Woods v. Western Holding Corporation

• Decision Date: 01 April 1948
• Docket Number: No. 4937.,4937.
• Citation: 77 F. Supp. 90
• Parties: WOODS v. WESTERN HOLDING CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

77 F. Supp. 90

WOODS v. WESTERN HOLDING CORPORATION.

No. 4937.

District Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D.

April 1, 1948.

Ed Dupree, General Counsel, and Hugo V. Prucha, Asst. General Counsel, both of Washington, D. C., C. H. Lichliter, Sp. Litigation Atty. Office of Housing Expediter, of Atlanta, Ga., and Carroll W. Berry, Chief Rent Attorney, of Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

William G. Boatright, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.

REEVES, District Judge.

This is an action by the Housing Expediter to enjoin the defendant from collecting or attempting to collect rentals in excess of a maximum fixed by the Housing Expediter and to prevent the eviction or any attempt to evict tenants for failure to meet the demands of the defendant for rental charges in excess of those established by the Housing Expediter. In addition, the plaintiff sought to prevent the defendant from offering to rent any portion of said premises in "any manner contrary to the provisions of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1881 et seq., and the rent regulations issued pursuant thereto."

There was a further prayer:

"That Defendant be required to make restitution to said tenants and be directed to refund to tenants, occupying or who occupied housing accommodations, all of the rent overcharges resulting from the collection of more than the maximum legal rents established pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended and extended, and the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, and the rent regulations issued pursuant thereto."

The properties involved are located at 103 West Ward Parkway and 107 West Ward Parkway and are known as Casa Loma East and Casa Loma West, Kansas, City, Missouri. Each building is nine stories high and has sixty-five units.

The complaint is conventional.

By answer the defendant asserts that, (a) the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 is unconstitutional, and (b) that these particular properties are not subject to control, or, in other words, that they have been decontrolled by the latest Congressional Act.

It is unnecessary to notice the constitutional question raised by the defendant for the reason that the Supreme Court, in Tighe E. Woods, Housing Expediter, v. The Cloyd W. Miller Co., a corporation, and Cloyd W. Miller, 68 S.Ct. 421, on appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio, upheld the constitutional validity of the act. The only other question then is whether the properties in question are subject to control under the Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq., directly affecting rentals.

The latest Act of Congress, approved June 30, 1947, appears in Title 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 1892, et seq., the first relating to Definitions under the said Housing and Rent Act of 1947. By paragraph (c) of said Section 1892 controlled housing accommodations are defined as follows:

"The term `controlled housing accommodations' means housing accommodations in any defense-rental area, except that it does not include —

"(1) those housing accommodations, in any establishment which is commonly known as a hotel in the community in which it is located, which are occupied by persons who are provided customary hotel services, such as maid service, furnishing and laundering of linen, telephone and secretarial or desk service, use and upkeep of furniture and fixtures, and bellboy service; * * *."

By paragraph (d) of Section 1894 of said Act:

"The Housing Expediter is authorized to issue such regulations and orders, consistent with the provisions of this title, as he may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this section and section 202(c) (section 1892(c) of this Appendix)."

Pursuant to such authorization, the Housing Expediter on September 5, 1947, issued, among others, the following regulations or interpretations of the Act:

"There is no all-embracing definition in the regulation of what is commonly known as a hotel and consequently each decision must be based upon the test of whether or not the particular establishment is commonly known as a hotel in the community in which it is located."

The evidence on the part of the plaintiff disclosed that these housing accommodations were ordinarily known among the occupants and others as Casa Loma East and Casa Loma West. The designation "hotel" was not in popular use among the occupants. However, each one of them said that there was maid service, laundry service, a telephone and secretarial or desk service, use and upkeep of furniture and fixtures, and a limited bellboy service. From their testimony it did not appear that uniformed bellboys were in attendance on the guests. However, several occupants of the properties said that they were favored with services from the elevator boy who performed the functions of a bellboy. Some of the other services were mentioned by the occupants as not adequate or full and complete. However, it was stated that, however limited, the services were provided.

Aside from the clear and lucid regulation or interpretation of the Expediter hereinbefore set out the courts have not, in view of rapidly changing customs and habits of the people, fixed upon an acceptable modern definition of hotels. The use of the appellations "tavern" and "inn" has almost become obsolete and it is judicially recognized that there are variants in the use of the name hotel.

The defendant produced evidence of well informed and experienced witnesses, such as hotel builders and hotel operators, who testified without exception that they were familiar with these properties and the manner of their operation. They...