Woodstock Iron Co. v. Fullenwider

• Decision Date: 28 May 1889
• Parties: WOODSTOCK IRON CO. ET AL. v. FULLENWIDER ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

6 So. 197

87 Ala. 584

WOODSTOCK IRON CO. ET AL. v. FULLENWIDER ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 28, 1889

Appeal from circuit court, Calhoun county; JOHN B. TALLY, Judge.

Ejectment by Fannie Fullenwider and others against the Woodstock Iron Company and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

Knox & Bowie, Cassady & Blackwell, and Caldwell & Johnston, for appellants.

Kelly & Smith, for appellees.

SOMERVILLE J.

The suit is one of ejectment, under the statute, brought by the appellees as the heirs at law of Samuel Hudson, deceased, and was commenced on June 28, 1887. It is shown that the widow of Hudson owned a life-estate in the lands, based on her allotted right of dower, and that she purchased the reversionary estate at a sale of the lands made by the administrator of Hudson for the payment of the decedent's debts on March 20, 1866, or more than 20 years before the commencement of this action. She received a deed from the administrator, paid the purchase money to him, and he used the money in the payment of the debts of the estate. The defendants claim title through the widow, who did not die until June 25, 1879, not less than 10 years before suit brought. The possession of the defendants, and those under whom they claim, has been continuous, exclusive, open, and under claim of ownership, since the date of the administrator's sale, or for over 20 years.

The whole case of the plaintiffs is based upon the contention that the proceedings in the probate court for the sale of the reversionary interest in the lands, owned by the decedent's estate, were void, and conveyed no title to the purchaser. The reasons assigned for this conclusion are because minors were interested in the estate, and no depositions are shown to have been taken as in chancery cases proving the necessity of the sale, and because there was no order of the probate court authorizing the administrator to make a deed to the purchaser, besides some other grounds, which need not be named. Bland v. Bowie, 53 Ala. 158; Satcher v. Satcher, 41 Ala. 26; Doe v. Hardy, 52 Ala. 291.

It is contended, further, by the plaintiffs (or appellees) that, under the authority of Pickett v. Pope, 74 Ala. 122, and other decisions of this court, neither the possession of the life-tenant, nor of the defendants as purchasers, holding under her, could be adverse to the heirs as reversioners until the death of the life-tenant, which occurred about eight years before the commencement of the action. For this reason, it is said, there was no right residing in the plaintiffs to sue at law, and hence there was no laches or neglect on their part which could be the foundation of any presumptions hostile to their title. The defendants, who are appellants in this court, contend, on the contrary, that all irregularities of sale and defects of title, under the admitted facts of the case, are cured by the presumptions arising from the lapse of 20 years, under the broad doctrine of prescriptions, now so thoroughly established in this state.

The plaintiffs certain had no right to sue in ejectment for these lands before the death of the widow, who was tenant for life; her possession, so far, at least, as concerns the legal title in the reversion, not being adverse or hostile to the heirs during the continuance of such particular estate. Pickett v. Pope, 74 Ala. 122; McCorry v. King's Heirs, 39 Amer. Dec. 165; Tied, Real Prop. § 715. The question is whether any presumption will arise from the lapse of 20 years sufficient to perfect the title of defendants, in view of the incapacity of plaintiffs to sue at law.

In considering this question, we shall regard the contention of the appellees as well taken, so far as to assume that the sale of the administrator conferred no legal title in the reversion on the widow as purchaser under the probate court proceedings in March, 1866. Regarding the proceedings in the probate court as void at law for the reasons stated, what, we may inquire, were the equitable rights, if any, acquired under it by the purchaser? This question has been fully settled by our past decisions. Where land of a decedent is sold by the probate court for the payment of debts or for distribution, and the proceeding is void for want of jurisdiction or otherwise, and the purchase money, being paid to the administrator, is applied by him to the payment of the debts of the decedent's estate, or is distributed to the heirs, while the sale is so far void as to convey no title at law, the purchaser nevertheless acquires an equitable title to the lands, which will be recognized in a court of equity; and he may resort to a court of equity to compel the heir or devisee to elect a ratification or rescission of the contract of purchase. It is deemed unconscionable that the heirs or devisees should reap the fruits of the purchaser's payment of money appropriated to the discharge of debts which were a charge on the lands, and at the same time recover the lands. They are estopped to deny the validity of the sale, and at the same time enjoy the benefits derived from the appropriation of the purchase money. And this principle applies to minors as well as adults. Bland v. Bowie, 53 Ala. 152; Bell v. Craig, 52 Ala. 215; Robertson v. Bradford, 73 Ala. 116. See, also, Ganey v. Sikes, 76 Ala. 421.

All of our decisions, it is true, recognizing the doctrine of presumption by prescription based on the lapse of 20 years of time, are founded upon the principle of some laches on the part of one who, having the right and capacity to sue either at law or in equity, neglects or omits to do so for such period of 20 years. For the repose of society, it is presumed that the right, if it existed, has...