Woods v. Union Pacific R. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. B186044.,B186044.
• Citation: 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 748,162 Cal.App.4th 571
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Raymond A. WOODS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

75 Cal.Rptr.3d 748

162 Cal.App.4th 571

Raymond A. WOODS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

No. B186044.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1.

April 15, 2008.

Girardi & Keese, John A. Girardi, Los Angeles, and V. Andre Sherman, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Michael Whitcomb, Monterey Park, and David M. Pickett, for Defendant and Respondent.

JACKSON, J.^*

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Raymond A. Woods appeals from a judgment entered following the grant of a directed verdict in favor of defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company. We affirm the judgment. Plaintiff also appeals from the order awarding defendant ordinary costs and expert fees and costs. Inasmuch as plaintiff has presented no arguments with respect to this order, we deem plaintiffs appeal from the order to have been abandoned and affirm the order. (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4, 188 Cal.Rptr. 115, 655 P.2d 317; Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6, 76 Cal.Rptr .2d 457.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1995, defendant hired plaintiff to work at its Long Beach Intermodal Container Transfer Facility (ICTF).¹ Plaintiff worked primarily as a groundman. Ascending and descending railcars was one of plaintiffs regular duties, a duty for which he received training.

On the evening of November 7, 2001, plaintiff was at ICTF loading an outbound intermodal railcar identified as a Gunderson GWG-33, a high profile 53-foot railcar with multiple bays. Attached to this railcar was a series of safety appliances that looked like and functioned as a ladder. From bottom to top, the appliances consisted of a sill step, two horizontal handholds, and two vertical handholds all of which were mounted to two vertical steel stiles that extended some distance above the top of the railcar.

While descending from this railcar, plaintiff sustained an injury. When plaintiff stepped onto the ground with his left foot, his right foot was on the bottom rung and his hands were on the bottom one-third of the vertical handholds. Plaintiff then turned his body to the right, intending to move to the next bay. When he initiated his turn to the right, he let go of the vertical handholds and brought his right foot down to the ground. At that time, he experienced a sharp pain in his left knee. At no time while descending the ladder did plaintiff slip or lose his grasp on the vertical handholds. The lower ends of these handholds were about two inches above plaintiffs head as he stood on the ground. The horizontal handholds (the rungs of the ladder) were available to grasp at lower positions.

Despite his injury, plaintiff remained in defendant's employ. Eventually, however, defendant discharged plaintiff, in that he was unable to perform his job and there were no light duty assignments he could perform. Plaintiffs injury necessitated surgery first to his left knee and later to his right knee.

On May 24, 2004, plaintiff filed this negligence action against defendant under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.) and the Federal Safety Appliance Act (SAA) (49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq.). The gravamen of plaintiffs action was that defendant "provided an unsafe workplace and engaged in unsafe and negligent practices contrary to its obligations under the FELA and/or provided unsafe railcars to its workers contrary to its obligations under the SAA, thereby directly or indirectly causing Plaintiffs injuries."

Trial in this matter commenced on May 25, 2005. Plaintiffs experts testified that the vertical handholds do not comply with the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as incorporated by the SAA and that plaintiffs injuries were caused by his exposure to unsafe working conditions, including the vertical handholds on the ladder, which compromised his leverage, balance and ability to control himself.

On June 2, 2005, after plaintiff rested his case, defense counsel informed the court that he wanted to make a motion for nonsuit. The court asked defense counsel to hold his motion until there was a break in the proceedings. Counsel agreed and then commenced the presentation of the defense case, calling several witnesses to testify. Among these witnesses was defendant's SAA expert, who testified, contrary to plaintiffs experts, that the vertical handholds under scrutiny in this case do not violate the CFR.

During a break in the proceedings, the court entertained defendant's motion for nonsuit, which was "based on the failure [of plaintiff] to provide evidence of a violation of the [SAA]." The court denied the motion in light of the experts' different interpretations of the SAA. The court further noted that even if it had not heard defendant's expert, it would have been inclined to deny the motion in light of plaintiffs expert's testimony that the CFR required horizontal handholds. Defendant then unsuccessfully moved for partial nonsuit on plaintiffs negligence claim.

On June 6, 2005, after defendant completed the presentation of its case, it filed a motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiff filed an opposition the same day. After listening to extensive arguments by counsel, the court reserved ruling on the motion, observing: "[W]hat it boils down to is, is this a violation or is this an interpretation? If it is an interpretation, it is my purview. If it is a violation, it is the jury's purview. It is a very difficult decision."

On June 7, 2005, after wrestling with the issue, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The court concluded that compliance with the SAA was a question of law, that plaintiff had failed to establish a violation of the SAA and that, apart from that, there had been no affirmative showing of negligence.

The court thereafter signed an order granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict and entered judgment in favor of defendant. This appeal followed.

CONTENTIONS

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for' a directed verdict, in that substantial evidence supported plaintiffs claim that defendant's railcar was not in compliance with the SAA. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the trial court made the correct ruling when it granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict and entered judgment in defendant's favor.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

A directed verdict in favor of a defendant will be reversed if "there is substantial evidence to support plaintiffs' claim, and if the state of the law also supports that claim." (Margolin v. Shemaria (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 891, 895, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 502; Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 629-630, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 386.) On appeal, we review the trial court's ruling, not its reasoning. (McClain v. Octagon Plaza, LLC (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 784, 802, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 885.) If the trial court's ruling or decision is correct upon any theory of law applicable to the case, it will be upheld without regard to the considerations underlying the court's determination. (Markowitz v. Fidelity Nat. Title Co. (2006) 142 Cal. App.4th 508, 520, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 217.)

Statutory and Regulatory Framework

"FELA is a broad remedial statute based on fault ... and is intended by Congress to protect railroad employees by doing away with certain common law tort defenses." (Villa v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe (8th Cir.2005) 397 F.3d 1041, 1045.) FELA imposes upon a railroad a continuing and nondelegable duty to use reasonable care to provide railroad employees a safe place to work. (Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry. (1943) 319 U.S. 350, 352-353, 63 S.Ct. 1062, 87 L.Ed. 1444.) It "holds railroad employers liable for the injury or death of railroad employees that results, in whole or in part, from the railroad's negligence or that of its agents. [Citations.]" (Frastaci v. Vapor Corp. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395, 70 Cal. Rptr.3d 402.)

The SAA is "substantively if not in form [an] amendment] to the [FELA]." (Urie v. Thompson (1949) 337 U.S. 163, 189, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282; accord, Fontaine v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1525, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 644.) The SAA also encompasses regulations enacted by the Federal Railroad Administration. (McGinn v. Burlington Northern R. Co. (7th Cir.1996) 102 F.3d 295, 299.) These implementing regulations are set forth in Part 231 of Title 49 of the CFR.

The SAA imposes on a railroad an absolute duty to provide and maintain safety appliances on its trains. (O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. (1949) 338 U.S. 384, 390-391, 70 S.Ct. 200, 94 L.Ed. 187.) The act "has been liberally construed so as to give a right of recovery for every injury the proximate cause of which was a failure to comply with a requirement of the [a]ct." (Swinson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. (1935) 294 U.S. 529, 531, 55 S.Ct. 517, 79 L.Ed. 1041.) When a violation of the SAA results in injury to an employee, the railroad is strictly liable for the injury. (Carrillo v. ACF Industries, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1158, 1170, fn. 4, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 832, 980 P.2d 386; McGinn v. Burlington Northern R. Co., supra, 102 F.3d at p. 299.) The SAA thus dispenses "with the necessity of proving that violations of the safety statutes constitute negligence; and making proof of such violation is effective to show negligence as a matter of law." (Urie v. Thompson, supra, 337 U.S. at p. 189, 69 S.Ct. 1018.)

The SAA does not create an independent cause of action. (Crane v. Cedar Rapids & I.C.R. Co. (1969) 395 U.S. 164, 166, 89 S.Ct. 1706, 23 L.Ed.2d 176.) It is the FELA that "makes railroads liable for a violation of the SAA." (Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Riles (1996) 516 U.S. 400, 408, fn. 11, 116 S.Ct. 890, 134 L.Ed.2d 34.) In other words, FELA is the vehicle for seeking redress for a violation of the SAA. (Crane, supra, at p. 166, 89 S.Ct. 1706.)

A FELA action may be brought in state or ...