Woods v. State
| Decision Date | 11 November 1946 |
| Docket Number | 36199. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | WOODS v. STATE. |
T. Price Dale, of Hattiesburg, for appellant.
Greek L. Rice, Atty. Gen., and Geo. H. Ethridge Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Woods by three separate affidavits, was charged with (1) exhibiting a deadly weapon, to-wit a pistol, in a rude, angry and threatening manner in violation of Section 2086, (2) with carrying concealed a deadly weapon, to-wit a pistol, in violation of Section 2079, and (3) with assault and battery with fists in violation of Section 2562, the three cited sections being in the Mississippi Code of 1942. At the beginning of the trial in the County Court the county prosecuting attorney moved the Court to grant an order consolidating these three charges into one and for one trial of the consolidated case because, as stated by him, the three crimes 'grew out of one and the same transaction.' Woods objected to this procedure but the trial judge granted '* * * the motion of the State to consolidate the cases inasmuch as they are misdemeanors.' Woods on this appeal contends that this was error and that we should reverse and remand the case therefor.
Mississippi has no statute on the subject of consolidating distinct criminal charges against the same person into one offense and a trial thereof as one case. Section 2514, Code 1942, grants to persons jointly indicted for felony the right to be tried separately on due application for a severance, and Section 2515 provides that persons jointly indicted for misdemeanors may be tried jointly or separately in the discretion of the Court. But the question involved here is not dealt with in either statute. The question under consideration is discussed in 8 R.C.L., page 166, par. 160; Lucas v. State, 144 Ala. 63, 39 So. 821, 3 L.R.A.,N.S., 412, and note thereto; Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 175 N.E. 718 79 A.L.R. 1380, and in 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 931, p 209. These authorities reveal that in some jurisdictions such consolidation and trial are permitted in the discretion of the court, but it will also be noted that many of the cases permitting consolidation were decided under statutes, federal and state, so permitting, or the defendants consented, or did not object, to such procedure, and that even under these conditions the action of the court is to be guided by a sound discretion, making sure that consolidation will save delay and expense and not prejudice the defendant. These precautionary requirements are stated in 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 931, p. 210, in this language: 'Under such statutes consolidation is authorized only when the offenses charged therein might have been joined in one indictment under separate counts, and should be allowed only where the court is satisfied that the ends of justice require it in order to avoid unnecessary relay and expense, and where accused is not thereby confounded in his defense or otherwise prejudiced, and the court is under a duty to protect with care the substantial rights of accused when subjected to a consolidated prosecution.'
The exact question seems not to have arisen in this court since this State was admitted into the Union, December 10, 1817. That fact itself is significant. However, this court has frequently held (with some exceptions, see Jimerson v. State, 93 Miss. 685, 46 So. 948) the case at bar not being one of the exceptions, that separate and distinct offenses can not be charged in one indictment or information although all offenses be midemeanors. McGraw v. State, 157 Miss. 675, 128 So. 875, and cases therein cited. These holdings prevent this State from coming within the above quoted requirement that 'consolidation is authorized only when the offenses charged therein might have been joined in one indictment'. See 27 Am.Jur. page 683, par. 124, for a general discussion of this question.
At common law and from the earliest colonial days in this country it has been the settled rule that a formal accusation is an essential condition precedent to a valid prosecution for a criminal offense. This is done by information supported by affidavit or by indictment. In either case the objects are first to furnish the accused such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to prepare his defense and avail himself of the conviction or acquittal against further prosecution for the same offense, and, second, to inform the court...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Williams v. State, 54294
...against him as will enable him to adequately prepare his defense. Westmoreland v. State, 246 So.2d 487 (Miss.1971); Woods v. State, 200 Miss. 527, 27 So.2d 895 (1946). Thus, all that is required in this regard is a concise and clear statement of the elements of the crime charged. Love v. St......
-
Smith v. State, 93-DP-00821-SCT.
...against him as will enable him to adequately prepare his defense. Westmoreland v. State, 246 So.2d 487 (Miss. 1971); Woods v. State, 200 Miss. 527, 27 So.2d 895 (1946). Thus, all that is required in this regard is a concise and clear statement of the elements of the crime charged. Love v. S......
-
King v. State, 07-KA-59203
...defense." Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 804 (Miss.1984) (citing Westmoreland v. State, 246 So.2d 487 (Miss.1971); Woods v. State, 200 Miss. 527, 27 So.2d 895 (1946)). The description should include a "concise and clear statement of the elements of the crime charged." Id. (citing Love v.......
-
Flowers v. State
...count indictment.” In support of his argument, Flowers cites State v. Berryhill, 703 So.2d 250 (Miss.1997), and Woods v. State, 200 Miss. 527, 27 So.2d 895, 896–97 (1946). Neither case supports Flowers's contention. Berryhill stands for the proposition that “capital murder indictments that ......