Woodside Village Condominium Association, Inc. v. Jahren

Decision Date03 January 2002
Docket NumberNo. SC00-1030.,SC00-1030.
Citation806 So.2d 452
PartiesWOODSIDE VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. Adolph S. JAHREN and Gary M. McClernan, Respondents.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Samuel R. Mandelbaum and James R. De Furio of Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Petitioner.

Robert G. Walker, Jr., Clearwater, FL, for Respondents.

ANSTEAD, J.

We have for review Woodside Village Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Jahren, 754 So.2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), which expressly and directly conflicts with White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So.2d 346 (Fla.1979), Flagler Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Crestview Towers Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 595 So.2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), and Seagate Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Duffy, 330 So.2d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons set forth below, we quash the district court's decision invalidating certain restrictions on leasing set out in the petitioner's Declaration of Condominium.

FACTS

At issue is the validity of amendments to the Declaration of Condominium adopted by the condominium owners which restrict the leasing of units in Woodside Village. Woodside Village is a condominium development located in Clearwater, Florida, consisting of 288 units. It was established in 1979 pursuant to Florida's "Condominium Act," chapter 718, Florida Statutes (1977). Petitioner, Woodside Village Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association"), is the condominium association that was formed pursuant to the Declaration of Condominium of Woodside Village ("Declaration"), recorded in the public records of Pinellas County. Respondents, Adolph S. Jahren and Gary M. McClernan, each own residential condominium units in Woodside Village.1

The original Declaration of Condominium for Woodside Village included a provision regarding leasing:

10.3 Leasing. The apartment may be leased or rented without prior approval, for any period of one (1) year or less, and may be leased by successive leases for periods in excess of one (1) year without the approval of the Board of Directors of the Association. In the event apartment owner leases to a lessee for a period of one (1) year or less and the apartment owner and lessee desire to extend that lease for a term of one (1) year or less, said extension shall not require the approval of the Association. However, if the Association finds during the term of any such lease that the lessee has violated the rules and regulations of the Association or the terms and provisions of the Declaration of Condominium of Woodside Village or other documents governing Woodside Village, a Condominium, or that the lessee has otherwise been the cause of a nuisance or annoyance to the residents of Woodside Village, then the Association may so notify lessor of its disapproval of such lessee in writing and lessor shall be precluded from extending any lease to said lessee without the written approval of the Association.

Further, section 11.1(b) stated: "Lease. No apartment owner may dispose of an apartment or any interest therein for a term in excess of one (1) year without approval of the Board of Directors of the Association." Thus, while leasing was permitted under the original Declaration, initial leases in excess of one year were subject to board approval. In addition, section 10.3 was amended in 1995 to require that all leases and renewals receive prior approval from the Board of Directors.

In 1997 some owners became concerned that units were increasingly becoming nonowner occupied, and that such a condition would have a negative impact on the quality of life in Woodside Village and on the market value of units. Accordingly, section 10.3 was amended in March of 1997 to limit the leasing of units to a term of no more than nine months in any twelve-month period. A provision was also added prohibiting owners from leasing their units during the first twelve months of ownership. These amendments were adopted by a vote of at least two-thirds of the unit owners as required by the Declaration. As amended, section 10.3 provides:

10.3 Leasing. All leases, subleases or assignments of leases and all renewals of such agreements shall be first submitted to the Board of Directors for approval or disapproval. No record owner or owners of units in this condominium shall rent or lease more than three of their units at any one time. No lease of an owner or owners who have three units rented or leased shall be approved by the Association. No unit may be rented for more than a total of nine (9) months in any twelve (12) month period. However, if the Association finds during the term of any such lease that the lessee has violated the rules and regulations of the Association or the terms and provisions of the Declaration of Condominium of Woodside Village or other documents governing Woodside Village, a Condominium, or that the lessee has otherwise been the cause of a nuisance or annoyance to the residents of Woodside Village, then the Association may so notify lessor of its disapproval of such lessee in writing and lessor shall be precluded from extending any lease to said lessee without the written approval of the Association.
No owner shall enter into a lease, rental agreement, or other similar conveyance of use of a unit during the first twelve (12) months of ownership of that unit.

(Emphasis added.) The following year the Association notified respondents in writing that two of their respective units were not in compliance with the nine-month lease restriction set out in section 10.3 as amended.

When the respondents failed to come into compliance with the leasing restrictions, the Association filed complaints in circuit court seeking injunctions to enforce compliance with the provisions of the Declaration. Respondents filed essentially identical answers admitting notice of their failure to comply with section 10.3, but denying that compliance could be mandated under Florida law. In addition, respondents filed counterclaims for declaratory and injunctive relief asserting that the lease restriction was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, and had no purpose other than to effectively ban all leasing of units. Respondents also asserted the lease restriction was confiscatory and deprived them of lawful uses which were permissible at the time of purchase. Accordingly, respondents sought an injunction prohibiting the Association from enforcing the lease restriction or, alternatively, requiring the Association to compensate respondents for the fair market value of their units.

Thereafter, the Association and respondents filed separate motions for summary judgment.2 Following a hearing on the parties' motions, the circuit court granted summary judgment in respondents' favor. Although the circuit court acknowledged that the Association has the authority to pass an amendment restricting the leasing of units, it concluded that the lease restriction at issue impermissibly "creates more than one class of ownership because it cannot be applied retroactively against unit owners who purchased their unit prior to the date of the amendment." The court ruled that the Association would be required to purchase respondents' units if it decided to enforce the nine-month lease restriction retroactively.

On appeal, the Second District affirmed the trial court's final summary judgment and held that the lease restriction could not be enforced because it was adopted after the respondents acquired their units and no significant lease restrictions existed when respondents purchased their units. See Woodside Village Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Jahren, 754 So.2d 831, 833 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)

. The court acknowledged that the lease restrictions would be valid if they predated the respondents' purchase of units. See id. at 832-33. In its analysis, the court rejected the reasoning of Flagler Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Crestview Towers Condominium Ass'n, 595 So.2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), and distinguished Seagate Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Duffy, 330 So.2d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), wherein the Third and Fourth Districts upheld the validity of amendments to condominium declarations imposing additional lease restrictions on existing unit owners. See id. at 833-35.3 The district court also cited an accommodation for leasing that Woodside Village made in a discrimination lawsuit on behalf of the handicapped as additional support for its holding. See id. at 835-36.

ANALYSIS

Condominiums and the forms of ownership interests therein are strictly creatures of statute. See §§ 718.101-718.622, Fla. Stat. (2000); see also Winkelman v. Toll, 661 So.2d 102, 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)

; Suntide Condominium Ass'n v. Division of Florida Land Sales & Condominiums, 463 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In Florida, Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, known as Florida's "Condominium Act," gives statutory recognition to the condominium form of ownership of real property and establishes a detailed scheme for the creation, sale, and operation of condominiums. Pursuant to section 718.104(2), a condominium is created by recording a declaration of condominium in the public records of the county where the land is located. See § 718.104(2), Fla. Stat. (2000).

The declaration, which some courts have referred to as the condominium's "constitution,"4 strictly governs the relationships among the condominium unit owners and the condominium association. As explained by the court in Pepe v. Whispering Sands Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 351 So.2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977):

A declaration of a condominium is more than a mere contract spelling out mutual rights and obligations of the parties thereto—it assumes some of the attributes of a covenant running with the land, circumscribing the extent and limits of the enjoyment and use of real property. Stated otherwise, it spells out the true extent of the purchased, and thus granted, use interest therein. Absent consent, or an amendment of the
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