Woodward v. Beech Aircraft Corp.

• Citation: 24 Kan.App.2d 510,949 P.2d 1149
• Decision Date: 11 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 75666,75666
• Parties: William H. WOODWARD, Claimant/Appellee, v. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, Self-Insured, Respondent/Appellant, and The Kansas Workers Compensation Fund, Appellee. 1
• Court: Court of Appeals of Kansas

Page 1149

949 P.2d 1149

William H. WOODWARD, Claimant/Appellee, v. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, Self-Insured, Respondent/Appellant and The Kansas Workers Compensation Fund, Appellee.

No. 75666. ¹

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

April 11, 1997.

Syllabus By The Court

1. The scope of review in a workers compensation case requires that the evidence be viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and that a determination be made as to whether the Workers Compensation Board's findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence.

2. When a primary injury under the Workers Compensation Act is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury, including a new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is a direct and natural result of the primary injury. The test is not whether the injury causes the condition, but whether the injury aggravates or accelerates the condition. Where a preexisting condition is aggravated by an accidental injury arising out of employment, a claimant is entitled to compensation for the entire disability without apportionment.

3. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to unlimited review by an appellate court.

4. K.S.A. 44-551(b)(1) does not limit the Workers Compensation Board's (Board) scope of review to issues raised in a written request for review. Once a party files a written request for review of an administrative law judge's decision, the Board has authority to address every issue decided by the administrative law judge.

5. The employer bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the credible evidence that it knowingly hired or retained a handicapped employee.

David S. Wooding and Roger E. McClellan, of Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Swartz, L.L.P., Wichita, for respondent/appellant.

David H. Farris, of Render, Kamas & Hammond, Wichita, for claimant/appellee.

Kendall R. Cunningham, of Gilliland & Hayes, P.A., Wichita, for appellee Kansas Workers Compensation Fund.

Before GERNON, P.J., and ROYSE and MARQUARDT, JJ.

MARQUARDT, Judge.

Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech) appeals from the order of the Workers Compensation Board (Board), which awarded William H. Woodward benefits based on an 18 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and found that the Workers Compensation Fund (Fund) was not liable for any portion of that award.

Woodward was employed at Beech as a sheet metal assembler. On October 18, 1991, Woodward stepped on an air hose and twisted his left knee.

Beech referred Woodward to Dr. Bossemeyer, who referred Woodward to Dr. Alan L. Kruckemyer. Dr. Kruckemyer performed arthroscopic surgery on Woodward's left knee on December 10, 1991.

On January 5, 1992, Woodward returned to work. Because Woodward favored his injured left knee, he began to suffer pain in his right knee. Woodward notified Beech of the problem with his right knee in mid-January 1992.

Dr. Kruckemyer's medical records of December 24, 1991, noted that Woodward was "developing some increased soreness in his right knee because of overuse." (Emphasis added.) Dr. Kruckemyer admitted on cross-examination that following an injury to one leg, a person can overuse or put more stress on the other leg. Dr. Kruckemyer released Woodward from treatment in August 1992, and Woodward continued working at Beech.

On March 29, 1993, Woodward sought treatment from Dr. Joyce, an orthopedic surgeon. Beech would neither authorize nor pay for Woodward's treatment by Dr. Joyce.

At the request of Woodward's counsel, Woodward was examined by Dr. Ernest R. Schlachter on June 25, 1993. At that time, Woodward complained of pain in both knees, occasional buckling in his left knee with the most recent incident being 1 week prior to the examination, and swelling in the left knee. Woodward testified that he considered this recent buckling in his left knee as either a reinjury or a continuation of his previous left knee injury. Dr. Schlachter testified that the aggravation to Woodward's right knee was a result of the October 1991 injury to the left knee.

Dr. Schlachter concluded that Woodward suffered an 18 percent permanent partial impairment of function to the body as a whole as a result of his knee problems.

Dr. Kruckemyer testified that Woodward suffered a 7.5 percent permanent partial functional impairment of the left leg as of August 1992 and an additional 5 percent permanent partial functional impairment of the left leg following the June 1993 buckling injury. Dr. Kruckemyer also testified that the additional 5 percent impairment would not have occurred but for Woodward's preexisting condition.

Prior to his October 18, 1991, injury, Woodward had undergone three surgeries to his right knee. Dr. Gary L. Harbin testified that Woodward had severe degenerative changes in the right knee and that a subsequent injury could hasten the degenerative process; however, the knee would degenerate regardless of any subsequent injury.

The administrative law judge (ALJ) noted that all parties agreed that Woodward suffered a compensable injury to his left knee on October 18, 1991. The ALJ concluded that the complications of the right knee arose from normal activities. The ALJ found that Woodward suffered a 12.5 percent impairment to the left leg only.

The ALJ also found that the Fund was liable for 40 percent of the award. The ALJ viewed the June 1993 left knee buckling incident as a separate injury that would not have occurred but for Woodward's preexisting condition. The ALJ concluded that Beech retained Woodward with knowledge of his previous injury and that he subsequently suffered another work-related injury.

In contrast, the Board found that Woodward aggravated a preexisting degenerative condition in the right knee as a result of overcompensating for the injured left knee. The Board concluded that Woodward had proved that he "sustained bilateral knee injuries as a result of his work-related accident on October 18, 1991." The Board reasoned that Woodward "has either aggravated or reinjured the right knee as a direct and natural result of the left knee injury." Thus, the Board concluded that Woodward suffered a nonscheduled injury and awarded compensation pursuant to K.S.A. 44-510e.

The Board also concluded that the Fund had no liability for Woodward's injuries. The Board based its conclusion on the finding that the evidence did not establish that the right knee injury constituted a subsequent work-related injury.

SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE

Beech argues that Woodward has not proven that he sustained a compensable injury to his right knee and that he should be limited to recovery for a scheduled injury to his left knee.

"Our scope of review in a workers compensation case requires that we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and that we determine whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial competent evidence." Grizzle v. Gott Corp., 19 Kan.App.2d 392, 393, 872 P.2d 303 (1993). This reasoning is now equally applicable to direct appeals from the Board to this court under K.S.A.1996 Supp. 44-556(a) and the Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. Our obligation is not to ascertain the facts but rather to determine whether the Board's findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence.

In Jackson v. Stevens Well Service, 208 Kan. 637, 643, 493 P.2d 264 (1972), the court held:

"[W]hen a primary injury under the [Workers] Compensation Act is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment every natural consequence that flows from the injury, including a new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is a direct and natural result of a primary injury."

See Adamson v. Davis Moore Datsun, Inc., 19 Kan.App.2d 301, 312, 868 P.2d 546 (1994).

The test is not whether the injury causes the condition, but whether the injury aggravates or accelerates the condition. Claphan v. Great Bend Manor, 5 Kan.App.2d 47, 49, 611 P.2d 180, rev. denied 228 Kan. 806 (1980). Where a preexisting condition is aggravated by an accidental injury arising out of employment, a claimant is entitled to compensation for the entire disability without apportionment. 5 Kan.App.2d at 51, 611 P.2d 180.

Beech relies on Boeckmann v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 210 Kan. 733, 738-39, 504 P.2d 625 (1972), in contending that a degenerative condition is not compensable under workers compensation.

In Demars v. Rickel Manufacturing Corporation, 223 Kan. 374, 379, 573 P.2d 1036 (1978), the court distinguished Boeckmann and held that heavy lifting on the job could constitute a series of accidents that would qualify a claimant for workers compensation. In Demars, the medical testimony supported the claim that the heavy lifting aggravated a preexisting condition and caused disability. Thus, under Boeckmann and Demars, the question of whether the aggravation of a preexisting condition is compensable under workers compensation turns on whether that aggravation stemmed from a job-related activity or injury. See Miller v. Board of Trustees of KPERS, 21 Kan.App.2d 315, 321, 898 P.2d 1188 (1995).

Here, the Board found that the accidental injury to the left knee, which the parties agree arose out of and in the course of employment, aggravated the preexisting condition in the right knee. An award of workers compensation is proper where a work-related injury accelerates or aggravates a preexisting condition. See Claphan, 5 Kan.App.2d at 51, 611 P.2d 180.

Beech notes that the disability ratings differ from the various doctors that treated Woodward. The Board addressed this argument and noted that Dr. Schlachter and Dr. Harbin used different systems in rating impairments.

" 'Findings in a workers' compensation case which are supported by substantial competent evidence will be upheld by this court on appellate review even though there is...