Woods v. United States
| Decision Date | 03 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action Criminal Action No. 7:09CR00064,Criminal Action Nos.7:09CR00043 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | AARON EUGENE WOODS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
By: Hon. Glen E. Conrad
Before the court are two petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by Aaron Eugene Woods ("Woods"), in connection with two separate federal criminal cases. Woods, who proceeds pro se, challenges the validity of his confinement pursuant to the judgments of this court convicting him, in one case, of knowingly making a false statement regarding his status as a felon in the attempted purchase of a firearm and, in the other case, of using fire to commit mail and wire fraud. After the government filed motions to dismiss each of the petitions, Woods responded, making the matter ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the government's motions must be granted.
As mentioned above, Woods' petitions arise from two separate criminal cases. In Case Number 7:09-cr-00043 ("7:09-cr-00043"), a grand jury returned a four-count indictment on July 16, 2009, charging Woods with various firearm-related counts, including making a false statement in connection with the attempted purchase of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (2006). In Case Number 7:09-cr-00064 ("7:09-cr-00064"), a grand jury returned a twelve-count indictment on October 22, 2009, charging Woods, and two co-defendants, withvarious felonies in connection with an arson, including using fire to commit a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h).1 The facts relevant to the instant petitions are set forth below.2
In a December 29, 2009 email transmitted by an Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") to Woods' attorney, Stephen Wills ("Wills"), the AUSA attached a copy of a proposed plea agreement in 7:09-cr-00064. (7:09-cr-00043 Docket No. 103-1 at 5.) The plea agreement provided for a term of incarceration of 120 months, as an agreed and binding sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). (Id. at 7.) The email mandated that, for the attached proposed plea agreement to remain valid, Woods would have to sign it by 5:00 p.m. on January 4, 2010. (Id. at 5.) The email also advised that, if Woods did not sign the plea agreement, the "next offer will not be that low," and furthermore, that the AUSA would consider adding another obstruction of justice charge through a second superseding indictment. (Id.) Pertinent to Woods' petitions is that the attached proposed plea agreement contemplated Woods pleading guilty to Count I of 7:09-cr-00064, using fire to commit a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h). (Id. at 5, 7.) Neither the email nor the attached proposed plea agreement contemplated Woods pleading guilty to any of the firearm-related charges in 7:09-cr-00043. (Id.) According to Woods, this omission from the plea agreement of any charges in 7:09-cr-00043 did not seem suspicious to him because an ATF agent had previously informed him that the government did not intend to prosecute him on the firearm-related charges based on Woods' claim that, as explained below, he had attempted to purchase the firearm merely as a gift for his son. (Id. at 3.)
After receiving a copy of the proposed plea agreement, Woods met with Wills on January 4, 2010 to discuss a potential guilty plea. (Id. at 1.) Based on Wills' advice, Woods signed the plea agreement that was attached to the December 29, 2009 email, pleading guilty to Count I of 7:09-cr-00064, using fire to commit a felony. (Id. at 1, 7.) However, to Woods' surprise, Wills visited Woods the next day, on January 5, at the Roanoke City Jail, where Woods was being detained prior to trial. (Id. at 2.) During this visit, Wills explained to Woods that the plea agreement that Woods had signed on the previous day had "mistakenly failed to include, or make mention of in any form, the gun charges related to the indictment in criminal case no. 7:09-cr-00043." (Id.) Wills related to Woods that the AUSA had "apologized for the oversight" and had asked Wills to tell Woods that "he had until 12 noon on January 7th to execute the newly revised plea agreement." (Id.) Wills also conveyed to Woods that the AUSA had agreed to let Woods choose to which firearm-related count of 7:09-cr-00043 he would plead guilty3 (Id.)
Confronted with this ultimatum, Woods questioned Wills on which of the four firearm-related charges was the "lesser charge and how [it] w[ould] affect [his] sentencing." (Id.) Woods asserts that Wills responded by informing Woods that he was not familiar enough with the gun statute to furnish Woods with a definite answer, but that he assumed that the charge embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), making a false statement, constituted the lesser charge. (Id.) Woods then "reluctantly signed the revised plea agreement, but requested that Mr. Wills research the law and provide [him] with the information necessary to make an informed decision as to thegun charge issue."4 (Id. at 2-3.) Woods alleges that Wills never provided him with an answer to his question regarding the "lesser charge" contemplated by the four-count firearm indictment in 7:09-cr-00043. (Id. at 3.) Wills' failure to provide this information to Woods was evidenced at the change of plea hearing several days later, on January 8, 2010, when Woods halted the hearing to ask Wills "what the lessor [sic] charge was." (Id.)
Thereafter, on March 29, 2010, the court presided over the sentencing hearing in Woods' case. The presentence investigation report prepared in contemplation of the sentencing hearing reflected that Woods' base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), making a false statement about his status as a felon in the attempted purchase of a firearm, was 14. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6) (). However, Woods argues now that, because he attempted to purchase the firearm for his son as a gift, his attempted purchase was for "lawful sporting purposes" and, thus, his base offense level should have been reduced to 6, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2). See id. § 2K2.1(b)(2) (). According to Woods, he questioned Wills at the sentencing hearing about whether the issue surrounding the proper base offense level calculation would be resolved. (7:09-cr-00043 Docket No. 103-1 at 4.) Wills responded that the AUSA "would not agree." (Id.) At the conclusion ofthe hearing, the court sentenced Woods to 120 months on the arson conviction and 36 months on the firearm conviction, the two sentences to run concurrently, so as to achieve the 120-month sentence contemplated under the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement.
Based on this series of events, Woods filed on April 5, 2011, a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction in 7:09-cr-00043, in which he advances two ineffective assistance of counsel arguments. First, Woods avers that Wills' performance was legally deficient based on Wills' alleged failure to respond to Woods' question regarding the "lesser charge" contemplated by the four-count indictment in 7:09-cr-00043. (Id. at 3.) Woods argues that Wills' failure to respond, coupled with the original revoked plea agreement and the associated time restraints imposed by the AUSA, "adversely affected [his] decision-making process and may have further proved detrimental] to his best interest with regards to his acceptance of the final plea aggreement [sic]." (Id) Second, Woods claims that Wills' performance was legally deficient for allegedly failing to dispute the assignment of a base offense level of 14 to his conviction for knowingly making a false statement about his status as a felon in the attempted purchase of a firearm. (Id. at 4.) According to Woods, Wills' alleged failure prejudiced him because the proper base offense level should have been 6, pursuant to the fact that Woods allegedly attempted to purchase the firearm as a gift for his son. (Id.)
As explained above, Woods pled guilty to Count I of 7:09-cr-00064, using fire to commit a felony. In an effort to have his conviction on this charge vacated, Woods filed on April 1, 2011, a § 2255 motion, in which he advances an ineffective assistance of counsel argument, claiming that Wills failed to conduct research that would have revealed that Woods' guilty plea was not supported by a proper factual basis. (7:09-cr-00064 Docket No. 102-1 at 1.) Morespecifically, Woods argues that the building to which he set fire lacked the necessary connection to interstate commerce and, as such, that the arson could not have served as the basis for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1). (Id.)
On June 16, 2011, the United States moved the court to dismiss each of Woods' petitions. (7:09-cr-00043/7:09-cr-00064 Docket No. 118.) In support of its motions, the government argues that Woods executed in his plea agreement a general waiver of his collateral-attack rights.5 (Id, at 1.) Woods responded on October 3, 2011 to the government's motions to dismiss, addressing the issue of waiver, as well as the merits of his claims. (7:09-cr-00043/7:09-cr-00064 Docket No. 128.)
To state a claim for relief under § 2255, a defendant must prove that one of the following occurred: (1) his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law;...
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