Woodsum v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 19 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 72-24 Orl. Civ.,72-24 Orl. Civ.
• Citation: 341 F. Supp. 448
• Parties: Barbara J. WOODSUM, individually, and Barbara J. Woodsum as representative of the class of similarly situated residents of the State of Florida v. James H. BOYD, Supervisor of Elections, Brevard County, Florida, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

341 F. Supp. 448

Barbara J. WOODSUM, individually, and Barbara J. Woodsum as representative of the class of similarly situated residents of the State of Florida v. James H. BOYD, Supervisor of Elections, Brevard County, Florida, et al.

No. 72-24 Orl. Civ.

United States District Court, M. D. Florida, Orlando Division.

April 19, 1972.

Ashmun Brown, c/o American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Cocoa Beach, Fla., Jerome J. Bornstein, c/o American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Orlando, Fla., Co-counsel for Woodsum, for plaintiffs.

Daniel Sears Dearing, Asst. Atty. Gen. State of Florida, Tallahassee, Fla., Clifton A. McClelland, Jr., Asst. County Atty., Brevard County, Fla., Titusville, Fla., for defendants.

Before SIMPSON, Circuit Judge, and YOUNG and KRENTZMAN, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KRENTZMAN, District Judge:

This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The jurisdiction of this Court was invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and the Court has jurisdiction of this case. In her complaint filed February 3, 1972, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated the plaintiff sought to have the durational residency requirements of Section 97.041 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A. declared unconstitutional and to have the defendants enjoined from enforcing those requirements. Accordingly, a duly constituted 3-Judge District Court was convened in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2284.

Plaintiff's prayer for a temporary restraining order was heard on February 10, 1972. Counsel for the defendants appeared and waived the notice requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2284 and the Court therefore construed the plaintiff's prayer as an application for preliminary injunction. Based upon the evidence and the argument presented at the February 10 hearing, and upon the further consideration of the Court, an order was entered on that date. In that order the Court held that the durational residency requirements of Florida Statutes, Section 97.041, F.S.A., of one year in the State and six months in the county where the voter desires to register, are unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants were enjoined from refusing the registration and permission to vote to any resident of the State of Florida based upon those durational residency requirements. Because of the stringent time requirements involved, a written opinion was not filed until this time:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following facts have been stipulated.

The plaintiff, Barbara J. Woodsum, is a citizen of the United States and a former resident of New Jersey. On or about December 30, 1971, she moved to the State of Florida and Brevard County where she is presently employed as a computer programmer. The plaintiff is a bona fide resident of the state and intends to remain here permanently.

The plaintiff sought to register to vote in the March 14, 1972 presidential preference primary and subsequent elections, but was advised by the defendant county Election Supervisor, James H. Boyd, or others representing him, that she would not be permitted to register since she had not met the statutory requirement of Fla.Stat. § 97.041, F.S.A. that she be a resident of the State of Florida for one year and of Brevard County for six months.

The plaintiff was a registered voter in the State of New Jersey before moving to Florida. All of the facts before the Court indicate, and it is not disputed by the defendants, that except for Florida's statutory durational residency requirement, the plaintiff would otherwise be duly qualified to register and vote in this state.

CLASS ACTION

The Court holds that this action may be maintained by the plaintiff as a class action on behalf of persons similarly situated. The class consists of, and is limited to, those bona fide residents of the State of Florida who do not fulfill the durational residency requirements of Section 97.041 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A. but who are otherwise qualified to register and vote in primary and general elections in the State of Florida. The prerequisites to a class action as prescribed by Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are found to be present and the action is maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b) (2) and (3).

ISSUES PRESENTED

The plaintiff complains that the durational residency requirements of Florida Statute § 97.041, F.S.A. and their enforcement by the defendants denies her equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and unconstitutionally abridges her right to interstate travel. Because of its decision regarding the equal protection issue, the Court finds it unnecessary to consider plaintiff's contentions relating to interstate travel.

DISCRIMINATORY CLASSIFICATION

The result of Florida's durational residency requirement is a discriminatory classification among bona fide residents of the state. Those residents who have lived in the state for a period of one year and in the county in which they wish to vote for a period of six months are allowed to register and vote in the state's primary and general elections. Bona fide residents who have not lived within the state for the requisite periods are not enfranchised in state and local elections.¹ The question which the Court must decide in determining if plaintiff and members of the class have been denied equal protection of the laws is whether the discriminatory classification is justified in terms of governmental purpose under the applicable standard of review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court's determination of the yardstick by which this discriminatory classification is to be measured is essentially the resolution of the case itself. In cases testing the constitutional validity of a state statute on equal protection grounds, two standards have emerged.

The Rational Relation Test

The older, more traditional standard is the "rational relation" test, sometimes called the "reasonableness" test. Under this standard, a "statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Such a discrimination will be held invalid "only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960). The "rational relation" test also places the burden of proof upon the party contesting the validity of the statute by presuming that law's constitutionality. Id. A number of recent cases have adopted this test in resolving the validity of durational residency requirements for voting and generally those courts have held that the residency requirements were valid.²

Defendants contend that the proper standard of review of the state durational residency requirement is the rational relation test and that the statute should be upheld as valid under that standard.

In support of this contention the defendants rely primarily upon two cases beginning with Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 24 S.Ct. 573, 48 L.Ed. 817 (1904). In that case the Supreme Court found constitutional a Maryland law which required newcomers into the state to register with the circuit court in the county in which they wished to vote a declaration that they intended to become citizens and residents of the state. After this declaration, the prospective voter waited a year before he could vote. Pope challenged the registration and declaration requirement, but did not specifically challenge the state's durational residency law (although the case is often cited as authority on the latter point).

The Court in Pope spoke of no specific "tests" which it had applied in reviewing the Maryland statute, but implicit in the Court's decision was the view that state laws under such circumstances would be upheld against a claim of denial of equal protection so long as there was no showing that the discrimination complained of was not rationally related to the promotion of a legitimate state interest.

In 1964 Maryland's durational residency requirement of one year in the state and six months in the county was challenged insofar as it applied to the elections of the President and the Vice President of the United States in the case of Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F.Supp. 721 (D.Md.1964). The 3-Judge District Court there held that the statute was constitutional, applying the rational relation test and relying heavily upon Pope v. Williams. Their decision was affirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court at Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125, 85 S.Ct. 807, 13 L.Ed.2d 792 (1965).

The Compelling State Interest Test

However, the validity of Drueding and Pope, supra, has been seriously challenged since Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583, was decided in 1969. In Kramer the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a section of the New York Education law which restricted the franchise in school district elections to persons who either owned or leased taxable realty in the district or had children in school. More importantly for the purposes of the instant action, the Court in Kramer applied the "compelling state interest" test as the proper standard for review.³

The compelling state interest test has been applied by the Supreme Court only where the subject matter of the discriminatory classification is in itself a fundamental and constitutionally protected right.⁴ Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Kramer made the determination that the right to vote was a fundamental and constitutionally protected right:

"And, in this case, we must give the statute a close and exacting examination. `Since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.

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