Woodvine v. Dean

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: HAMMOND, J.
• Citation: Woodvine v. Dean, 194 Mass. 40, 79 N.E. 882 (Mass. 1907)
• Decision Date: 04 January 1907
• Parties: WOODVINE v. DEAN et al. (two cases).

194 Mass. 40

79 N.E. 882

WOODVINE v. DEAN et al. (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 4, 1907

COUNSEL

Harrison Dunham, for petitioner.

Ralph W. Foster, for respondents.

OPINION

HAMMOND, J.

In the original act establishing the land court there was no provision for the revision by this court of questions of law arising in that court. Questions of law arising upon trial in the superior court on an appeal from the land court might be brought here 'in the same manner as in proceedings at law in said [superior] court.' St. 1898, p. 685, c. 562, § 14, now Rev. Laws, c. 128, § 13. A subsequent statute provided that questions of law arising in the land court might be taken directly to this court for revision in the same manner as questions of law are taken to this court from the superior court. St. 1899, p. 84, c. 131, § 2, now Rev Laws, c. 128, § 13. In the case before us there are two bills of exceptions, one arising out of the hearing in the land court and one out of the trial in the superior court. The first bill raises only one question, and that is one of jurisdiction.

Denton G. Woodvine devised the land in question to the petitioner who was his wife, and in his will he made no provision for his children, of whom Hortense W. Dean, who will be hereinafter designated as the respondent, was one. As to the title the crucial and only question was whether this omission was intentional. If it was, then the petitioner's title was good as against the respondent; otherwise it was not. Rev. Laws, c. 135, § 19. This was plainly a question of fact. At the hearing before the land court the respondent asked for a ruling that the court had no jurisdiction in regard to this issue. The court refused so to rule, proceeded to the trial of the issue, and found as a fact that the omission was intentional; and ordered a decree for registration of title in the petitioner. The respondent excepted to the refusal to rule as requested, and appealed from the 'decision' of the land court to the superior court, 'to the extent, and in so far as appears in the issues filed herewith to be tried in said superior court.' The only issue 'filed herewith' was the following: 'Whether or not the omission of Denton G. Woodvine under whose will said petitioner claims title to the land which she seeks to have registered in this proceeding, to provide in said will for his children was intentional and not occasioned by accident and mistake, as provided in chapter 135, § 19, of the Revised Laws.' Thus, for the time being, the proceedings in the land court were suspended, and the parties went to the superior court to try the issue above set forth.

The land court rightly refused the ruling requested. The question whether the omission was intentional was pivotal. The rights of the parties could not be determined without first settling it, and the proceeding was for the purpose of settling those rights. With certain exceptions, not here material, the decree finally to be entered in this case as to the nature and extent of the petitioner's title is 'conclusive upon and against all persons.' Rev. Laws, c. 128, § 37. That it is not only the right but the duty of a court engaged in such an inquiry, for such a purpose, to determine such a fact, is too plain for argument.

We now pass to the exceptions raised at the trial in the superior court upon the issue hereinbefore set forth. In so far as the respondent sought to raise there the same question as to jurisdiction as had been raised in the land court, she had no right to any ruling because that question was immaterial to the issue then on trial. In so far as she sought to raise a question as to the jurisdiction of the superior court it is manifest that since the land court had jurisdiction the appellate court, to whom the issue was submitted, also had jurisdiction.

At the trial the report of the land court made under St. 1905, p 208, c. 288, was offered in evidence by the petitioner and against the objection and exception of the respondent it was admitted. The respondent objects first that the statute providing for the admission of the report is inapplicable to this case because it went into effect April 13, 1905, which was subsequent to the time (February 19, 1905) when the original petition was...