Woods v. Ross
| Decision Date | 20 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 21-2011-DDC-TJJ,Case No. 21-2014-DDC-TJJ,Case No. 21-2012-DDC-TJJ,Case No. 21-2013-DDC-TJJ |
| Parties | EPHRAIM WOODS, JR., Plaintiff, v. KENDRA ROSS and CHERYL ROSS, Defendants. FATIMAH MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. KENDRA ROSS and CHERYL ROSS, Defendants. DWIGHT JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. KENDRA ROSS and CHERYL ROSS, Defendants. RAASIKH ROBERTSON, Plaintiff, v. KENDRA ROSS and CHERYL ROSS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
This Order addresses pending motions in four separate but related cases. Plaintiffs filed four pro se Petitions1 in the District Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas, against Kendra Ross and her mother, Cheryl Ross, alleging (1) breach of contract and memorandum of agreement, and (2) defamation and slander. Defendant Kendra Ross removed each action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) alleging diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For clarity, the court cites documents in the first-filed case in our court, Woods v. Ross, No. 21-2011 (D. Kan.), unless otherwise specified because the majority of filings do not differ in substance between cases. Also, because Kendra Ross and Cheryl Ross share a surname, this Order, for clarity, often refers to them simply as "Kendra" and "Cheryl." The court means no disrespect to either individual by its use of their first names.
Plaintiffs filed these four actions pro se. The court thus construes their filings liberally and holds them to "a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But the court does not become an advocate for the pro se party. Id. Plaintiffs' pro se status does not excuse them from complying with the court's rules or facing the consequences of noncompliance. See Ogden v. San Juan Cnty., 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994).
These four plaintiffs are individual members of a community, once known as the United Nation of Islam. This community has included The Value Creators and The Promise Keepers, successor organizations to the United Nation of Islam. Each plaintiff filed suit in the DistrictCourt of Wyandotte County, Kansas, naming as defendants Kendra Ross and her mother, Cheryl Ross.
Plaintiffs attempt to re-litigate issues already decided by this court in a separate case, see Ross v. Jenkins, No. 17-2547 (D. Kan.). In 2017, Kendra Ross filed a lawsuit against Royall Jenkins, The Value Creators, Inc. (formerly known as The United Nation of Islam, Inc.), The Value Creators LLC, and The Value Creators Inc. alleging violations of state and federal human trafficking law and labor laws. Complaint, Ross v. Jenkins, No. 17-2547 (D. Kan. Sept. 15, 2017), ECF No. 1. In May 2018, the court granted Kendra's Motion for Default Judgment against the defendants and awarded her nearly $8 million in damages. Memorandum and Order, Ross v. Jenkins, No. 17-2547 (D. Kan. May 23, 2018), ECF No. 40 (). Kendra filed a second federal lawsuit against The Promise Keepers, Inc., The Promise Keepers 417 Inc., and The Promise Keepers 417, Inc. after the named defendants in the first federal lawsuit transferred property and assets fraudulently to defendants in the second lawsuit. Amended Complaint, Ross v. The Promise Keepers, No. 19-2091 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 2019), ECF No. 45. The court, again, awarded Kendra default judgment and awarded her damages on part of her fraudulent transfer claim. Memorandum and Order, Ross v. The Promise Keepers, No. 19-2091 (D. Kan. July 17, 2017), ECF No. 85.
Plaintiffs—filing suit as individual members of the community—allege Kendra breached a member agreement with the community and committed defamation. They argue Kendra, once a child member of the United Nation of Islam, must follow a membership agreement (evidenced by an example "savior letter") because they provided food, shelter, and education to her while she was a child member in the United Nation of Islam. See Doc. 1-1 at 28. Plaintiffs describe the agreement as one requiring lifelong servitude for the community, even when a member joinsthe community as a child. They also allege Kendra defamed the United Nation of Islam and the community when she filed her federal lawsuit in 2017, in her interview on NBC's Today Show, and when A&E aired an episode about the United Nation of Islam. For the following reasons, the court denies all of plaintiffs' motions and grants Kendra's Motions to Dismiss in these four cases.2
Plaintiffs filed Motions for Recusal requesting the undersigned judge recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455 in all four cases. They argue that because the undersigned judge ruled in favor of Kendra in Ross v. Jenkins, No. 17-2547 (D. Kan), he cannot consider plaintiffs' claims impartially in these four cases.3 Kendra filed Responses and plaintiffs filed Replies. For the following reasons, the court denies plaintiffs' Motions for Recusal.
Under § 455, a judge must disqualify himself "in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," or "[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party . . . . " 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) & (b)(1). The test for determining impartiality is an objective one, based on a judge's "outward manifestations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Speculation, opinion, and adverse rulings are no reason for recusal under § 455. United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993-94 (10th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiffs reason that the undersigned judge ruled in favor of Kendra in Ross v. Jenkins, No. 17-2547 (D. Kan.) and thus cannot consider the proceedings in these four cases impartially. They argue Kendra misled the court in her previous federal lawsuits. And, they assert, the undersigned cannot rule in plaintiffs' favor without a conflict of interest because of his rulings in Kendra's prior lawsuits.
But adverse rulings provide no reason for recusal. See Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1305 (10th Cir. 1997) (). See also Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1268 (10th Cir. 1988) (). Plaintiffs identify no other facts that might call into question the undersigned's impartiality or suggest that the undersigned has a bias or prejudice. In sum, plaintiffs have failed to establish any grounds to remove the assigned judge from this case. Therefore, the court denies the following motions:
Kendra removed these actions from the District Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas, alleging diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Doc. 1 at 3 (Notice of Removal¶ 8). Plaintiffs filed what the court construes as Motions to Remand asking the court send the cases back to the District Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas. See generally Doc. 7 (); see also Doc. 29 (). Plaintiffs' extensive and numerous motions fail to respond to Kendra's argument that diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Docs. 7, 29. For the following reasons, the court denies plaintiffs' Motions to Remand and Motions to Transfer Case.
The court carries an independent obligation to satisfy itself that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). And the court "must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking." Penteco Corp. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Gas Sys., Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A "party invoking diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." Middleton v. Stephenson, 749 F.3d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 2014).
A defendant may remove a civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) to federal court if the parties originally could have filed it in federal court. This provision includes cases where diversity jurisdiction exists. Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over "civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—(1) citizens of different States[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). "Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity—no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any defendant." Grynberg v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 805 F.3d 901, 905 (10th Cir. 2015). The "relevant time period for determining the existence of complete diversity is the time of the filingof the complaint." Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC v. Century Sur. Co., 781 F.3d 1233, 1239 (10th Cir. 2015).
"For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a person is a citizen of a state if the person is domiciled in that state." Middleton, 749 F.3d at 1200. "And a person acquires domicile in a state when the person resides there and intends to remain there indefinitely." Id. When a court determines "a person's domicile for diversity-jurisdiction purposes, a district court should consider the totality of the...
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