Woods v. State, 30976
| Decision Date | 03 April 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 30976,30976 |
| Citation | 250 Ind. 132,235 N.E.2d 479 |
| Parties | Herman WOODS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
John J. Dillon, Atty. Gen., Dennis J. Dewey, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This was a criminal prosecution brought by indictment against appellant, Herman Woods, charging him in two counts with rape of and incest with his fifteen-year-old daughter, Sandra Woods.
The indictment filed in this case in the Gibson Circuit Court, on the 8th day of October, 1965, omitting caption and formal parts, reads as follows:
COUNT ONE
'The Grand Jury of Gibson County, State of Indiana, on their oaths present and charge that Herman Woods, on or about the 1st day of May, 1965, in said county and state, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously make an assault in and upon one Sandra Woods, then and there being a female child under the age of sixteen (16) years, to-wit: of the age of fifteen years, and did then and there unlawfully and feloniously ravish and carnally know her, the said Sandra Woods, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.'
Following trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts. Judgment was entered on the verdicts and appellant was sentenced on each count to be imprisoned in the Indiana State Prison for two (2) to twenty-one (21) years, the sentences on the two counts to run concurrently. Appellant's motion for new trial was overruled and he brings this appeal on the basis of four main contentions, all of which are redundantly set out in such motion:
1. That the trial court erred in refusing to sustain appellant's plea in abatement which challeged the propriety of the selection of the grand jury from which the indictment against appellant emanated.
2. That the trial court erred in refusing to sustain appellant's motion to quash the indictment.
3. That the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony by the prosecuting witness to be admitted into evidence, which substantially prejudiced appellant's right to a fair trial.
4. That the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
Appellant's contention that the grand jury which returned the indictment in this case was improperly selected and impaneled is based upon an erroneous interpretation of the law.
The relevant statutes are as follows:
Ind.Ann.Stat. § 4--3304 (Supp.1967)
Ind.Ann.Stat. § 4--3320 (Supp.1967) (our emphasis)
Appellant contends, apparently, that the grand jury members were not selected 'as nearly as possible' in proportion to the population of each commissioner's district, and upon that premise bases his conclusion that the statute was not complied with and his rights have been prejudiced.
In support of this specification, appellant states that the Gibson County population, as of 1960, was 29,949, and then proceeds to break down the total between the various commissioner's districts as follows:
First District 4,914
Second District 11,951
Third District 13,084
Appellant then contends that the members of the grand jury from which the indictment of appellant emanated were not selected according to proper apportionment principles, in that some grand jurors represented larger population masses than others. This distribution, he says, is not in compliance with § 4--3304, supra, requiring jurors to be selected 'as nearly as possible in proportion to the population in each county commissioner's district.'
Appellant's view of what the statute requires is erroneous. It is not the drawing of prospective jurors immediately preceding a term of court which § 4--3304, supra, requires to be in proportion to population distribution, but the original yearly selection of a pool of names from which prospective jurors will be drawn for the various terms of court during the calendar year.
It should be noted that Ind.Ann.Stat. § 4--3320, supra, under which prospective jurors for a particular term of court are selected, contains no requirement that such selection be made in proportion to population distribution. So long as the apportionment requirements are followed in selecting the entire yearly pool of prospective jurors, as required by § 4--3304, supra, no apportionment violation of § 4--3320, supra, will arise, even if all the jurors on a particular panel reside in the same district. See Harrison v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 147, 165, 106 N.E.2d 912, 32 A.L.R.2d 875.
The record in this case shows that the jury commissioners selected a total of 1090 names from which juries were to be selected for the various terms of court in the calendar year 1966. So far as can be determined from the record, those names were selected as much as possible in accordance with the population distribution of the various districts, and the trial court so found.
Not only does the record reveal substantial compliance with the statutory provisions above-quoted, but also a complete absence of irregularities of the nature relied upon by appellant. Since there was substantial compliance with the statutory requirements of jury selection, appellant cannot show prejudicial error in the refusal of ...
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