Woods v. Sec'y, CASE NO. 6:17-cv-5-Orl-31KRS
| Decision Date | 29 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 6:17-cv-5-Orl-31KRS |
| Parties | CHEYANNE WOODS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause is before the Court on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition," Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed a Response to the Petition ("Response," Doc. 12) in compliance with this Court's instructions and with the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases for the United States District Courts. Petitioner filed a Reply to the Response. (Doc. 14).
Petitioner alleges five claims for relief in the Petition. For the following reasons, the Petition is denied.
Petitioner and five co-defendants were charged by indictment in the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida with first degree murder with a firearm (Count One), burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery (Count Two), and robbery with a firearm (Count Three). (Doc. 12-2 at 5-7). Petitioner entered into a negotiated plea whereby she agreed to plead guilty to Count Three and in exchange, the State agreed to a sentence cap of twenty-seven years in prison. (Id. at 10-12). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a twenty-year term of imprisonment. (Id. at 71). Petitioner appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal ("Fifth DCA") affirmed per curiam. (Id. at 135).
Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id. at 139-62). The trial court summarily denied relief. (Id. at 164-66). Petitioner appealed, and the Fifth DCA affirmed per curiam. (Id. at 230).
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase "clearly established Federal law," encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
The first task of a federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court recently stated that a court should "look through" any unexplained decision Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192, (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192-93, 1195-96.
If the claim was adjudicated on the merits, § 2254 provides "two separate bases for reviewing state court decisions; the 'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses articulate independent considerations a federal court must consider." Maharaj v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005). Even if the federal court concludes that the state court applied federal law incorrectly, habeas relief is appropriate only if that application was "objectively unreasonable." Id.
Finally, under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." A determination of a factual issue made by a state court, however, shall be presumed correct, and the habeas petitioner shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See Parker, 244 F.3d at 835-36; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient and "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"; and (2) whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.1 Id. at 687-88. A court must adhere to a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689-90. "Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id. at 690; Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1989).
As observed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the test for ineffective assistance of counsel:
has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial. Courts also should at the start presume effectiveness and should always avoid second guessing with the benefit of hindsight. Strickland encourages reviewing courts to allow lawyers broad discretion to represent their clients by pursuing their own strategy. We are not interested in grading lawyers' performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.
White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Under those rules and presumptions, "the cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between." Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994).
Petitioner alleges that her sentence was not legally justified and is disproportionate to her co-defendants' sentences. (Doc. 1 at 5). Petitioner notes that her two female co-defendants received six-year sentences. (Id. at 5-6). Petitioner raised this claim in a motion for modification of sentence, and the trial court denied the motion. (Doc. 12-2 at 76-82). Petitioner also raised this claim on direct appeal. (Id. at 95-102). The Fifth DCA affirmed per curiam. (Id. at 135).
The Supreme Court of the United States has not recognized a federal constitutional right to a sentence that is proportionate to one's co-defendant. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1984); Bush v. Singletary, 99 F.3d 373, 375 (11th Cir. 1996). Proportionality review is required by Florida law in some instances; however, even if Petitioner's sentence was disproportionate, "[a] federal court may not issue the writ [of habeas corpus] on the basis of a perceived error of state law." Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Alternatively, the Court concludes that Petitioner's sentence is not impermissiblydisproportionate. Florida courts have held that a defendant is not entitled to a downward departure based on proportionality if the co-defendants are not equally culpable. State v. Diaz, 189 So. 3d 896, 901 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). The Diaz court noted that a trial court would only be "'justified in departing downward to meet a codefendant's sentence if the record established beyond a reasonable doubt that the culpability of the defendant was no greater than that of the codefendant.'" Id. (quoting Sanders v. Satte, 510 So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla. 1987)).
During Petitioner's sentencing proceeding, defense counsel argued for a youthful offender sentence. (Doc. 12-2 at 60-68). The trial court determined that a youthful offender sentence was not warranted. (Id. at 71). In making this decision, the trial court stated the following:
(Id. at 71).
The trial court considered Petitioner's degree of involvement in the crime and concluded that she was more culpable than some of her co-defendants because she helped to plan the crimes. In light of this finding, Petitioner cannot show that her sentenceis disproportionate. The state court's denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, Claim One is denied.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred by denying her motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 1 at 8). Following the sentencing proceeding, Petitioner filed a document entitled "Written Objection and Motion for Reconsideration." (Doc. 12-2 at 76). Petitioner sought reconsideration or modification of her sentence pursuant to Rule 3.800 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id. at 76-80). The trial court denied the...
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