uncracked. The reverse, of course, would not be true. If the party contending that the windshield was cracked at the time of the accident, presented a photograph showing the windshield as cracked, an inference that the cracked condition existed at the time of the accident would not be reasonable because it would have been possible for the windshield to have become cracked between the time of the accident and the time the photograph was taken. The uncracking of a cracked windshield may be possible in some expert's laboratory with the use of extreme skill and the application of special techniques. To believe that such a feat occurred, however, would not be reasonable in the absence of any evidence indicating such an extraordinary accomplishment.

We are confronted with a similar situation in ...