Woodward v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 April 1911
• Citation: Woodward v. Southern Ry. Co., 70 S.E. 1060, 88 S.C. 453 (S.C. 1911)
• Parties: WOODWARD v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

70 S.E. 1060

88 S.C. 453

WOODWARD v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

April 24, 1911

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; R. W Memminger, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Allen Woodward against the Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

E. M Thomson, for appellant. Hunter A. Gibbes and W. Boyd Evans for respondent.

WOODS J.

On April 24, 1908, a section of the roundhouse of the Southern Railway Company at Columbia fell and injured the plaintiff Allen Woodward, one of the company's employés. Under a complaint alleging that the injury was caused by the negligence, recklessness, and willfulness of the railroad company, the plaintiff recovered judgment for $850, and the defendant appeals.

The first question to be decided is whether there was error in refusing the motion for nonsuit as to the cause of action for punitive damages, made on the ground that there was no evidence of willfulness or wantonness on the part of the defendant. There was no dispute as to the immediate cause of the accident and the injury. A spring of one of defendant's large locomotives was broken, and a hostler was backing it into the roundhouse for repairs. The broken spring caused the engine to careen a little to one side, so that it struck and broke one of the posts supporting the roof, and a section of the roof fell, striking and injuring the plaintiff. The evidence on the part of the plaintiff was to the effect that the space between a large engine moving into the roundhouse and the posts was about three inches, that the space had not been increased since 1873, when the engines were much smaller, that posts had been knocked out by engines before this accident, and that a supporting post would be broken, if struck by an engine, even if driven with care. This evidence would certainly warrant the jury in inferring that the defendant could not fail to know that its employés were subjected to great peril by reason of the lack of adequate space between the posts and moving engines, and that thus it recklessly disregarded its duty to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work. The motion for nonsuit as to the cause of action for punitive damages was properly refused.

This conclusion disposes of the first exception, for it was conceded by counsel for appellant that the evidence referred to in that exception was admissible...