Woods v. Thrower

• Decision Date: 05 May 1921
• Docket Number: 10617.
• Citation: 107 S.E. 250,116 S.C. 165
• Parties: WOODS v. THROWER.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

107 S.E. 250

116 S.C. 165

WOODS v. THROWER.

No. 10617.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 5, 1921

Appeal from Richland County Court; M. S. Whaley, Judge.

Action by Charles A. Woods against T. E. Thrower. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Tompkins Barnett & McDonald, of Columbia, for appellant.

Barron McKay, Frierson & McCants, of Columbia, for appellee.

GARY C.J.

The facts are thus stated in the record:

"This is an action in claim and delivery to recover possession of a Premier automobile.

Summons and complaint was served on the 28th day of January 1920. Plaintiff, who resides at Marion, S. C., through his agent, Marshall Wallace, sent his automobile to defendant's shop at Columbia, S. C., for certain repairs. The contention of plaintiff is that the defendant agreed to complete such repairs for the sum of $100. Defendant, on the other hand, contended that plaintiff agreed to pay the reasonable cost of such repairs, including new parts furnished, and that the only statement he made to plaintiff's agent as to the cost of same was that the labor on the car, exclusive of parts, would amount to approximately $100. He accordingly, after completing the repairs, rendered a bill to plaintiff in the sum of $230. Plaintiff's agent refused to pay this sum, but tendered defendant $100 and demanded the automobile. Defendant claiming a lien for repairs, refused to surrender the car unless his bill for $230 was paid. Hence this action.

The plaintiff seized the car under delivery proceedings, and the defendant put up bond and retook same.

The entire transaction on the part of the plaintiff was handled by the overseer of plaintiff's plantation Marshall Wallace; plaintiff himself at the time being engaged in his official duties in Richmond, Va.

The issues were tried before his honor Judge Whaley, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. Defendant made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and in due time an appeal was taken to this court."

The exceptions raise two questions, the first of which is whether his honor the presiding judge erred in admitting, over defendant's objection, testimony to show the reputation of the witness Marshall Wallace for truth and veracity and fair dealing. After the witness Marshall Wallace had testified in behalf of the plaintiff, another witness, J. C. Gasque, testified as follows, over the objection of the defendant's attorneys:

"By Mr. McKay: Q. Mr. Gasque, I will ask the question over again. Do you know what Mr. Wallace's reputation is for truth and veracity and fair dealing in the community in which he lives? A. I have known Mr. Wallace, sir, for 12 or 15 years in Marion, and always known him to be an upright honest person around the community, sir. He bears a very good reputation, a very esteemed reputation, around the community. Mr. McKay: Your honor, Mr. E. W. Mullins of this bar would testify to the same effect. They admit that.

Mr. McDonald: And we wish to interpose the same objection, your honor, to Mr. Mullins' testimony."

The record shows that the witness Marshall Wallace was a resident of Marion, and not of Richland, county, in which the action was tried.

The principal authority upon which the appellant's attorneys rely is the case of Chapman v. Cooley, 12 Rich. 654, in which it was decided that the character of a witness cannot be defended by evidence, unless it has been attacked directly by evidence. The reasons assigned by the court in that case for its conclusion are thus stated:

" The consumption of the limited time which can be appropriated to the administration of justice and of the money of parties and witnesses required by the trial of collateral issues as to character is a great and growing mischief. In this very case, involving in pecuniary interest the value of a cotton screw and seven bags of cotton, the judge reports that three days of a former session were occupied, with no other fruit than mistrial by cessation of the term, and that at the trial which resulted in a verdict, notwithstanding his ruling to exclude such evidence as to the principal witness of the plaintiff, 56 witnesses were examined as to character. Great delay, expense, and exasperation necessarily follow such a course. Instead of trying the issue in the action, the procedure, in many cases, is a trial of the witnesses, and every witness is expected to bring in his train a host of compurgators who will swear to their faith in him when he contradicts himself or is contradicted by others. These collateral issues as to character are practically and sometimes justly applied not only to the witnesses as to the facts in controversy, but also as to the witnesses as to character themselves, and really are unlimited and illimitable. In a large majority of cases those collateral investigations are altogether sterile, either because the testimony of the witness assailed is immaterial, or because the number is nearly equal of those attacking and those defending his character. It is frequently a mere contest as to the number of compurgators and the

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