Woods v. State

Decision Date02 December 1983
Docket NumberNo. 782S280,782S280
Citation456 N.E.2d 417
PartiesNorman WOODS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

David M. Shaw, Evansville, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Stephan E. Wolter, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

Appellant Woods was convicted in a trial by jury of theft and was sentenced to thirty-two years at the Indiana Department of Corrections. The enhanced sentence was founded upon a verdict that he was an habitual criminal. He appeals contending that the court committed error in instructing the jury and in overruling his motion to dismiss the habitual offender allegations.

Appellant was charged with the theft of a car from a car sales company. Indiana Code Sec. 35-43-4-2 defines theft as follows:

"(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a class D felony."

The jury was properly instructed that there are four elements to theft, namely that the defendant:

1. knowingly or intentionally

2. exerted unauthorized control

3. over property of another person

4. with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use.

The information in this case alleged:

"that Norman Woods on or about the 18th day of April A.D., 1979 ... did knowingly exert unauthorized control over property in the custody of Bennett Motors, Inc., to-wit: one 1978 Chrysler Cordova ... with intent to deprive Bennett Motors, Inc., of the value and use thereof, by obtaining said vehicle by promising Donald Gaines, an agent of Bennett Motors, Inc., that he would bring to the business premises of Bennett Motors, Inc., on April 19, 1979, a cashier's check in the amount of $6,214.00, or that he would deposit on April 10, 1979, $6,214.00 in checking account number 1-222-0488-340-005-611 of the Security Pacific National Bank, which acts the said Norman Woods knew would not be performed, all in violation of I.C. 35-43-4-2."

Indiana Code Sec. 35-43-4-1 provides definitions applicable to the charge made.

"(a) As used in this chapter, 'exert control over property' means to obtain ... drive ... or possess property....

(b) Under this chapter, a person's control over property of another person is 'unauthorized' if it is exerted:

* * *

* * *

(6) by promising performance that the person knows will not be performed...."

The facts tending to support the verdict show that appellant procured overnight use of a car from a car salesman at a lot, upon delivering a check for the purchase price on an account in a California bank and upon his promise to return and deposit the purchase price in the account or deliver a cashier's check, the next day. He told the salesman that there was no money in the account at the time. The account was in fact closed and therefore no longer in existence. This final flurry of activity came at the culmination of the dealings which had included such maneuvers as the creation by appellant of the false impression that his girlfriend was his wife. The day following the delivery of the check, he packed his bags and made an unannounced departure from town with the car.

I.

Over appellant's objection the trial court gave the following Jury Instruction 5 quoting from Ind.Code Sec. 35-43-4-4(e):

"A statute provides in part as follows:

A person who has insufficient funds in or no account with a drawee bank who makes, draws, or utters a check, draft, or order for payment on the bank may be inferred:

(1) To have known that the bank would refuse payment upon presentment in the usual course of business; and

(2) To have intended to deprive the owner of any property acquired by making, drawing, or uttering the check, draft, or order for payment of (any) part of the value of that property."

Appellant contends that this instruction was not applicable to the facts of this case, since (1) he was not charged with obtaining property by means of a bad check, but by virtue of a promise to pay at a later date, and (2) he had disclosed to the salesman that the check was then worthless. He...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Perkins v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • October 25, 1985
    ...beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has been twice convicted and twice sentenced for prior felony convictions. Woods v. State (1983), Ind., 456 N.E.2d 417; Miller v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 454, 417 N.E.2d The State argues that although no direct evidence was presented concerning the ......
  • Jones v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • August 28, 1984
    ...2 (3) over property of another person (4) with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use. See, Woods v. State, (1983) Ind., 456 N.E.2d 417, 418; Snuffer v. State, (1984) Ind.App., 461 N.E.2d 150, 155. The unexplained possession of recently stolen property alone is a......
  • Williams v. Duckworth
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • April 19, 1984
    ...had been previously twice convicted and twice sentenced for felonies, ... (emphasis in the original). Id. at 342. In Woods v. State, 456 N.E.2d 417, 419 (Ind.1983), the Indiana Supreme Court noted that "the burden of the state in proving the status of habitual criminal is met solely by proo......
  • Pennington v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • February 16, 1984
    ...control 3. over property of another person 4. with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use. Woods v. State, (1983) Ind., 456 N.E.2d 417; Williams v. State, (1969) 253 Ind. 316, 253 N.E.2d 242; Nelson v. State, (1975) 167 Ind.App. 59, 337 N.E.2d 877. As to the offe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT