Woodward v. City of Wake. Field

• Citation: 210 N.W. 322,236 Mich. 417
• Decision Date: 07 October 1926
• Docket Number: No. 87.,87.
• Parties: WOODWARD et al. v. CITY OF WAKE. FIELD et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

236 Mich. 417

210 N.W. 322

WOODWARD et al.

v.CITY OF WAKE. FIELD et al.

No. 87.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 7, 1926.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Gogebic County, in Chancery; George O. Driscoll, Judge.

Suit by William E. Woodward and others against the City of Wakefield and others to set aside contract for purchase of land. Decreet for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Contract held void and such as should be set aside.

Argued before the Entire Court.Charles M. Humphrey, of Ironwood (William G. Cloon, of Ironwood, of counsel), for appellants.

Harry K. Bay, of Ironwood, for appellee. City of Wakefield.

William S. Baird, of Ironwood, for appellees Alvin Rummel and Edythe B. Rummel.

BIRD, C. J.

Plaintiffs are residents and taxpayers of the city of Wakefield. Defendant Alvin B. Rummell was mayor of the city of Wakefield in 1924. His wife, Edythe B. Rummell, was the owner of certain real estate in the city adjacent to the community house owned by the city. She made an offer in writing to sell it to the city for $17,300. The offer was accepted by the council and voucher drawn for the down payment of $7,300.

Plaintiffs assert in their bill that the sale was void because it violated the following charter provision:

‘No officer of the city shall be interested, directly or indirectly, in the profits of any contract, job work or services, other than official services to be performed for the city. Any contract made in violation of this provision shall be void.’

Other provisions of the charter are:

‘All legislative power and authority of the city shall be vested in and be exercised by the city commission, herein referred to as the commission; which shall consist of the mayor and four city commissioners, each of whom shall vote on all questions unless disqualified by interest or excused therefrom by vote of the other four members. The commission shall be judge of the election and qualifications of its own members and shall prescribe rules for its own proceedings, not in conflict with this charter.’

‘All sessions of the commission shall be public and shall be held at the city hall. Three members shall be required to constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but the member or members present at a regular meeting may adjourn the same from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner as shall be prescribed by rules or ordinance.’

It appears that after the offer was made the commission considered it when all the members were present, but no action was taken thereon. At a later meeting, when only a bare quorum, including the mayor, was present, the offer was accepted and a voucher was ordered drawn for the down payment of $7,300. It appears that the mayor and his wife lived on the premises which were sold to the city, and they reserved the right to occupy the premises until the latter part of the year. The record shows that the premises were mortgaged for $6,000, and the mayor was the indorser of the notes secured by the mortgages. These notes were paid in part with the down payment of $7,300.

It appears the contract with the city to purchase the property was prepared by the mayor. It was not submitted to the city attorney as is usual with such papers. It further appears that the vote of the council was participated in by the mayor, and without his vote the contract could not have been made. The testimony of Mrs. Rummel shows that she understood her husband was acting for her. She testified that she left everything to him.

After hearing the parties, the trial court was impressed that the provisions of the charter had not been violated, and it appears that he was influenced largely by the fact that no fraud had been committed in the transaction, in that the premises were well worth what had been paid for them. Being of this view, he denied relief and dismissed plaintiff's bill.

If Mr. Rummel acted as agent for his wife, his duty to her and his duty as mayor of the city conflicted. In respect to the city, it was his duty to secure the premises as cheaply as possible. In respect to his wife, it was his duty to secure as much for the premises as he could. The law has sought to avoid this collision of private interests with official duty...