Woods v. State
| Decision Date | 17 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 57481.,57481. |
| Parties | William Andrew WOODS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Karla K. Butko, Verdi, for Appellant.
Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney, and Joseph R. Plater, Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.
David M. Schieck, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice.
Before PICKERING, C.J., GIBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS, CHERRY and SAITTA, JJ.
In this appeal, we consider whether the State's failure to file a responsive pleading in justice court, leading to dismissal of a criminal complaint, constitutes conscious indifference to a defendant's procedural rights and/or important procedural rules barring a new prosecution for the same offense. First, we consider whether a conscious indifference analysis applies where, as here, the State's failure to oppose a defendant's motion to dismiss results in the dismissal of a criminal complaint. We conclude that it does because the analysis is appropriate where an action or inaction by the State causes the dismissal of a complaint. Second, we consider whether the State's inaction here constituted conscious indifference. We conclude that the State's failure to file an opposition demonstrated conscious indifference to an important procedural rule. We therefore conclude that the district court erred by denying appellant William Andrew Woods' pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus and reverse the judgment of conviction.
Woods was charged via criminal complaint with one count of sex offender failure to notify appropriate agencies of change of address. After one continuance at Woods' request, the preliminary hearing was set for November 17, 2009. On that date, Woods' counsel, Karla K. Butko, filed and personally served the deputy district attorney who appeared at the preliminary hearing, Michael Mahaffey, with a motion to dismiss.2 Woods asserts, and the State does not contest, that the parties agreed to reset the preliminary hearing so that the State could file an opposition. The State, however, did not file an opposition. On December 9, 2009, before the preliminary hearing took place, the justice court granted the motion and dismissed the case due to the lack of an opposition.
Five days later, on December 14, 2009, the State—through Deputy District Attorney Patricia Halstead—filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal. Therein, Ms. Halstead conceded that the motion to dismiss was properly served, but argued that it was not brought to her attention “through office procedure” and Ms. Butko neither placed a courtesy call when no opposition was filed nor filed a request for submission. She also pointed out in her reply that Ms. Butko knew that Ms. Halstead was the deputy assigned to the case but that the motion to dismiss was not served on her through “traditional means.” The justice court granted the State's motion for reconsideration but stated:
The State is hereby put on notice that this Court does not intend in any manner to validate the State's failure to properly respond in a timely manner to motions that are filed by the defendants in cases pending before this Court. The State's argument that the Defendant did not provide them with a courtesy call is specious, at best. Neither the Defendant, nor this Court, has any obligation to remind counselwhen responses are due to various motions that are filed in this Court.
The justice court then ordered the State to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss. The parties agree, however, that the justice court later determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter due to the prior dismissal and again dismissed the case.
On March 10, 2010, the State obtained an indictment against Woods for the same offense charged in the criminal complaint. Woods filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus and/or motion to dismiss the indictment alleging, inter alia, that the State willfully failed to comply with important procedural rules and acted with conscious indifference to his procedural rights when it failed to oppose the motion to dismiss. This conscious indifference, he argued, barred a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
The State filed a response to the petition, pointing out that Ms. Butko provided a copy of the motion to Mr. Mahaffey even though she knew that Ms. Halstead was the deputy assigned to the case. The State asserted that the motion was not properly served or submitted through a request for submission. It also alleged that the justice court articulated that it believed that the State had not acted improperly.3 Finally, the State declared that it “clearly abided by all procedural rules.”
After a hearing, the district court issued a written order denying the petition and concluding that the State did not exhibit willful or conscious indifference to Woods' rights. Specifically, the court determined that:
[t]he State undeniably made a substantial error in failing to oppose the Motion to Dismiss, however, there has been no showing of conduct that rises to the level of willful or conscious indifference. Upon realizing that the Motion to Dismiss was granted, the State filed a Motion for Reconsideration.... [T]he State's Motion for Reconsideration was not filed with conscious indifference to the rights of the defendant. It was filed in good faith with legal support.... The State made a mistake in failing to oppose the Motion to Dismiss, but neither that mistake nor the subsequent filings by the State indicate any conscious indifference to Woods' procedural rights.
Woods was subsequently convicted of sex offender failure to notify appropriate agencies of change of address. This appeal follows.
On appeal, Woods contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the State's failure to oppose his motion to dismiss constituted willful or conscious indifference to his procedural rights. He asserts that the State is barred from initiating new criminal proceedings where the original proceedings were dismissed due to the State's demonstration of conscious indifference. First, however, we consider the threshold question, not addressed by the parties but implicated by the written order, of whether the conscious indifference analysis applies to the factual scenario presented by this case.
Applicability of conscious indifference analysis
This court first announced the conscious indifference rule over 40 years ago, holding that “[a] new proceeding for the same offense (whether by complaint, indictment or information) is not allowable when the original proceeding has been dismissed due to the willful failure of the prosecutor to comply with important procedural rules.” Maes v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 317, 319, 468 P.2d 332, 333 (1970). This rule was initially promulgated as a means to strictly limit continuances in justice court so that cases could be handled in a timely manner. See, e.g., McNair v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 434, 436–37, 514 P.2d 1175, 1176 (1973). Accordingly, most of the cases undertaking a conscious indifference analysis consider the procedure surrounding continuances of preliminary hearings. See Joseph John H., a Minor v. State, 113 Nev. 621, 621–24, 939 P.2d 1056, 1057–58 (1997); Sheriff v. Roylance, 110 Nev. 334, 337, 871 P.2d 359, 361 (1994); Sheriff v. Simpson, 109 Nev. 430, 432–34, 851 P.2d 428, 430–31 (1993); Sheriff v. Menendez, 98 Nev. 430, 431–32, 651 P.2d 98, 98–99 (1982); Downey v. Sheriff, 88 Nev. 14, 15, 492 P.2d 989, 990 (1972); Bustos v. Sheriff, 87 Nev. 622, 623–24, 491 P.2d 1279, 1280–81 (1971); State v. Austin, 87 Nev. 81, 82–83, 482 P.2d 284, 284–85 (1971); Maes, 86 Nev. at 318, 468 P.2d at 332.
This court has, however, considered claims of conscious indifference in other contexts. For example, in Johnson v. Sheriff, we considered whether the State exhibited conscious indifference to appellant's rights where the justice court dismissed the case after the State failed to corroborate the testimony of appellant's accomplice. 89 Nev. 304, 305, 511 P.2d 1051, 1051–52 (1973). In State v. Lamb, we considered whether the State exhibited willful or conscious indifference when a criminal complaint was dismissed after the prosecutor failed to establish probable cause. 97 Nev. 609, 610–11, 637 P.2d 1201, 1202–03 (1981). And in Phillips v. Sheriff, we concluded that the State did not act in a consciously or willfully indifferent manner where its case was dismissed in justice court due to the unavailability of a witness. 93 Nev. 309, 310–11, 565 P.2d 330, 331 (1977). See also Sheriff, Nye County v. Davis, 106 Nev. 145, 149, 787 P.2d 1241, 1243 (1990); Watson v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 236, 237–38, 562 P.2d 1133, 1133 (1977); State v. Maes, 93 Nev. 49, 51, 559 P.2d 1184, 1185 (1977). These cases establish that a conscious indifference analysis is appropriately applied where some action or inaction by the State results in the dismissal of a criminal complaint. Accordingly, we conclude that a conscious indifference analysis is appropriate here, where the State's failure to oppose Woods' motion to dismiss resulted in the dismissal of the criminal complaint.
Conscious indifference
Woods alleges that the State acted with willful and conscious indifference to his right to defend against the charge in a timely manner 4 by failing to oppose the motion to dismiss. The State concedes that its failure to oppose the motion to dismiss “might amount to negligence” but asserts that the failure does not constitute willful or conscious indifference. The State reiterates that the motion was served on “stand-in counsel” and emphasizes that Ms. Halstead filed a motion for reconsideration as soon as she learned of the order of dismissal.5 We agree with Woods and conclude that the...
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