Woodward Iron Co. v. Bradford
| Decision Date | 13 October 1921 |
| Docket Number | 6 Div. 458 |
| Citation | 206 Ala. 447,90 So. 803 |
| Parties | WOODWARD IRON CO. v. BRADFORD. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; J.C.B. Gwynn, Judge.
Petition by the Woodward Iron Company for common-law certiorari to review and revise the decisions and findings in proceedings by Irene Bradford under the Workmen's Compensation Act against the Woodward Iron Company, in which James Bradford was made a party claimant, or, in the alternative, an appeal from the decision. Appeal dismissed. Certiorari awarded, and cause reversed and remanded.
Huey & Welch, of Bessemer, for appellant.
Beddow & Oberdorfer, of Birmingham, for appellee.
This is a proceeding to review a judgment, order, or decree of the circuit court upon a claim which arose under the "Workmen's Compensation Act" (Acts 1919, pp 206 to 239). Said review is sought both upon an appeal and by a petition for certiorari, in the event an appeal does not lie. All that we find in the act with reference to an appeal or review is the following expression in section 21 "That the decision of the judge hearing the same shall be conclusive and binding between the parties, subject to the right of appeal in this act provided for."
The only other provisions providing for a review or an appeal are expressions appearing later on in section 21 and in section 28, which will be later quoted and discussed. The last expression in section 21 is:
"From such decree any party aggrieved may by certiorari within thirty days thereafter appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama."
Had the right of appeal been given without saying that it should be done by certiorari, there could be little doubt as to what the Legislature meant, and the judgments and decrees under this act would be appealable like other judgments and decrees of the circuit court. But, as the act requires that it must be done by certiorari and within 30 days, and as the right to a common-law certiorari and an appeal are inconsistent, the former not being usually granted where there is a right of appeal, the legislative intent was evidently to provide or preserve a right to review exclusively by certiorari, and not by the unnatural and inharmonious proceeding of appealing by certiorari. This view is confirmed by the further expression in section 28 as follows:
"Provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed as limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals to review questions of law by certiorari"
--also by the further fact that, knowing that, if the judgment or decree was appealable, the question would be reviewable by bill of exceptions only, other than the record, they required, by section 28, that the determination of the court shall be filed in writing with the clerk, and shall contain a statement of the facts and conclusions as determined by said judge, thus extending the scope of the record to the inclusion of said written statement of the court so as to make it a part of the record for the review of legal questions apparent upon same. It is also manifest that the Legislature did not mean an ordinary appeal, or one by the statutory certiorari as now used to sometimes remove causes from a justice of the peace court to the circuit court, as these methods contemplate a general review and include questions which must be reserved and presented to this court by a bill of exceptions. The Legislature limits the time to 30 days and makes no provision for a bill of exceptions within that time, and, under the general law, the aggrieved party has 90 days for presenting a bill of exceptions, and the trial judge has 90 days after the presentation of same for signing. It thus appears that the Legislature did not have in mind the review of questions which could be properly presented only by a bill of exceptions, and in the use of the word "appeal" in this statute intended the word "review," and that it should be done by the common-law writ of certiorari, the purpose and extent of which had been frequently defined and set forth by the existing decisions of this court and with which the Legislature must be presumed to have been familiar.
Alabama was among the last states to adopt a Workmen's Compensation Law, which is in the nature of an insurance against injury, not self-inflicted, or due to drunkenness or willful misconduct of the employé. The compensation is fixed and uniform, and but few questions of law or disputed facts should arise in the administration of same, and the circuit judges who see and hear the witnesses were supposed to be better triers of the facts than the appellate courts. It was also contemplated that this law would be administered without the needless expense or delay usually accompanying personal injury suits under the Employers' Liability Act (Code 1907, § 3910), as a very simple mode of procedure is provided in case of a dispute, and, unlike most of the states placing the administration and enforcement of same in the hands of an industrial board or commission, composed generally of laymen we have placed the administration of ours with the circuit judges of the state, who are not only presumed to be learned in the law, but experienced triers of facts, but as a safeguard against an erroneous interpretation of this law by them the Legislature intended to merely reserve to this court its right under section 140 of the Constitution to superintend and control the judgments of inferior courts and to extend, by statute, the same right to the Court of Appeals as to all cases under this act which come within its jurisdiction as to amount. Again, the Legislature provided for the administration of this law by the circuit judges without the aid of a jury, except in the sole event that willful misconduct is set up as provided in section 21, and realized that there would be no juries to be influenced or prejudiced by the technical errors of accepting and rejecting certain portions of the evidence, and that the judges would probably consider only the material evidence going to the substance of the claim or defense, and did not anticipate a necessity for a review of these questions by providing the ordinary appeal with a bill of exceptions.
We therefore hold that, in order to review a judgment or decree of the circuit court under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the aggrieved party must within 30 days after the rendition of same apply to this court, or the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, for a common-low writ of certiorari, which application shall set forth the questions of law sought to be reviewed, and which must be apparent upon the record--that is, the pleading or the filed conclusion and statement of the judge as required by section 28 of the act--and the appellate court will consider what it deems questions of law as thus presented, and will not review the conclusion of the circuit judge when the same is supported by any of the evidence as set out by the judge or the reasonable tendencies of same, or in the application of the law to disputed facts. We will not, however, review the trial court as to objections to evidence, as these rulings do not pertain or belong to the record, as there is no provision for setting out same in the written statement or finding of the judge as required by section 28 of the act. Of course, cases may arise in the future when the line between what is a question of law and fact may be shadowy, and with which we will deal as the questions arise, but in order to review the same it must be a question of law apparent upon the record. This court also reserves unto itself and the justices thereof the inherent right to impose such reasonable terms or conditions as may be necessary to protect the successful party against a delay incident to the determination of the petition, as a condition precedent to an order of stay or suspension of the judgment of the trial court pending a consideration of the petition for certiorari.
An appeal to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals is a part of the remedy subject to legislative control, and is not a vested right. Theo. Poull Co. v. Foy-Hays Co., 159 Ala. 458, 48 So. 785. It would therefore seem that the Legislature can limit, restrict, or abolish the right of appeal so long as it does not attempt to restrict the right of this court to exercise its superintendence and control over inferior tribunals under section 140 of the Constitution. Ex parte L. & N.R.R., 176 Ala. 631, 58 So. 315; Ex parte Candee, 48 Ala. 412; Ex parte Croom and May, 19 Ala. 566. The cases of Ex parte Haughton, 38 Ala. 570, and Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165, dealt with statutes depriving parties of the right to appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, and which said right is expressly reserved by section 168 of the Constitution and its predecessors. Moreover, this defendant employer had the option of avoiding the Compensation Act, but, having elected to accept the same, is bound by its provisions and waived the right to invoke constitutional objections to same. Authorities infra.
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