Woods v. Superior Court
Decision Date | 08 January 1981 |
Docket Number | S.F. 24152 |
Citation | 170 Cal.Rptr. 484,620 P.2d 1032,28 Cal.3d 668 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 620 P.2d 1032 Marion J. WOODS, as Director, etc., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF BUTTE COUNTY, Respondent; Julia SEIBERT et al., Real Parties in Interest. |
No appearance for respondent.
Legal Services of Northern California, Butte Regional Office, Chico, Daniel L. Siegal, Michael R. Bush and Alan Lieberman, for real parties in interest.
Andrea Saltzman, William Marlin, Phyllis E. Andelin and Thomas W. Pulliam, Jr., San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of real parties in interest.
Victoria J. De Goff, Berkeley, as amicus curiae.
We have concluded that a decision of the Director (petitioner) of the Department of Social Services denying benefits to real parties in interest below (applicants) pursuant to an assertedly invalid regulation may be reviewed by administrative mandamus. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5; unless otherwise indicated subsequent statutory references are to this code.) Accordingly, petitioner's demurrer to applicants' petition for such writ was properly overruled, and his petition for mandate and/or prohibition to restrain further trial court proceedings will be denied.
In reviewing this matter we reaffirm our traditional reluctance to interpose prerogative writ review of rulings on pleadings. (State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 243, 115 Cal.Rptr. 497, 524 P.2d 1281, fn. 3; Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 851, 92 Cal.Rptr. 179, 479 P.2d 379.) We are persuaded, however, that the procedural validity herein presented is an important and continuing issue in California administrative practice fully meriting our attention.
According to factual allegations in the petition, applicants were required to vacate apartment dwellings occupied by them as tenants after the City of Oroville declared them to be dangerous and unfit for human habitation. Applicants thereupon unsuccessfully applied to the Butte County Department of Social Welfare (county) for funds to relocate. Thereafter pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 10950, applicants requested and received a "fair hearing" before an appropriate officer of that department for the purpose of challenging county's action. Following the hearing, during which applicants presented testimony and arguments, petitioner denied their claims on the ground that departmental regulations covering "non-recurring special needs" do not authorize expenditure of housing relocation funds.
Seeking to compel petitioner to set aside his decision and to afford them relief, applicants petitioned the Superior Court of Butte County for a writ of mandamus pursuant to section 1094.5, claiming that the departmental regulations violated federal and state law. (See 42 U.S.C. § 606(e); Welf. & Inst.Code, § 11450, subd. (d).)
Petitioner demurred to applicants' petition, contending that the appropriate method of challenging the validity of a departmental regulation was either by petition for "ordinary" mandamus under section 1085 or by an action for declaratory relief pursuant to section 1060. Following the overruling of his demurrer petitioner here seeks an extraordinary writ to annul the ruling.
Initially, we note that a demurrer must be overruled if the moving party has alleged facts entitling him to some form of relief. More specifically, we have said that if a proper basis for issuance of mandamus is alleged, "it is unimportant that plaintiff's pleading was not in form a petition for mandamus ...." (Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 638, 234 P.2d 981; see also, Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 802, 813-814, 140 Cal.Rptr. 442, 567 P.2d 1162 ( ).) Here, petitioner apparently conceding that applicants' factual allegations would state a cause of action for issuance of a writ of mandamus pursuant to section 1085 (rather than § 1094.5), the propriety of the trial court's order overruling petitioner's demurrer becomes even clearer.
Section 1094.5, subdivision (a), provides as follows: When the three elements of hearing, evidence, and discretion are found to be present, "by the very terms of the statute (§ 1094.5, subd. (a)), the procedure there set forth is to be utilized in all cases in which review of a final adjudicatory order is sought by mandate ...." (Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., supra, at p. 814, 140 Cal.Rptr. 442, 567 P.2d 1162, fns. omitted.)
Of course, mandamus pursuant to section 1094.5, commonly denominated "administrative" mandamus, is mandamus still. It is not possessed of (Grant v. Board of Medical Examiners (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 820, 826, 43 Cal.Rptr. 270; see Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 814, 140 Cal.Rptr. 442, 567 P.2d 1162.) The full panoply of rules applicable to "ordinary" mandamus applies to "administrative" mandamus proceedings, except where modified by statute. (See 5 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Extraordinary Writs, § 213, p. 3970; Cal.Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 1966) § 1.5, p. 7.) Because applicants are conceded to have stated a cause of action for some form of extraordinary relief, petitioner's demurrer properly was overruled.
More fundamentally, however, the specific extraordinary relief sought by applicants here-a writ of mandamus pursuant to section 1094.5-is the proper means for review of an adjudicatory decision of the Department of Social Services which is alleged to be invalid because it is based upon an invalid regulation. The propriety of such procedure is grounded upon two statutory footings-sections 10950-10965 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, containing the manner for assertion of entitlement to public social service benefits, and section 1094.5 itself.
Several sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code are pertinent. Section 10950 provides in relevant part: "If any applicant for ... public social services is dissatisfied with any action of the county department relating to his application ... he shall, ... upon filing a request with the State Department of Social Services ..., be accorded an opportunity for a fair hearing." The "fair hearing," by virtue of section 10953 of the code, is to be conducted by the director of the department, by the department's administrative adviser, by a referee employed by the department or, in certain cases, by a representative of the Office of Administrative Hearings, each acting with all the powers and authority conferred upon the head of the department. (Id., § 10954.) Other sections of this code provide for the procedural details of the hearing. (Id., §§ 10955-10960.) The statutes impose no limitation, factual or legal, upon the issues which may be raised in the "fair hearing."
Section 10962 of the Welfare and Institutions Code explicitly provides for judicial review of the director's final decision in the following manner: Significantly, the judicial review contemplated is "of the entire proceedings," including, of course, "questions of law."
Applicants have fully complied with the requirements of this statutory scheme in asserting their claims for social service benefits: They applied to the county for such benefits; upon denial of their applications, they sought and obtained a "fair hearing"; and upon receipt of the director's final decision rejecting their applications, they timely filed in the superior court a petition for section 1094.5 mandamus, as directed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 10962.
Quite apart from the specific authorization of Welfare and Institutions Code section 10962, we have declared as a general principle: "Since the enactment of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is no longer open to question that in this state the writ of mandamus is appropriate 'for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal ....' " (Boren...
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