Woodson v. Sully

• Decision Date: 08 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 85-3049-S.,85-3049-S.
• Citation: 801 F. Supp. 466
• Parties: Helen D. WOODSON, Father Carl Kabat, Father Paul Kabat, Christopher Union, Sandra Mitchell, Larry Cloud Morgan, Leslie A. Cottrill, on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Owen L. SULLY, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Wyandotte County, Kansas, and his agents, subordinates and employees, and the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Wyandotte, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

801 F. Supp. 466

Helen D. WOODSON, Father Carl Kabat, Father Paul Kabat, Christopher Union, Sandra Mitchell, Larry Cloud Morgan, Leslie A. Cottrill, on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Owen L. SULLY, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Wyandotte County, Kansas, and his agents, subordinates and employees, and the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Wyandotte, Defendants.

No. 85-3049-S.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

September 8, 1992.

David J. Waxse, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Overland Park, Kan., Claudia J. York, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, Mo., Larry Rute, Kansas Legal Services, Topeka, Kan., American Civ. Liberties Union of Western Missouri by David R. Morris, General Counsel, Overland Park, Kan., for plaintiffs.

James R. Goheen/Jeanne Gorman Rau, McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A., Donald C. Long, Kansas City, Kan., for defendants.

Gerald Golden, Kansas City, Kan., for Owen L. Sully.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SAFFELS, Senior District Judge.

Before the court is a proposed Amended Consent Judgment and Decree which is submitted for the court's approval. The proposed order amends the Consent Judgment and Decree, dated March 30, 1987, in which the parties agreed to build and operate a new county jail under the terms and conditions set forth in that agreed order.

Factual Background

This action began in 1985 with a class action suit filed by prisoners in the Wyandotte County Jail who alleged their conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. The defendants are the Board of County Commissioners of Wyandotte County and the three individual commissioners (hereinafter referred to as "defendant Board"), and the Sheriff of Wyandotte County. In 1987, the parties negotiated a stipulated Consent Judgment and Decree under which a new county jail facility was to be constructed. Additionally, the agreed order set forth provisions to govern management of the new facility. On March 30, 1987, this court approved and adopted the Consent Judgment and Decree. By the terms of the agreed order, this court was to have continuing jurisdiction for one year following the occupation of the newly constructed jail, at which time the case could be dismissed by agreement of the parties "if the defendants are in satisfactory compliance with all the terms and conditions of the consent judgment and decree at that time." (Consent Judgment and Decree, p. 11.) Until that time, defendants were to file quarterly reports on the progress towards compliance with the consent decree. The last quarterly report filed with the court was dated November 13, 1990. The transition to the new facility was completed March 30, 1990. Defendant Board states no agreed order of dismissal was entered one year later because there was not satisfactory compliance with the consent decree at that time.

After lying dormant since November 1990, this matter was reopened in March 1992 when defendant Sheriff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. The Sheriff complained that defendant Board was proposing to interfere with the Sheriff's ability and authority to operate the jail in a constitutional manner and in compliance with the Consent Judgment and Decree. Defendant Sheriff later withdrew his motion, and indicated the parties were in serious and constructive dialogue to resolve present problems regarding the operation of the jail.

The court scheduled a hearing to determine the status of the action and what, if any, action needed to be taken in this matter. Prior to the hearing, all parties met to fashion a proposed amended agreement that would govern the future operation of the facility. It appears this discussion was fueled by the recognition of all parties that the new jail is not being operated in compliance with the Consent Judgment and Decree. Particularly, it appears the provisions regarding the level of staffing and the training of the staff have not been followed.

The resulting proposed Amended Consent Judgment and Decree before the court is submitted by plaintiffs and defendant Board. Defendant Sheriff objects to those portions of the proposed agreement which create a Jail Control Authority to oversee operation of the jail, and which provide for the hiring of a Jail Administrator to be in charge of the daily operation of the county jail facility. The Jail Administrator would serve at the pleasure of the Jail Control Authority, of which defendant Sheriff is one of six voting members. Defendant Sheriff claims these provisions are in direct conflict with Kansas state statutes which make the Sheriff responsible for operation of the county jail. Defendant Sheriff indicates he would support the proposed amended order if it is changed to have the Jail Administrator appointed by the Sheriff with the consent of the Jail Control Authority, and that the Jail Administrator serve under the direction of the Sheriff.

Discussion

Under Kansas statutes, the county sheriff is clearly responsible for keeping the county jail.¹ The board of county commissioners is to provide reasonable funds for keeping such prisoners.² Courts have recognized a sheriff's exclusive and absolute authority as provided in state statutes, but have held the county liable for actions or inactions of the sheriff under that authority. See e.g., Lucas v. O'Loughlin, 831 F.2d 232, 235 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1035, 108 S.Ct. 1595, 99 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), and cases cited therein. See also, Eames v. Board of County Com'rs of Phillips County, Kan., 733 F.Supp. 322, 324 (D.Kan.1990) (county commissioners liable for negligence of sheriff and deputies); Albro v. County of Onondaga, N.Y., 627 F.Supp. 1280, 1288 (N.D.N.Y.1986) (sheriff accountable for unconstitutional conditions, county must accept primary responsibility). This statutory scheme gives rise to understandable tensions between the Board of County Commissioners and the County Sheriff, as evidenced in the present case.

Defendant Board argues the proposed amended consent decree complies with state statutes. Defendant Board's statutory analysis relies on language found in other Kansas statutes which defendant Board uses to indicate the sheriff does not have exclusive control over all prisoners.³ Defendant Board also points to the statutory provision for a matron who is charged by statute with the care of women prisoners.⁴ Finally, defendant Board cites statutes which make the Board of County Commissioners responsible for control of county expenditures.⁵ The court is not persuaded by these arguments. To the extent the proposed Jail Control Authority and Jail Administrator exceed advisory status, such entities clearly extend into the state statutory duties and responsibilities of the sheriff. Thus, the court finds the proposed Amended Consent Judgment and Decree, if approved, would not be authorized under Kansas law.

Plaintiff class and defendant Board rely heavily on their assessment that defendant Sheriff is responsible for the noncompliance with the original Consent Judgment and Decree,⁶ and argue the court has broad equitable power to fashion a remedy that addresses the problem. They argue the proposed amendment to the original consent decree is appropriate and within the court's remedial authority because the creation of the Jail Control Authority and Jail Administrator address the specific problems created by the inaction of the current sheriff.

The court recognizes its obligation to fashion appropriate remedies for constitutional violations. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 280, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2757, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977). See e.g., Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 431 (3rd Cir.1990) ("The district court is entitled to require immediate correction of those conditions that it finds to contribute most significantly to the constitutional violations identified and that it determines can be most readily remedied"). The court further recognizes that limitations imposed by state law do not necessarily defeat this court's jurisdiction to fashion required remedies for constitutional violations. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 744, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 3127, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974). Where it is found that a particular remedy is required to vindicate constitutional guarantees, the federal courts can set aside state-imposed limitations that operate to prevent compliance with the United States constitution. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57-58, 110 S.Ct. 1651, 1666-1667, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990). See also, Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.1992) ("While there are federalism concerns in institutional reform litigation involving correctional facilities, they do not automatically trump the powers of the federal courts to enforce the Constitution or a consent decree").⁷ However, to approve a remedy that sets aside state law, this court must assure itself that "no permissible alternative" can accomplish the required task. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 51, 110 S.Ct. at 1663. The use of a court's equitable remedial power must be tempered by a "proper respect for the integrity and function of local government institutions." Id. Remedies must be fashioned with minimum intrusion into the affairs of local officials. Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 438 (6th Cir.1984). Only when the least intrusive remedy fails to work should the court exercise more comprehensive equitable relief. Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 699 F.Supp. 1137, 1146-47 (W.D.Pa. 1988).⁸

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies to modification of the terms of a consent decree. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 748, 757, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). The flexible standard to be applied to consent decrees governing prisons or jails requires the party seeking modification to establish a significant change in facts or law. Rufo, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 760; Diaz v. Romer, 961 F.2d...