Woodward v. Lawson
Citation | 167 S.E.2d 660,225 Ga. 261 |
Decision Date | 24 April 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 25106,25106 |
Parties | John R. WOODWARD, III v. Ed. S. LAWSON et al. |
Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
John R. Woodward, III, Jesup, for appellant.
Gibbs & Leaphart, J. Alvin Leaphart, Jesup, for appellees.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
The appeal here is from the order and judgment of the trial court sustaining the motion of intervenors to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. It appears from the lengthy and overly prolix complaint that the defendant Lawson employed the plaintiff, a practicing attorney, to examine the title to a described fifty-acre tract of land. The plaintiff claims to have performed that service, submitted his report to the defendant and a bill in the amount of $115 for such services. The bill not having been paid, the plaintiff filed this action in which he sought to recover a money judgment against the named defendant, and also sought to impress a lien upon the described tract of land, and also sought various equitable relief with respect to the land. Four persons filed a motion for leave to intervene, praying that they be allowed to intervene as parties defendant. This motion was granted and they thereafter filed an intervention in the case in which they claimed title to the land in question, and in which intervention they also moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. No answer on behalf of the named defendant appears to have been filed.
1. The interveners having been allowed by the order of the court to file their intervention in the case and to become parties defendant under the provisions of § 24 of the Civil Practice Act (Code Ann. § 81A-124) they thereafter were, 'for all intents and purposes,' original parties, and they could file any pleading in the case that original parties could have filed just as though they had been named parties defendant in the complaint. In re Raabe, Glissman & Co., Inc. (D.C.S.D.N.Y.) 71 F.Supp. 678. The trial court, therefore, properly had before it the question presented by the interveners' 'First, Third and Fourth Defenses,' to wit: whether or not the complaint stated a claim for relief against them or with respect to the property described in the complaint to which property they claimed title.
2. The liens which an attorney at law may enforce are set forth in Code § 9-613. Paragraph (3) of that section provides that 'upon all suits for the recovery of real or personal property, and upon all judgments or decrees for the recovery of the same, attorneys at law shall have a lien on the property recovered, for their fees, superior to all liens but liens for taxes * * *' Middleton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324, 328, 138 S.E. 852, 854. Accordingly, the statute...
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...of common law, see OCGA § 15–19–14(b), and therefore the relevant Code section must be strictly construed. Woodward v. Lawson, 225 Ga. 261, 262(2), 167 S.E.2d 660 (1969); Hill v. Centennial/Ashton Properties Corp., 254 Ga.App. 176, 178(2), 561 S.E.2d 853 (2002). “Accordingly, the statute wi......
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