Woodson v. State

• Decision Date: 06 July 1910
• Citation: 54 So. 191,170 Ala. 87
• Parties: WOODSON v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

54 So. 191

170 Ala. 87

WOODSON v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

July 6, 1910

Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1911.

Appeal from Criminal Court, Jefferson County; S. L. Weaver, Judge.

John Woodson was convicted of an offense, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Mayfield J., dissenting.

W. S Burrow, for appellant.

Alexander M. Garber, Atty. Gen., for the State.

McCLELLAN J.

The record proper in this transcript is free from irregularity. The bill of exceptions fails to show that any exception was reserved, in any manner, to any action or ruling of the trial court on the trial. It purports to set out substantially all of the evidence, and it is apparent from it that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction of the offense charged in the indictment. The trial court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person. Having complete jurisdiction, and the judgment being grounded in a verdict accurately responding to the indictment, the adjudication of guilt, and the sentence therefor, cannot be void.

In respect of cases in the category to which this case belongs the jurisdiction this court has is appellate only. Review here, in such cases, is limited to those matters upon which action or ruling at nisi prius was invoked and had. Accordingly, where the evidence is deemed insufficient to warrant a conviction a ruling of the trial court on that proposition must be properly (usually by special instruction requested) invited, in order to invoke or justify a review of the question, so raised below, by this appellate court. Such is the settled rule, on principle and in practice, by which this court is bound. The following decisions of this court, among others, are in point, and sustain the rule stated: Knapp v. McBride, 7 Ala. 19; Skinner v. State, 30 Ala. 524; Hubbard v. State, 72 Ala. 164; Dentler v. State, 112 Ala. 70, 20 So. 592; Bowdon v. State, 91 Ala. 61, 8 So. 694; Ex parte Knight, 61 Ala. 482.

There being no question reserved for review in this appellate court, the judgment below must be affirmed.

Affirmed.

DOWDELL, C.J., and ANDERSON, SAYRE, and EVANS,, JJ., concur.

MAYFIELD J. (dissenting).

I cannot agree to an affirmance of this case. The record shows the appellant to have been convicted of a grave felony and sentenced by the lower court to 20 years' imprisonment in the penitentiary. This record is certified by the lower court to this court as containing "all the evidence." It contains no evidence that shows, or in the slightest degree tends to show, the commission of any felony--the one charged, or any other. This being true, I cannot understand how this court can say that there was no reversible error.

The majority of the court hold that, as the record fails to show that the defendant requested any charges or invoked any ruling of the trial court upon the sufficiency of the evidence, we cannot on this appeal review the action of the trial court or disturb the judgment or sentence; the record proper being regular, and the judgment valid on its face. If it was a question as to the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, this would be true, and I would not for a moment doubt the correctness of the conclusion of the majority. But this is not the case; it is a case in which there is "no evidence." Whether there is any evidence in a given case, criminal or civil, tending to prove the issue, is a question of law for the court, and not a question of fact for the jury.

How it was possible for the lower court to convict and sentence the accused, without any evidence of guilt or any proof of the corpus delicti, and not commit reversible error I cannot understand. The statute allows all defendants in criminal cases to appeal to this court from the judgment of conviction. The right is absolute, and without bond or security. Defendants in criminal cases are not required to assign errors, to argue the case, or to file brief, on appeal to this court. The law makes this court, as it were, their guardian; and requires us to search the record for errors, and, if any we find, to reverse, unless it affirmatively appears that no injury to the defendant resulted from the error.

The statute now allows defendants to have a bill of exceptions, as in civil cases; and thereby he is enabled to make all those questions and matters a part of the record, which would not otherwise appear of record, and to thus present them for the review of this court, as if they were a part of the record proper in the lower court. The bill of exceptions is not a part of the record proper of the lower court, in such sense that it is required to be recorded and kept in that court; but it is a part of the record for the purposes of appeal, which is the only object or purpose of allowing it. And it is a part of the record proper of this court in that case, and on the hearing we accord to it the same verity that we do to the record proper of the lower court.

The bill in this case recites that it contains all the evidence. The record proper contains all the pleadings, indictments, pleas, verdict, judgment, etc. So we can and should review the evidence in this case, just as we can and should review the pleadings on a writ of error. If the evidence as thus shown proves or tends to prove the guilt of the defendant, then it is a question for the jury, and when they have weighed and passed upon its sufficiency, we cannot and should not disturb their finding. If, however, there is no evidence that proves or tends to prove the commission of the offense charged, then there is no question of fact or of law to submit to the jury. If the prosecuting officer does not ask for a nolle prosequi, the court should direct a verdict for the defendant, for the lack of proof, whether so requested or not.

It is the duty of the solicitor, as well as of the court, to see that no defendant is convicted without some proof of his guilt--at least, it should appear that some offense has been committed by some one--unless the defendant in open court voluntarily interposes his plea of guilty. If he declines to plead or stands mute, the court, for him, must cause the plea of not guilty to be entered; and should not allow the defendant to plead guilty unless he is well advised. Frequently the defendant has no counsel, and the court is not, in all such cases, required to appoint counsel for him; but it is always the duty (in fact, one of the chief duties) of the court to see that the defendant has a fair and impartial trial. Certainly a defendant cannot be said to have had a fair and impartial trial, when he has been convicted of a horrible crime, and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, in the face of his plea of not guilty, and of the fact that there is no evidence showing or tending to show the commission of the crime, by himself or any one else, and in spite of the fact that the evidence introduced conclusively and indisputably shows that the crime alleged, and for which defendant was convicted, was "not" committed, and this evidence is the testimony of none other than the very person upon whom the crime is alleged to have been committed.

If the record proper fails to show any indictment, or that, because of its form, it charges no offense, or does not charge the offense of which the defendant was convicted, this court will reverse, and notwithstanding the question of the sufficiency of the indictment was not raised or passed upon in the court below. If, however, the defect was one that could or should have been corrected in the court below, or was one which the defendant could waive, it will be presumed, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that he did waive it; or it will be treated as an error that is cured by the verdict and judgment. In the same manner, if it be an irregularity or error in the verdict or judgment, which could and should have been objected to in the court below, and was not so objected to, and being one that could be waived, then it will be so treated on appeal and will not justfy a reversal; but if there is no

verdict or no judgment the case will be reversed or the appeal dismissed, as justice or the practice may require, because there is nothing to support the conviction and the sentence.

A judgment of conviction and sentence can no more be supported without proof than it can without an indictment or information. The defendant, in a felony case, can no more waive the one than he can the other, except in the manner authorized by statute. Of course if there is no bill of exceptions, or if it does not contain all the evidence, the appellate court properly presumes that there was evidence before the trial court to support the verdict; but when the record proper shows a plea of not guilty, and the bill of exceptions shows all the evidence, and there is none showing or tending to show the corpus delicti, there is of course nothing to support the verdict, and therefore necessarily nothing to support the judgment of conviction. The condition is as if there was no indictment, or as if the indictment charged one offense and the judgment was that of conviction for a different one.

The only cases relied upon by the majority of the court, for the affirmance of the judgment, are those in which there was a failure to prove the venue, and those involving felony in which there was a failure to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. It is true that both of these are necessary elements of proof to support a conviction, and upon first blush these authorities seem not to be distinguishable from the case at bar; but, upon a closer scrutiny and comparison they are found to be wholly different in principle and in practice. Both elements go to the "sufficiency" of the proof to support the conviction, not to the corpus delicti and not the question whether...