Woodward v. Rule

• Citation: 355 Ill. 163,188 N.E. 911
• Decision Date: 13 February 1934
• Docket Number: No. 21785.,21785.
• Parties: WOODWARD et al. v. RULE, County Judge, et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

355 Ill. 163

188 N.E. 911

WOODWARD et al.

v.RULE, County Judge, et al.

No. 21785.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1933.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1934.

Suit by R. C. Woodward and others against Henry F. Ruel, County Judge, and others. From a decree in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants appeal.

Reversed, and cause remanded, with directions.

STONE, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Circuit Court, La Salle County; Joe A. Davis, judge.

Joseph D. Carr, of Ottawa, C. B. Hughes, of Bloomington, and H. L. Richolson, of Ottawa, for appellants.

Hibbs & Pool, William Zwanzig, and Butters & Butters, all of Ottawa, for appellees.

DE YOUNG, Justice.

R. C. Woodward, Walter Wolfe, J. L. Sharp, and Emery Anderson filed a bill in the circuit court of La Salle county against the city of Ottawa, the mayor, the commissioners, the clerk, and the treasurer of that city, the judge of the county court of La Salle county, and the contractor for the improvement of portions of Joliet and other streets in the city of Ottawa. The relief sought was the vacation of an order entered by the county court approving and confirming the certificate of the completion and acceptance of the improvement, and an order restraining the return as delinquent of parcels of real property assessed therefor, and enjoining the payment of money or the issuance of bonds or vouchers for or on account of the construction of the improvement. Answers were filed, and after a hearing a decree in substantial conformity with the prayer of the bill was entered. From that decree the defendants prosecute this appeal.

At the March, 1929, term of the county court of La Salle county, the board of local improvements of the city of Ottawa filed a certificate of the completion of the particular improvement in substantial conformity with the provisions of the ordinance requiring its construction. A time was fixed for a hearing to consider and determine whether the facts stated in the certificate were true. The statutory notice was given and owners of parcels of property assessed, including the appellees, filed objections to the application. The objectors charged that inferior materials had been used, and that the improvement had not been completed in accordance with the provisions of the ordinance. The county judge of La Salle county called Hon. Henry F. Ruel, judge of the county court of Kankakee county, to preside at the hearing on the application and the objections thereto. The hearing began on January 2, 1930, and continued through six days. The questions presented were the cost of the improvement, the amount required to pay interest on the bonds, and whether the improvement had been constructed in substantial compliance with the requirements of the ordinance. Upon the conclusion of the testimony and the arguments of counsel, the court, by an order, took the case under advisement. On July 15, 1930, the court entered an order finding that it had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; that the certificate of completion and acceptance was legal and sufficient; that the improvement conformed substantially to the requirements of the ordinance, and that the cost as certified and the sum estimated to pay accruing interest on bonds were excessive to the extent of $2,600 and $3,000, respectively. The amount of the assessment in excess of $253,482.26 was abated and credited pro rata upon the respective assessments for the improvement, and the certificate, as modified, was approved and confirmed. The objectors prayed an appeal from this order, but the motion was denied.

The appellees allege in their bill that on January 7, 1930, Judge Ruel stated in open court that the improvement had not been completed in accordance with the provisions of the ordinance; that he verbally ordered the contractor to repair the pavement; that, on account of the inferior brick used in the pavement, he would provide in an order, thereafter to be entered, for the allowance of a substautial rebate to the property owners; that Judge Ruel did not enter his findings or his order in his docket, nor did the clerk of the court do so upon any record in his office, and that the only order entered was one taking the case under advisement for an indefinite period of time. It is also alleged in the bill that on July 15, 1930, the appellees, by a motion, objected to further action or any decision upon the certificate until an additional certificate should be filed by the board of local improvements; that a second motion supported by affidavits was made to make the record show the substance of the court's oral findings and verbal order on January 7, 1930; that the same affidavits were offered in support of a third motion for leave to introduce evidence of the repairs to the improvement made after the cause had been taken under advisement, and that all these motions were denied.

The grounds upon which the appellants seek a reversal of the decree are that the county court had jurisdiction when its order of July 15, 1930, was entered, and that this order is immune from attack in a collateral proceeding. To support the decree, the appellees maintain: First, that the remarks of Judge Ruel on January 7, 1930, and his action in taking the cause under advisement amounted to a final decision; second, that on July 15, 1930, the county court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order approving and confirming the certificate; and, third, that the order entered on that day was void and subject to collateral attack.

Section 84 of the Local Improvement Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 24, § 790, p. 516, Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, c. 24, par. 214, p. 364) provides that, within thirty days after the final completion and acceptance of the work, the board of local improvements shall certify the cost thereof to the court in which the assessment was confirmed, together with an amount estimated by the board to be required to pay the accruing interest on bonds or vouchers issued to anticipate collection of the assessment. If the total amount assessed for the improvement exceeds its cost, the excess, except the estimated interest, shall be abated, and the judgment reduced proportionately to the public and private property owners, and credited pro rata upon the respective assessments for the improvements under the direction of the court. It is further provided that, when the assessment shall be divided into installments, it shall be the duty of the board of local improvements to state in the certificate whether the improvement conforms substantially to the requirements of the original ordinance, and to make an application to the court to consider and determine whether the facts stated in the certificate are true. The court is required to fix a time and place for a hearing upon the application. It is provided that public notice shall be given of the time and place fixed for such hearing by posting and publication. Upon such hearing the certificate of the board of local improvements shall be prima facie evidence that the matters and things stated therein are true, but, if any part thereof is controverted by objections duly filed, the court shall hear and determine the objections in a summary manner, and shall enter an order according to the fact. The order of the court is made conclusive, and no appeal or writ of error is allowed to review or reverse it. If the court finds against the allegations of the certificate, it is directed to enter an order accordingly, and, in that event, the board of local improvements shall procure the completion of the improvement. The board may file additional or supplemental applications until the court shall be satisfied that the allegations of the certificates are true, and that the improvement has been constructed in substantial conformity with the ordinance.

The jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction on July 15, 1930, of the county court of La Salle county over the subject-matter, the particular proceeding, and the parties determines the validity or nullity of the order assailed. As applied to courts, jurisdiction is the legal authority to hear and determine controversies concerning certain subjects. Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the right to hear and determine causes of the general class to which the particular cause belongs. In its application to a certain controversy, jurisdiction is the right to hear and determine that controversy. People v. Ford, 289 Ill. 550, 124 N. E. 549;O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354, 75 N. E. 108,108 Am. St. Rep. 219,3 Ann. Cas. 966;Sumner v. Village of Milford, 214 Ill. 388, 73 N. E. 742. Local improvement proceedings did not exist at common law; they are of statutory creation. Downey v. People, 205 Ill. 230, 68 N. E. 807. The General Assembly may confer upon the county court jurisdiction to determine the questions arising in special statutory proceedings. People v. McGoorty, 270 Ill. 610, 110 N. E. 791; 4 Mason on Special Assessments (2d Ed.) p. 1962. In local improvement proceedings, jurisdiction is conferred upon county courts by section 37 of the Local Improvement Act. Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 24, § 738, p. 501, Cahill's Rev. Stat. 1933, c. 24, par. 162, p. 350. Statutory jurisdiction requires strict compliance with the statute conferring it, or the proceeding will be void. People v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 160 N. E. 76;City of Casey v. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Bailway Co., 263 Ill. 352, 105 N. E. 130; Sumner v. City of Milford, supra. The purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of the court in local improvement causes is the protection, by judicial investigation and determination, of the rights of the owners whose property is subject to the assessment, the municipality, and the holders of the improvement bonds. Case v. City of Sullivan, 222 Ill. 56, 78 N. E. 37; 4 Mason on Special Assessments (2d Ed.) p. 1968. Section 84 provides for a summary hearing upon the certificate of completion and acceptance. The order of the county court is...